FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

East Asia

FBIS-EAS-90-009
Friday
12 January 1990

Daily Report
East Asia

FBIS-EAS-90-009

CONTENTS

12 January 1990

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

NORTHEAST ASIA

Japan

Agenda of Abe-Gorbachev Talks Highlighted 1
  World Affairs To Be Discussed *[KYODO]* 1
  Territories Issue Mentioned *[KYODO]* 1
  Soviet Sources Comment *[KYODO]* 2
Kaifu Sending Letter to Bush on Imports *[Tokyo TV]* 2
Takeshita Supports Kaifu Remaining in Office *[KYODO]* 2
Discussion Over Fate of PRC Hijacker Continues 2
  Authorities Doubtful of Claims *[KYODO]* 2
  Dissidents Want Japanese Trial *[KYODO]* 3
  Government To Reject Request *[KYODO]* 3
Red Army Hijackers Not Eager To Return Home *[KYODO]* 4
Former Cabinet Secretary Announces Candidacy *[KYODO]* 4
EPA Report Names Priorities for Coming Year *[KYODO]* 4
Joint-U.S. Shipbuilding Talks Slated for 18 Jan *[KYODO]* 5
Delegation To Attend Environmental Conference *[KYODO]* 5
Suzuki, Hungary Agree on Auto Production *[KYODO]* 5
Fujitsu Develops Revolutionary Robot Eye *[KYODO]* 6

North Korea

North Premier Sends Letter to South Counterpart *[Pyongyang Radio]* 6
Fourth Sports Meeting Reaches No Agreement *[Pyongyang Radio]* 7
South Koreans in Japan List Compatriots' Tasks *[KCNA]* 8
'Team Spirit' Denounced; 'Wall' Removal Demanded *[KCNA]* 8
Daily Urges U.S. Change on Denuclearization *[KCNA]* 9
U.S. Rapped on Denial of Role in South Korea *[Pyongyang Radio]* 9
Kim Il-song Meets Visiting Italian Official *[KCNA]* 10
KCNA Describes North's Foreign Policy Goals *[KCNA]* 10
World 'Warmly Welcomed' Kim Il-song Proposals *[KCNA]* 11
SKNDF Leader Supports Kim Il-song Proposal *[KCNA]* 11
Struggle for National Reunification Reviewed *[Pyongyang Radio]* 12
General Holds News Conference Concerning 'Wall' *[KCNA]* 14
Officials Urge Pulling Down Concrete Wall *[KCNA]* 15
National Agricultural Conference Continues 16
  Kim Il-song Delivers Address *[KCNA]* 16
  Report on Day Two of Meeting *[KCNA]* 16
  Accomplishments, Plans Noted *[KCNA]* 17
Pyongyang Mass Meeting Welcomes Defector *[KCNA]* 17
Defector Interviewed on Visiting 'Concrete Wall' *[KCNA]* 17
Need To Build Socialism by Own Efforts Stressed *[KCNA]* 18
First Expeditionary Party to Antarctic Departs *[KCNA]* 18

South Korea

Specialists Claim North's Party Cadres Purged *[Seoul Radio]* 18
PPD's Kim Tae-chung Seeks To Visit Pyongyang *[YONHAP]* 18
YONHAP Reports on North's Letter Proposal 19

South To Ask North To Install 'Hot Lines' *[YONHAP]* 19
Exchange of North-South Journalists Stressed *[HANGYORE SINMUN 10 Jan]* 19
North-South Official Views Prospects, Problems *[YONHAP]* 20
Analysis on Downscaling of Team Spirit Exercise *[YONHAP]* 20
U.S. Ambassador's Remarks on Kwangju Criticized *[KYONGHYANG SINMUN 10 Jan]* 21
U.S. State Department Welcomes No's Proposal *[YONHAP]* 22
U.S.-North Korea Sixth Round Meeting Discussed *[HANGYORE SINMUN 11 Jan]* 22
North's Intent in Meeting With U.S. Analyzed *[CHOSON ILBO 10 Jan]* 23
No's Conference, Economy, Issues Analyzed *[THE KOREA HERALD 11 Jan]* 24
Opposition Parties Interpret No's Remarks *[THE KOREA HERALD 12 Jan]* 25
No, Kim Yong-sam Meet on Reshaping System *[YONHAP]* 25
Korea To Send Official to UN Group in Beijing *[YONHAP]* 26
* Prospect for RDP-PPD Merger Analyzed *[CHINSANGGWA NAEMAK No 1]* 26
* Military Reorganization Plan Revealed 31
    * New Structure Explained *[HANGUK ILBO 25 Oct]* 31
    * Impact, Prospects *[HANGYORE SINMUN 25 Oct]* 32

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Burma

Government Soldiers Die in Explosion at Pangkan *[Bangkok BANGKOK POST 12 Jan]* 35
Information Committee Holds 73d News Conference *[Rangoon Radio]* 35

Malaysia

French MP Visits, Speaks on Cambodian Problem *[BERNAMA]* 36
Cooperation With E. European Nations To Increase *[BERNAMA]* 36

Cambodia

Hun Sen Addresses Svay Rieng Meeting 7 Jan *[Phnom Penh Radio]* 36
Hun Sen Awards Promotion to Prey Veng Cadres *[Phnom Penh Radio]* 40
1989 Industrial Production Said To Top Plan *[SPK]* 40
SPK Reports 1989 'Enemy' Troop Losses 40
    Battambang, Siem Reap Provinces 40
    Banteay Meanchey Province 41
Losses Among 'Enemies' in Kompong Thom Noted *[Phnom Penh Radio]* 41
ANS Claims Control of Part of Kompong Thom *[BBC]* 41
Role of UN Seat in Peace Process Downplayed *[Radio VOK]* 41
Shelling of Battambang Defense Posts Reported *[Radio VONADK]* 42
Results of Route 56 Attacks 6-8 Jan Reported *[Radio VONADK]* 42
Gold Said Stolen From Party Political Bureau *[Radio VODK]* 42
Northwest Battambang Defense Line Said Attacked *[Radio VODK]* 42

Indonesia

Daily Views Regional Impact of Noriega Surrender *[MERDEKA 5 Jan]* 43
Islamic Group Member Jailed for 7 Years *[THE JAKARTA POST 5 Jan]* 44

Laos

SRV 'Reactionaries' Found Guilty of Espionage *[Vientiane Radio]* 44
    U.S. Headquarters Alleged *[KPL]* 44
LFNC Sends National Day Greetings to Cambodia *[Vientiane Radio]* 44

Philippines

Ileto Dismisses Report of Coup Set for 25 Jan *[Manila Radio]* 45
Defense Issues No Statement on Coup Participants *[Manila Radio]* 45
Two Generals Want Dismissal of Rebellion Charges *[Manila Radio]* 45

Armed Forces Personnel Dropped From Roster 46
    Colonel Noble on List *[Manila Radio]* 46
    Total of 1,456 Deleted *[MANILA BULLETIN 11 Jan]* 46
De Villa Puts Camp Aguinaldo on Blue Alert *[Quezon City Radio]* 46
De Villa on Military Aid in Enrile Prosecution *[Manila Radio]* 47
De Villa Warns Against Protecting Rebels *[Manila Radio]* 47
Ramos, De Villa on Rebel Soldiers' Hit List *[Baguio City Radio]* 47
Ramos Rejects Peace Talks With Communist Rebels *[Quezon City Radio]* 47
Report on CPP Memorandum on Political Trends 47
    Part One *[THE MANILA TIMES 4 Jan]* 47
    Part Two *[THE MANILA TIMES 5 Jan]* 49
    Part Three *[THE MANILA TIMES 6 Jan]* 52
    Part Four *[THE MANILA TIMES 7 Jan]* 54
Pampanga Mayors Declare War Against Rebels *[PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE 11 Jan]* 56
Contribution From U.S. Bases Said 'Exaggerated' *[THE MANILA CHRONICLE 12 Jan]* 56
Government Launches Foreign 'Propaganda' Campaign *[MALAYA 8 Jan]* 57
Aquino Expresses Confidence in Economy's Growth *[Manila Radio]* 58
Aquino To Go to Samar 25 Jan To Launch Project *[Quezon City Radio-TV]* 58
Cebu Governor Asks for More Security on Seas *[Quezon City Radio]* 58
Campaigners Warned Against Carrying Firearms *[Quezon City Radio]* 59
Manila Police To Form Aerial Patrol Unit *[MANILA BULLETIN 10 Jan]* 59
Budget Deficit Rose to P17.2 Billion in 1989 *[PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE 10 Jan]* 59
Jan-Oct 1989 Trade Deficit at $2.2 Billion *[PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER 7 Jan]* 60
Agreement Reached on Rescheduling Maturing Debt *[BUSINESS WORLD 10 Jan]* 60
Projections on Regional Growth Published *[BUSINESS STAR 8 Jan]* 60
Memorandum for Livestock Sector Assistance Signed *[BUSINESS STAR 11 Jan]* 62

Thailand

Williamsburg Conference Held in Chiang Mai 62
    Alatas on Cambodian Peace Moves *[THE NATION 12 Jan]* 62
    Alatas on Khmer Participation *[Jakarta Radio]* 63
    Chatchai Gives Opening Address *[BANGKOK POST 12 Jan]* 63
Praman Holds News Briefing on Ministerial Swap *[BANGKOK POST 12 Jan]* 64
Chawalit Denies Involvement in Cabinet Changes *[BANGKOK POST 12 Jan]* 65

Vietnam

Press Law Adopted by Eighth National Assembly 65
    Installment One *[Hanoi Radio]* 65
    Conclusion of Press Law *[Hanoi Radio]* 67
Mountain Region Resolution Issued 27 Nov 69
    First Installment *[Hanoi Radio]* 69
    First Part of Second Installment *[Hanoi Radio]* 70
    Part Two of Installment Two, Three *[Hanoi Radio]* 71
Agriculture, Food Industry Minister Interviewed *[Hanoi Radio]* 73

AUSTRALASIA

Papua New Guinea

Government Extends Bougainville Emergency *[Melbourne International]* 76

Vanuatu

Vanuatu Rejects Diplomatic Ties With Taiwan *[Melbourne International]* 76

Japan

Agenda of Abe-Gorbachev Talks Highlighted

World Affairs To Be Discussed

OW1101132590 Tokyo KYODO in English 1303 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 11 KYODO—Japan's former Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe will leave for Moscow on Saturday for talks with Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev on bilateral relations and world affairs. Abe will be the first senior representative from a Western bloc nation to talk with Gorbachev after the Soviet leader's cancellation of a meeting with Britain's Labor Party chief Neil Kinnock earlier this month due to "busy domestic schedules." Gorbachev went to Soviet Lithuania on Thursday to meet with members of the Lithuanian Communist Party which has announced it wants to break with the Kremlin.

Abe, former secretary general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], will lead a delegation composed of seven other LDP lawmakers, some of whom have served as cabinet members, as well as senior officials from the Ministries of International Trade and Industry, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. The Abe-Gorbachev meeting is scheduled for next Monday.

Abe's political standing has been strained since 1988 by revelations in the stocks-for-favor bribery scandal involving Japan's information conglomerate Recruit Co., from which Abe had received political donations. An illness and consequent surgery last year also meant it was impossible for him to make public appearances. But LDP sources say that the tour and the growing importance given to ties with the Soviet Union in Japan's diplomatic agenda will result in Abe, who says he has already recovered from illness, again moving to the political center stage.

Still a strong contender for the Japanese prime ministership and leading the second biggest intra-LDP faction after former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's faction, Abe was reported as telling his aides he will "arrange the circumstances" for Gorbachev's scheduled visit to Tokyo in 1991. Sources close to Abe said he intends to reconfirm Gorbachev's proposed visit and, if possible, hopes to clarify the date of the visit.

Abe met with Gorbachev in May 1986 in Moscow when he was Japan's foreign minister. He was quoted as saying he would not hurry any solution to the biggest obstacle to bilateral ties, the return to Japan of four islands off Hokkaido held by the Soviets after World War II. Abe also was quoted as telling aides that what is more significant now is high-level bilateral dialogue.

Abe's aides said he is to discuss not only bilateral ties but also topics covering Asian and world affairs amid what the Foreign Ministry officials call "the third wave" in the postwar Japan-Soviet relationship. Officials described the "first wave" as being the 1956 Japan-Soviet joint communique which resumed postwar bilateral ties and the "second wave" being the 1973 summit meeting between then Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Kremlin chief Leonid Brezhnev.

Soviet Foreign Minster Eduard Shevardnadze is sheduled to visit Tokyo in March for regular bilateral foreign ministers' talks.

Territories Issue Mentioned

OW1201115990 Tokyo KYODO in English 1109 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 12 KYODO—Former Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe said Friday he hopes his upcoming meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev will help bring an end to the cold war in Asia. On bilateral relations, Abe said in an interview that Japan should move ahead with economic relations and other overall ties without first resolving a territorial dispute dating back to World War II.

"So far the transition from cold war to dialogue has taken place in Europe only," said the leading contender for premiership after Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. "Asia must be included so that we can have a change in global structure," Abe said on the eve of a January 13-16 trip to Moscow as a representative of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party [LDP].

Abe noted to a group of reporters that both Japan and the Soviet Union have officially expressed support for abolishing nuclear weapons. "Disarmament and arms control have made progress in Europe, but not yet in Asia. I hope to improve the environment for reducing tensions," he said.

Abe said that during Monday's meeting he hopes to probe the roles of both Japan and the Soviet Union in ending tensions on the Korean peninsula and bringing peace to Kampuchea. Gorbachev may mention Sino-Soviet relations during the talks, he said.

On Japan-Soviet relations Abe called for accelerated improvement. "The position that relations cannot be improved without first moving forward on the territorial issue is not necessarily a good thing from the perspective of today's world order, or for Japan," Abe said. The Soviet Union and Japan share the view that the Asia-Pacific area will be the most economically dynamic region in the 21st century, Abe said.

He said perestroyka, or restructuring, is in the interest of Asia as well as the rest of the world, and that Japan should assist. Japan should more actively promote a "balanced expansion" of economic, technical and cultural relations, as well as exchange of personnel, Abe said. But he said that for Japan the postwar era will not come to an end without resolving the issue of the four northern islands occupied by the Soviet Union and the "political vacuum" with North Korea.

Abe will be the first leader from a Western bloc nation to meet with Gorbachev since the Soviet leader cancelled a meeting earlier this month with Britain's Labor Party chief Neil Kinnock due to a busy domestic schedule. The trip, timed for shortly before general elections expected in mid-February, also represents Abe's return from the periphery of politics after being implicated in the Recruit stock scandal in 1988-89, and suffering from an illness last year. Abe last met Gorbachev in 1986 while he was serving as foreign minister.

The LDP and the Soviet Communist Party agreed to boost high-level contacts in December 1988 when Abe, then LDP secretary general, met in Tokyo with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Soviet Sources Comment

OW1201122490 Tokyo KYODO in English 1033 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 12 KYODO—Former Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe's upcoming visit to Moscow will greatly help develop political dialogue between Japan and the Soviet Union, Soviet diplomatic sources said on Friday. The sources, describing Abe's January 13-16 trip a "very significant event," said it will mean the creation of another channel of contacts between the two countries.

Abe, former secretary general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), is scheduled to leave for Moscow on Saturday as head of a high-powered LDP delegation—the first LDP mission ever to be invited by the Soviet Communist Party to visit Moscow. Abe will meet President Mikhail Gorbachev on Monday.

The Soviet sources, speaking to reporters in a regular press briefing, said the Soviet Communist Party will accept if Abe offers an invitation for the party to send a similar mission to Japan. The Soviet Union expects Abe will first bring up Japan's territorial claim to four Soviet-held islands off Hokkaido during a meeting with Gorbachev, the sources said.

Abe and Gorbachev will cover a wide variety of problems, including a conclusion of a Japan-Soviet peace treaty, bilateral economic cooperation and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region, they said. The sources said Gorbachev may not specify the date of his visit to Japan due to various circumstances.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, in a meeting with his Japanese counterpart Taro Nakayama in New York last September, said that Gorbachev will visit Japan in 1991. But the date of the visit has not been specified.

Kaifu Sending Letter to Bush on Imports

OW1101053890 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1000 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Prime Minister Kaifu has decided to send a personal letter to President Bush, promising further efforts to increase Japan's imports. This letter will be delivered to the President by International Trade and Industry Minister Matsunaga, who is now visiting the United States. In his letter, the prime minister says he plans to fulfill his promise made at the Japan - U.S. meeting held last September to introduce a tax system for the promotion of goods imports and to abolish tariffs on 1,000 items, mainly industrial goods.

Takeshita Supports Kaifu Remaining in Office

OW0901134390 Tokyo KYODO in English 1202 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 9 KYODO—Former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita on Tuesday expressed support for Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu to stay on in office if the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wins a simple majority in the House of Representatives election expected in February. Takeshita, who heads the largest faction in the LDP, said Kaifu will be renamed as prime minister if the LDP secures 257 seats or more in the 512-seat lower house of in the upcoming election.

Kaifu, who came to office on August 9, won a two-year term as president of the LDP at the party congress held on October 31. Political sources say the LDP may dump Kaifu if the party loses the upcoming general election.

In a lecture at a Tokyo hotel, the former prime minister also predicted that the LDP will score more than 257 seats in the election. On January 4, Kaifu said at a press conference that he will aim at gaining a simple majority in the election, including conservative independents who will join the LDP after getting elected to the lower chamber.

The LDP currently holds 294 seats in the powerful lower house, followed by 84 for the Japan Socialist Party, 55 for Komeito, 28 for the Democratic Socialist Party and 27 for the Japan Communist Party. On the possible date for the election, Takeshita said it will be proclaimed on February 3 and the voting day will be set for February 18.

Discussion Over Fate of PRC Hijacker Continues

Authorities Doubtful of Claims

OW1101060290 Tokyo KYODO in English 0519 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 11 KYODO—Japanese authorities are doubtful about the claim by a Chinese hijacker that he fled China to escape political persecution, government spokeswoman Mayumi Moriyama said Thursday. "According to information we have received from

China, Zhang Zhenhai was arrested for embezzlement. We are doubtful about his claim," Chief Cabinet Secretary Moriyama said.

Lawyers from the Fukuoka Prefecture Bar Association who met with Zhang earlier in the week reported that Zhang told them his arrest in October on charges of embezzlement was connected with his participation in pro-democracy demonstrations last June in Beijing's Tiananmen Square.

"Even if his claim is true, hijacking is still a serious crime against humanity," Moriyama told a regularly scheduled news conference. She said Japan still plans to send Zhang back to China.

Zhang was transferred Thursday morning from Fukuoka Detention House to Tokyo for a court hearing to determine whether Japan would accept China's request for his extradition, Justice Ministry sources said. Zhang told the Japanese lawyers that he sought political asylum because he was "sick of political persecution" in China.

Zhang, 36, manager of a textile machinery factory in Hubei Province, said the Chinese authorities arrested him to interrogate him as a "political criminal." Japanese law stipulates that a person wanted for politically motivated actions cannot be handed over to another country. Due to lack of a bilateral agreement between Japan and China on reciprocal extradition of hijackers, Japan will base its judicial procedures on an international law on extradition to which both nations are signatories. According to this law, the Tokyo High Prosecutors Office must request the Tokyo High Court to hand down a decision on extradition within two months after the suspect is detained.

The court in turn must give its ruling within two months after it receives the request. If it acknowledges the legitimacy of the extradition request, the justice minister will order Tokyo prosecutors to send the suspect back, in this case, to China. Kazuyo Iwaki, one of the lawyers fighting to prevent Zhang's extradition, expressed grave concern over not being notified in advance of Zhang's transfer to Tokyo, and said a member of the Fukuoka Bar Association will see Zhang in Tokyo on Friday morning and consult with lawyers of the Japan Bar Association.

Zhang told the lawyers that an anonymous person claiming to represent the Japanese Government had visited him recently and complained that he talked with the lawyers while refusing to do so with government officials, Iwaki said. The lawyers have concluded after several sessions with Zhang that he faces the possibility of execution if returned to China, Iwaki said. A Chinese Embassy official in Tokyo said in December that there was a possibility that Zhang, if convicted, could be condemned to death.

Zhang is suspected of hijacking a New York-bound Air China passenger liner on its way from Beijing on December 16 last year with 208 persons aboard, including his wife and son, who were sent back to China along with the plane the next day.

Zhang suffered a broken pelvis when an attendant pushed him out of the aircraft onto the concrete below at Fukuoka airport where the plane had landed. He underwent an operation in Fukuoka before being put in the detention house on December 31.

Dissidents Want Japanese Trial

OW1101130790 Tokyo KYODO in English 1246 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 11 KYODO—A Chinese dissidents group in Japan said Thursday it will deliver a petition to the Japanese Government and the Supreme Court on Friday urging that a suspected Chinese hijacker be tried in a Japanese court. The Japan branch of the Federation for Democracy in China said in the petition that the group approves the hijacking of a Chinese airliner allegedly carried out by Zhang Zhenhai, regarding it as a bid to obtain political asylum. It demanded that Zhang, the 36-year-old manager of a textile factory, be tried in Japan from the viewpoint of humanitarianism. The Paris-based federation was formed by exiles who fled China following the military crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators last June. The Japan branch was established in December.

Zhang was transferred Thursday from Fukuoka Detention House to Tokyo for a court hearing on whether he should be extradited to China. He was detained after an Air China plane bound from Beijing to New York landed at Fukuoka on December 16.

Government To Reject Request

OW1201102290 Tokyo KYODO in English 0826 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 12 KYODO—Japanese Justice Minister Masao Goto said Friday the government will not change its initial decision to send alleged Chinese hijacker Zhang Zenhai back to China even if he asked for political asylum. Goto told reporters that he is treating the case as a criminal one, involving the violation of international law, rather than a political offense. The justice minister added that sending Zhang's wife and their son back to China was a correct decision.

Zhang has repeatedly sought political asylum, rather than extradition, Kazuyo Iwaki, a member of the Fukuoka Bar Association, said Friday.

Iwaki and two other lawyers visited Zhang after he was transferred from Fukuoka Detention House to Tokyo for a court hearing on Thursday. Zhang, 36, seemed in good condition and was willing to be interviewed, Iwaki said. Zhang is suspected of hijacking a Chinese aircraft on December 16 last year, with his wife and a son.

A Chinese Embassy official said in December in Tokyo that Zhang may be sentenced to death if convicted.

Red Army Hijackers Not Eager To Return Home

OW0901214490 Tokyo KYODO in English 1516 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Beijing, Jan. 9 (KYODO)—Japanese Red Army radical group members wanted for hijacking a plane to North Korea some two decades ago denied any desire to return home if they face certain arrest, the returning leader of a support group said Tuesday. Yukio Yamanaka, head of a support group known for its aid to imprisoned student demonstrators, said he met four of the seven members living in Pyongyang during his visit which began January 2. Group leader Takamaro Tamiya said the members had no interest in returning home to be arrested, but added he wanted to negotiate with the Japanese Government.

Nine members of the Red Army hijacked a Japan Air Lines flight with 131 passengers aboard in March 1970 and directed it to North Korea. One hijacker succumbed to illness while in Pyongyang and police captured a second suspect in 1988 after he attempted to sneak into Japan. Tamiya denied any pressure from North Korean authorities to return home, Yamanaka said. North Korean officials were said to have hinted at possible repatriation during a visit with the seven hijack suspects in 1988.

Tamiya and the three other members who met him looked healthy, he said, dispelling previous rumors some were seriously ill. But remaining members Yoshimi Tanaka, Takahiro Konishi and Takeshi Okamoto failed to appear. Tamiya said only that they "had essential business to attend to," but rumors have been circulating that the three might have already left the country.

Former Cabinet Secretary Announces Candidacy

OW1101110790 Tokyo KYODO in English 0944 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Ise, Mie Pref., Jan. 11 KYODO—Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Takao Fujinami, charged with taking bribes from the information conglomerate Recruit Co., announced on Thursday that he will run in the next general election for the House of Representatives widely expected to be held in February. Fujinami, the former chief of staff for former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, told a news conference he would work hard for Japan and his home town with the "deep understanding" of his supporters.

"I'm convinced of my innocence." "I want to prove how unjust the prosecutors' indictment against me was," he said. Fujinami was indicted last May for allegedly accepting bribes from Recruit from 1985 to 1986 in return for using his influence on behalf of the conglomerate.

Prosecutors charged Fujinami received 20 million yen from Recruit and purchased 10,000 unlisted shares of Recruit Cosmos Co., a real estate subsidiary of Recruit, through his secretary, making substantial profits through the resale of the stock after they went public. Fujinami denied the charges on the opening day of the trial of the Recruit influence-peddling scandal, which rocked Japan's political world last year.

A House of Representatives member from Mie Prefecture, he quit the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) after his indictment but still maintains his seat in the lower house as a conservative independent. Former Vice Education Minister Kunio Takaishi, who is charged with accepting bribes from Recruit, has also announced he will run for the next general election from Fukuoka Prefecture.

EPA Report Names Priorities for Coming Year

OW0901211590 Tokyo KYODO in English 0938 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 9 KYODO—Japan's economic priorities for 1990 are structural adjustment, the promotion of more equitable policies and its overall contribution to the world economy, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) said Tuesday. The agency identified the nation's priorities in a report on the state of the economy in 1989 and assessed the tasks for the coming year.

The report states that the major problems to overcome in achieving structural adjustment of the domestic economy are price differentials between the domestic and overseas markets, land and housing policies and a reduction in working hours. The report says the government should ease regulations covering these problem areas as much as possible.

"Structural adjustment aims at extracting maximum advantage from the market mechanisms, and policies encouraging competition should be further promoted," the report says. The report states that a considerable number of problem areas await reform in the taxation system. It says that income and land taxes should be made subject to review in addition to the on-going review of the consumption tax.

The report says Japanese consumers would be more enthusiastic about economic restructuring if they were made aware of the enormous advantages they would reap in the process. "Consumers themselves should have a greater voice in the marketplace," the report says.

Noting that many Japanese do not really feel they are benefiting directly from their nation's having achieved the world's highest gross national product, the report says there is still a need for more equitable economic policies. It urges a review of policies with a fairer distribution of national wealth as the main aim. The report also notes the increasing number of opportunities Japan now has for contributing to the world economy. It cites social restructuring in East European countries and environmental preservation as two examples of areas where Japan can contribute.

Summarizing the state of the Japanese economy in 1989, the EPA report says it was characterized by continued "stable growth, led by strong domestic demand with increasing capital and infrastructure investment."

The report notes that Japan's economy is experiencing a period of expansion which began in November 1986, the third longest such period since the Pacific war. The nation's economic growth rate showed a 9.6 percent increase in the January-March 1989 quarter from the previous three months, but plunged to minus 3.1 percent in the April-June quarter due to the introduction of the consumption tax in April. However, it recovered to 12.2 percent in the July-September quarter and growth appeared to continue through the rest of the year, the agency said.

With only 100 job-seekers to every 132 vacancies in the July-September quarter, wholesale and consumer prices remained stable except for a rise just after the introduction of the consumption tax. Individuals and the public sector enjoyed a fund surplus, while businesses experienced a shortage due to their enthusiasm for investment. This effectively limited the capital available to the nation, the report said.

Japan's trade surplus shrank sharply in 1989, but the report notes that the pace of shrinkage has begun to slow. But the report says the international trade imbalance is still large and requires continued close monitoring. Given the strength of domestic demand and the labor shortage, the report warns that these factors could trigger inflation. It says that despite an apparent increase in the number of job seekers, small and medium-sized companies suffered labor shortages. This was caused by the widening gap in working conditions between large and small companies, as well as the fact that a significant number of job-seekers are women and older persons. The report therefore recommends a review aimed at an improvement in working conditions in smaller companies.

Overall, the report says an investment boom is fueling the current healthy economy. While this is not a problem at the moment, it cautions that the boom is ultimately dependent on decision made at the company-owner level and that this aspect will require attention since the trend could easily change.

Joint-U.S. Shipbuilding Talks Slated for 18 Jan

OW1001133690 Tokyo KYODO in English 1256 GMT 10 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 10 KYODO—Japan and the United States will hold two-day talks on shipbuilding in Tokyo from January 18-19, government officials said Wednesday. The officials said U.S. charges that the Japanese Government subsidizes the shipbuilding industry and thus causes unfair trade practices will be a focus of the discussions.

The negotiations were proposed by the United States under Super Section 301 of the 1988 U.S. Omnibus Trade Act which authorized the U.S. President to take retaliatory action against nations proven to have unfair trade practices, they said. Washington later dropped its allegations last July on the condition that the question concerning subsidies would be solved in bilateral negotiations. The issue has been reviewed in multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Each member nation is required to submit a report on the issue in its own country by January 19.

Delegation To Attend Environmental Conference

OW1101110090 Tokyo KYODO in English 0714 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 11 KYODO—Japan will send representatives to a two-week 24-nation environmental conference in Poland and Hungary, Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI] sources said Thursday. The conference, seeking to provide support and answers to the two East European nations' growing pollution problems, opens in Warsaw Sunday with delegates coming from the United States, Canada, the European community and Japan. The meeting will move to Hungary for the second week.

MITI sources suggested that the conference is not directly related to the recent democratic developments sweeping Eastern Europe, but said it would be the first time Japanese government-level support together with that of other developed nations would be offered to both countries. It remains unclear, however, whether the assistance will be financial or technical in nature, the sources said, but the role of each participant and environmental priorities will likely be established. Poland, which is a prominent coal producing nation, is plagued by air pollution, especially in the southern regions where industries consume large amounts of coal-produced energy.

The environment has worsened in Polish cities and water supplies have been contaminated with waste water and industrial pollutants. Air pollution is particularly bad in the industrial northern regions of Hungary and Budapest, where 40 percent of the nation's population lives. Hungarian environmental officials will be seeking solutions to the problems brought about by the area's concentration of car exhaust fumes, electric power plants, iron and steel works, as well as emmissions from chemical factories.

Suzuki, Hungary Agree on Auto Production

OW0901212990 Tokyo KYODO in English 1256 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 9 KYODO—Suzuki Motor Co. Tuesday announced an agreement with Hungary on

Tuesday to assemble subcompact cars in the East European nation, a move that is timed with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's visit there next week. Suzuki President Osamu Suzuki told reporters Tuesday afternoon that he will visit Hungary to sign documents for the basic accord. The signing may take place on Friday at the earliest, he said. The signing of a formal agreement is expected to come within six months after ironing out the details of the project, Suzuki said.

The long-awaited agreement calls for a 20-billion-yen project to produce a 1,000 to 1,300-C.C. model based on Suzuki's Cultus, marking the biggest investment in Eastern Europe involving a Japanese firm, Suzuki said in a statement. The Cultus is exported under the Swift brand name.

Production is slated to begin in 1992 at 15,000 units a year, with 50,000 planned for the third year and 100,000 in the following years, it said. The statement said production will be undertaken by a joint company involving Suzuki, giant Japanese trading house C. Itoh and Co., Hungarian holdings company Autokonszern Rt., and the International Finance Corp., a World Bank affiliate that funds private projects. Capitalized at 10 billion yen, the joint concern will be owned 50 percent by Autokonszern, 30 percent by Suzuki and 10 percent each by C. Itoh and the IFC. A plant will be built in the city of Esztergom, 40 kilometers north of Budapest, Hungary's capital. Part of the 1 billion dollars Japan has pledged to provide Poland and Hungary in low-interest financing by the Export-Import Bank of Japan is expected to be used for the project.

In announcing the agreement, Suzuki President Osamu Suzuki said local procurement of parts and other components will be 50 percent in the first year, with the final target set at more than 70 percent. Suzuki disclosed that the main components such as engines will be supplied from Japan for the time being.

"It's important to raise local content, but it's difficult to set specific targets on a year-to-year basis. We've reached accord to deal with it in a flexible manner," he said. Suzuki also noted that his company and its Hungarian partner did not set any export targets, but said they agreed to balance the volume of imported parts and that of exports in the long run.

Seeking ways of earning hard currencies, Hungary has asked Suzuki to work out a specific export plan regarding the project. Suzuki indicated his confidence in the plan and said he expects Japanese Government support for it. He added, however, that such support was not tied to Kaifu's upcoming visit to Hungary. Kaifu is slated to visit Hungary on Jan. 15 as part of his 11-day European tour.

The business deal came after years of negotiations between Suzuki and Hungary which began in 1985. The talks were suspended for some time, however, due to internal problems in Hungary. The Japanese Government welcomed the agreement as a way to promote economic relations between the two countries.

"We welcome the accord as it should help promote industrial ties between Japan and Hungary," said an official at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

The Japanese Government has pledged support for economic reforms in Eastern Europe, including Hungary, and Kaifu is expected to announce Japan's plan to expand financial support to Hungary and Poland during his European visit.

Fujitsu Develops Revolutionary Robot Eye

OW1001014590 Tokyo KYODO in English 0949 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 9 KYODO—Fujitsu Ltd. said Tuesday it has developed the first video sensor eye for use with unmanned artificial intelligent robots that can distinquish objects as clearly as the human eye. A Fujitsu official said the "intelligent robot eye detecting high speed motion device" would be ideal for plants that require automatically-controlled robots for various types of manufacturing. The robot eye operates at 30 frames per second and relays the images to a central processing unit (CPU) which determines the movements of the robot. Human eyes can capture 60 images per second, the company official said.

The letter size CPU can compute information received from the video camera as fast as the human mind. It can direct the robot to initiate a single action, and distinguish such colors as red, blue and yellow. This is possible because the CPU utilizes the "fuzzy" logic theory which allows it to make a logical deduction from inferences drawn from various types of data.

Fujitsu has already shipped samples of the robot eye to automobile and farm machinery producers for testing. The company hopes to commercialize the product within the year.

North Korea

North Premier Sends Letter to South Counterpart

SK1201090990 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0800 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Telephone message sent to Kang Yong-hun, South Korean prime minister, by Yon Hyong-muk, premier of the DPRK]

[Text] Dear Kang Yong-Hun, ROK prime minister,

On 9 January, I sent to you a telephone message notifying you that we will send two liaison officials to Seoul to directly deliver to your side's negotiations team the letter adopted in the joint meeting of the representatives of the DPRK Government and political parties.

In view of the importance of our new save-the-nation proposal and in view of the entire fellow countrymen's desire to pull down the wall of national division and realize free visits and full-scale opening between the North and the South, it was most reasonable that we tried to deliver letters to your side's authorities and heads of each political party by sending liaison officials to Seoul.

However, we cannot understand at all the fact that your side refused our sincere proposal without reasonable reason under the pretext of past rules. It is a regrettable matter.

Your side, under the pretext of rules followed until now, is trying to confine sending and receiving letters between the North and the South to a small district in Panmunjom. This cannot but be viewed as old-fashioned thinking from the confrontation period.

In fact, at the time when the questions of free visits between the North and the South and full-scale opening are on schedule, if liaison officials are not allowed to directly deliver letters to parties of negotiations, the confrontation situation between the North and the South will never be settled at all. Furthermore, there will be no development in the North-South relations.

This time, your side refused our proposal by raising unreasonable pretexts. This shows that your side's talk about visits and opening is empty words and that your side, in fact, is opposed to them.

Since your side is opposed to our liaison officials' going to Seoul, I will be forced to deliver these letters in Panmunjom. To this end, I will send two liaison officials to the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 1000 on 13 January.

Fourth Sports Meeting Reaches No Agreement

SK1101085290 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1500 GMT 10 Jan 90

[Text] The fourth meeting of working-level delegates of the North-South sports talks to discuss the issue of the formation of a North-South single team for the 11th Asian Games was held behind closed doors on 10 January at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Panmunjom.

When the meeting was over, Chang Ung, our side's delegate, met with reporters and explained how the contact took place that day. He said that the purpose and mission of this meeting was to conclude the drafting of the 10 points concerning the formation of the single team, which both sides had agreed on; to complete the drafting of detailed rules on the formation and operation of the Joint Committee and the Joint Secretariat for the single team; and to discuss the issue of how to guarantee the implementation of the agreement. In connection with this, our side said:

First, our position on the drafting of the items on the formation of the single team is to decide on the drafting of the 10 points one after another and to present at the talks a letter of agreement on which the consensus of views has been reached.

Second, our position on the issue of how to sincerely guarantee the implementation of the agreement is this: Since the South said in the previous full-dress talks that it would advance its proposal, we would like this to happen. As for the issue of detailed rules on the formation and operation of the Joint Committee and the Joint Secretariat for the single team, our side said that because we examined their proposal and agreed on it in the previous sixth full-dress talks, we recognized that discussions on this issue were over.

However, the South, ignoring the mutual agreement, presented new complicated problems that have nothing to do with the mission of the contact, even problems that must be discussed on a working level at the Joint Committee, which will be established in the future, thus creating an artificial obstacle to the contact and wasting time. Under the pretext of promoting the so-called atmosphere, the South advanced a new proposal that prior to the establishment of the Joint Committee, goodwill matches be held and that each side inspect each other's sports facilities. It also advanced a preposterous and very unreasonable proposal that a letter be sent to the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee and the Asian Olympic Council to inform them that because the agreement on the formation of the single team is not implemented and because, as a result, it is impossible for a the single team to participate in the games, the North and South will separately participate in the games. Moreover, the South proposed that competitions for selecting athletes be held almost 2 months earlier than had been agreed on by the two sides. In addition, even though the two sides had agreed that the host side will pay for expenses for travel to the North or the South and will provide means of transportation, the South side proposed that each side use its own means of transportation.

In connection with this, our side said that the fact that at a time when discussions on the formation of the single team have reached their final stage, the South presented the working-level delegates with issues that must be handled by the Joint Secretariat or that have nothing to do with the formation of the single team represents an artificial obstacle to our contact and presents complicating issues. Our side stressed that when seeing the South's position and attitude, we cannot but doubt whether it has any intention to organize the single team or not. Our side said that the 10 points must be well drafted by the two sides' working-level delegates in accordance with their mission and function, as assigned by the full-dress talks. We also insisted that the proposal to hold goodwill matches or inspect each other's sports facilities before the Joint Committee is established be included in detailed rules of the letter of agreement is not in compliance with the mission and function of the two sides' working-level delegates. In connection with the issue of notifying the relevant authorities that the two sides will separately participate in the Asian Games in case the agreements on the formation of the single team are not implemented, our side strongly criticized such an extremely impure attitude, because this means that the South thought from the start that the single team would not be formed.

Our side went on to say that the two sides must respect their previous agreements and sincerely deal with them, stressing that the South must no longer commit the act of reversing agreed points by even raising issues that it has agreed to discuss in the Joint Committee or the Joint Secretariat. Our side said that even though the South is talking about a will to form the single team, when seeing it hinder progress in the talks with preposterous demands, we don not think that it has the will to form the single team. After saying so, our side repeatedly called on the South to start by drafting the 10 points on the formation of the single team. However, while presenting its unreasonable demands that day, the South resorted to groundless insistence. In an effort to solve, at all costs, the issue of the formation of the single team, thus giving joy to all the fellow countrymen and sports men of the North and South, our side agreed on the preamble of the letter of agreement, the guarantee note of the authorities, and the effective date of the agreement.

In concluding the meeting, our side advised the South to assume a sincere attitude in forming the single team. We proposed 11 January as the fifth and next contact for working-level delegates, but the South insisted on 15 January to the end until we agreed.

South Koreans in Japan List Compatriots' Tasks

SK1201052990 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0359 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—Kwak Tong-ui, chairman of the Federation of South Koreans in Japan for Democracy and Unification ("Hantongnyon"), a "Mindan [Korean Resident's Association in Japan]"-lining Koreans' organisation, in a statement to the press on the New Year said that the tasks facing the compatriots overseas this year are firstly to make all efforts to achieve the reunification of the homeland, the cherished desire of the nation, in 1995 marking the 50th anniversary of the August 15 liberation, according to a report of MINJOK SIBO quoted by the KNS [Korean News Service] in Tokyo.

If the year 1995 is to be glorified with national reunification, the reunification movement must be decisively strengthened so as to strongly oppose the "two Koreas" plot such as "separate entry" into the United Nations and "cross recognition" and promote non-governmental exchange between the North and the South and consolidate great national unity, he said. He called for all-out efforts to realize a nationwide meeting for peace and national reunification this year.

The second task facing the compatriots overseas this year, he said, is to further strengthen and develop the anti-dictatorship struggle for democracy. A powerful struggle should be waged to remove the "security-oriented rule", scrap the "National Security Law" and punish the chief culprits of the Kwangju massacre and "irregularities of the Fifth Republic" and this struggle should be developed into the liquidation of the "Sixth Republic," he stressed.

The third task, he said, is to wage an active struggle to ease the tensions and build a peace system on the Korean peninsula. He went on: We should strongly demand that the United States sign a peace agreement with the North and withdraw its nuclear weapons and forces and should struggle for their realisation. We should lift up louder voices demanding the adoption of a non-aggression declaration between the North and the South and a drastic cutback of arms in the two parts.

He said the fourth task is to strengthen international solidarity to win greater international support for independence, democracy and reunification, and the fifth task is to decisively strengthen the subjective forces.

'Team Spirit' Denounced; 'Wall' Removal Demanded

SK1201045290 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0417 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique on January 10 made public the plan of the "Team Spirit 90" joint military exercises, a preliminary war and a test nuclear war to invade the northern half of Korea, according to a report.

Making public this criminal plan in Washington and in Seoul simultaneously, they declared that forces more than 180,000 strong and aircraft carrier and other equipment will be mobilised in the manoeuvres and the reinforcing forces from the U.S. mainland will begin their transfer from the end of this month.

This criminal act of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges has touched off a wave of national resentment among the entire Korean people.

With a view to paving the way of peaceful reunification, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put forward a new save-the-nation proposal entering this year, the keynote of which is to remove the concrete wall, a symbol of national division and of North-South confrontation, in the area South of the military demarcation line and ensure free travel and a full-scale open door.

The U.S. imperialists and their stooges announced the "Team Spirit 90" plan at last, throwing a wet blanket over the ardent desire of our people for an early reunification of the country and the support of the world peaceloving people to it.

The announcement of the provocative plan of war exercises proves that they do not want peace on the Korean peninsula and its peaceful reunification at all but seek northward invasion only.

In particular, it clearly shows once again to the world that the "peace" and "detente" cried for by the U.S. imperialists are big lies.

Daily Urges U.S. Change on Denuclearization

SK1201064290 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0509 GMT 12 Jan 90

["The United States Must Discard Wrong Stand"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang January 12 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today hits out at the United States' opposition to the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

Recalling that, although over two months have passed since the DPRK proposed a three-way negotiation among the DPRK, the United States and South Korea to convert the Korean peninsula into nuclear free zone, the U.S. authorities have not yet given an answer to it, the news analyst says:

The denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, which means removing one of the most dangerous hotbeds of nuclear war in the world, stands out with great urgency not only for peace in Korea but also for peace in the world.

The Korean peninsula has become a dangerous hotbed of nuclear war because the United States has brought huge aggression forces and nuclear weapons into South Korea and turned it into the largest nuclear forward base in the Far East directed against the DPRK and socialist countries. Accordingly, the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula is impossible in the absence of the United States. The U.S. is feigning ignorance, closing its eyes to this stark fact. But it can by no means evade its responsibility for the solution of the problem of the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

If the United States truly wants peace and the relaxation of tensions on the Korean peninsula, it must not shun this problem but come out to the table of three-way negotiation to discuss and solve it.

U.S. Rapped on Denial of Role in South Korea

SK1201000590 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1150 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Commentary by station commentator Chong Pong-kil: "The Color of the Puppeteer Cannot Be Concealed"]

[Text] According to a report, the U.S. Government was extremely astonished by the remarks Chon Tu-hwan made in his so-called National Assembly testimony, saying that the United States might have been involved in the 26 October incident and it understood the unavoidability of the 17 May step. So, the U.S. Government issued through the U.S. Embassy in South Korea a written refutation saying that this was rude and absurd.

This is a shameless act intended to conceal the dirty nature of the U.S. imperialists as a wirepuller of the 26 October incident and of the Kwangju massacre.

As everyone knows, it was absolutely a product of the U.S. imperialists' stratagem and intrigue that traitor Pak Chong-hui was shot to death on 26 October 1979.

In October 1979, the South Korean people were gallantly turning out in the patriotic struggle to achieve the democratization of the society and the reunification of the fatherland. The people's gallant struggle persistently waged in Pusan, Masan, Seoul, Kwangju, and all other areas in South Korea was drastically shaking the foundation of the U.S. imperialists' colonial rule.

Dismayed at this, the U.S. imperialists secretly huddled at the White House to discuss the situation in South Korea and reached a conclusion that traitor Pak Chong-hui must be eliminated, and a new running dog loyal to the United States must be put in his place to bridge over the crisis in South Korea. Thus, according to this plan, the U.S. imperialists had Kim Chae-kyu, then director general of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency, shoot traitor Pak Chong-hui to death.

With regard to this, Kim Chae-kyu himself confessed that the United States was behind him.

However, the U.S. imperialists argued what Chon Tu-hwan said about the U.S. understanding of the unavoidability of the 17 May step was something designed to create a false illusion. They contended that their stand toward the incident was already expressed through their written explanation forwarded to the Kwangju Special Committee of the National Assembly in June last year.

This is also a shameless sophistry.

In the so-called written explanation, the U.S. imperialists said that the puppet special forces and the 31st puppet Army Division were not under the U.S. military control and the 20th puppet Army Division as well was the unit which was released from the U.S. military operational control. They also said that they were unaware in advance of the sending of the puppet special forces to Kwangju and that they later came to know about the sending of the 20th puppet army division.

How shameless this is!

As is widely known, the Kwangju massacre was committed totally under the mastermind of the U.S. imperialists and with their support through military show.

When the popular Kwangju uprising erupted, the U.S. imperialists took emergency steps, clamoring that the uprising must be obliterated by an iron fist. The U.S. Administration and its military circles sent the puppet army units which were under Wickham, then commander of the U.S. Forces in South Korea, to suppress the popular Kwangju uprising and issued the order of alert to the U.S. imperialist forces of aggression in South Korea. They also sent a strike force to the South Korean waters organized with aircraft carrier "Coral Sea" as a backbone. Still not satisfied, the U.S. imperialists additionally sent carrier "Midway" and airborne warning and control system planes to the areas surrounding South Korea.

Gleysteen, then U.S. ambassador to South Korea, in an interview with Japan's ASAHI SHIMBUN in May 1985, confessed that he ordered, under an agreement with the White House, that the 20th puppet Army Division be sent to the rioting area. The so-called political councillor of the U.S. Embassy in South Korea as well said that the United States approved the sending of the martial law army to Kwangju.

Thus, it is an irrefutable, stark historical fact that the U.S. fist immersed Kwangju in a sea of people's blood.

This was precisely why traitor Chon Tu-hwan, who committed the Kwangju massacre along with traitor No Tae-u, under the mastermind of the U.S. imperialists, only equivocally said that the United States might have been involved, the United States understood, and so on, because he was unable to continue to conceal the truth.

So, the U.S. imperialists were startled like a bull which got burnt by fire and created a farce of issuing a written refutation. This is exactly something like a thief crying "stop thief."

The U.S. imperialists are trying to shirk all the blame onto the puppet, whom they once controlled and used, because he has now become useless. They are trying to evade responsibility. However, this is a foolish act.

What the U.S. imperialists are doing will only further expose their nature as the ringleaders who masterminded the Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u ring's Kwangju massacre.

No matter what, the U.S. imperialists can never evade the responsibility for the Kwangju massacre.

The South Korean people will never leave the U.S. imperialists, who killed tens of thousands of their compatriots, unpunished but will get the price of blood from them.

Kim Il-song Meets Visiting Italian Official

SK1101102090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1012 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—The great leader President Kim Il-song today received Prof. and Dr. Giancarlo Elia Valori, secretary general of the Italian Institute of International Relations, on a visit to Korea. Present there were Kim Yong-sun, director of a department of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Tal-hyon, chairman of the External Economy Commission, and Yi Chong-hyok, DPRK representative at the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.

President Kim Il-song had a conversation with the guest in a cordial and friendly atmosphere.

He was presented with a gift by the guest.

He arranged a luncheon for the guest.

KCNA Describes North's Foreign Policy Goals

SK1201095990 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0959 GMT 12 Jan 90

["Our Party's Consistent Foreign Policy of Independence, Peace and Friendship"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang January 12 (KCNA)—The foreign policy of independence, peace and friendship clarified once again by the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song in his New Year address is a guideline to which our party, the government of the Republic and our people should continue to hold fast in external relations and it firmly guarantees our victory for its validity and inexhaustible vitality, says NODONG SINMUN today in a signed article.

It goes on:

Our party and the government of the Republic set it as a steadfast principle of their foreign activities to adhere to the independent stand. We decide on foreign policy independently in conformity with the specific conditions and interests of our country, establish and develop relations with other countries on the principle of complete independence and equality and independently solve all the international problems in accordance with our own conviction and from our own judgement in the interests of our people and the common interests of the world people.

To struggle in defence of peace is a consistent foreign policy of our Republic.

Proceeding from the nature of our socialist system, our party and the government of the Republic are resolutely struggling to check and frustrate the imperialists' moves of aggression and war and guarantee peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world, consistently pursuing the peaceloving foreign policy.

What is urgent at present in preventing a new world war, a thermonuclear war and defending world peace and security is to remove the danger of a nuclear war and ease the tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The immediate and most urgent question to this end is to get the U.S. forces and their nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea and turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

Our party and the government of the Republic consider it a consistent foreign policy to develop friendly and cooperative relations with various countries the world over on the principle of complete equality and mutual respect.

We will, in the future, too, develop the relations of friendship and cooperation with the progressive people of the world including those of socialist and non-aligned countries and give active support and encouragement to the peoples of all countries in their struggle for independence, peace, national sovereignty and social progress.

This year, too, we will consistently pursue the foreign policy of independence, peace and friendship so as to ceaselessly strengthen our revolution's international solidarity, accelerate the historical cause of national reunification and make a great contribution to bringing earlier the accomplishment of the people's cause of independence.

World 'Warmly Welcomed' Kim Il-song Proposals

SK1201080590 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0504 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 12 (KCNA)—International community warmly welcomed a new save-the-nation proposal put forward by the great leader President Kim Il-song in his New Year address and demanded the prompt removal of the concrete wall which adds to the tragedy of division.

Mikhail Titarenko, director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, said that President Kim Il-song proposed to begin with pulling down the concrete wall, ensuring free travel between the North and the South and opening all their doors.

Warmly welcoming this proposal, he demanded that the U.S. troops get out of South Korea, the nuclear weapons there be dismantled and the United States stop military exercises on the Korean peninsula and in the Far East.

The Jamaican peace council in a statement expressed full support to the proposal set forth by Comrade Kim Il-song to remove the concrete wall built by the South Korean authorities in the area South of the Military Demarcation Line and achieve Korea's reunification.

Noting that the concrete wall in the area South of the Military Demarcation Line of Korea has been built by the U.S. and South Korean side, the Italian papers IL MESSAGGERO and L'UNITA said that the South side is throwing a wet blanket over the North's peace proposals.

The All-India Youth Federation and All-India Students Federation in a joint statement said that so long as the South Korean authorities keep the concrete barrier, a symbol of division, the world people will not believe their talk about "reunification".

Now that the U.S. and South Korean authorities welcome the opening of the barrier in another country, there is no reason why the concrete wall built in the area south of the Military Demarcation Line should not be destroyed, the statement stressed.

SKNDF Leader Supports Kim Il-song Proposal

SK1201050090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0408 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—Hong Chi-yong, vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the South Korean National Democratic Front [SKNDF] (Hanminjon), published a statement on January 6 in support of the new save-the-nation proposal put forward by the great leader President Kim Il-song in his New Year address, according to radio "Voice of National Salvation".

He said:

"Hanminjon" believes that a phase of epochal turn would open for national reunification when the proposal of President Kim Il-song to remove the concrete wall built along the truce line and realise free travel and total opening is carried into practice.

In this connection, "Hanminjon" fully approves and warmly hails the convocation of a North-South top-level conference in which the heads of the authorities and leaders of political parties will take part for free travel and full-scale opening between the North and the South which was proposed by President Kim Il-song in his new year address.

The new year address for this year of President Kim Il-song, the sun of nation, is rapidly spreading, evoking extensive sympathy from among the South Korean people.

The rulers must totally pull down the concrete wall in the whole section of 240 kilometres of the truce line.

At the same time they must give up the divisive hysterics in persisting in "separate entry" into the U.N. and suppressing the figures fighting for reunification under the pretext of "a unified channel of dialogue". They must respond to the proposal for free travel and complete opening between the North and the South at the earliest date, regarding reunification, the supreme task of the nation, as the goal of highest value. There can be neither justification nor excuse to refuse it.

"Hanminjon" firmly believes that all the people will march forward for national reunification, regarding the new year address of President Kim Il-song for this year as a new milestone of reunification.

Struggle for National Reunification Reviewed

SK1001005490 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1129 GMT 29 Dec 89

[Unattributed talk: "The Year of the Struggle To Open a New Phase for Peace in the Country and Its Reunification"]

[Text] The last year of the 1980s, which has been filled with victory and glory, is winding up.

In this significant year, our party and the government of the Republic have made all possible efforts to provide favorable conditions and circumstances for guaranteeing peace on the Korean peninsula and achieving peaceful reunification.

In his address on New Year's Day of 1989, the great leader who devotes everything to giving our nation a reunified fatherland, taught that substantial progress should be made in guaranteeing certain peace in the country and in expediting peaceful reunification this year.

Also, he advanced an important negotiation proposal for convening a North-South political consultative conference of leadership-level figures, who can represent the opinions of each party, grouping, and walk of life in the North and the South, in Pyongyang at an early date.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught: The proposal for founding a democratic confederal republic of Koryo [DCRK] is the best way for solving the problem of national reunification most quickly under the realistic conditions in our country.

Figures in the political and social circles in South Korea have also asserted that the fatherland should be reunified in the confederal system. Today, the South Korean authorities cannot turn away from the way of reunification through the confederal system. Convinced that under these circumstances, the way for reunification through the confederal system can serve as a basis of national consensus, we courteously propose that a North-South high-level political consultative conference be held in Pyongyang at an early date to sincerely discuss the way for reunification through the confederal system.

The great leader's new negotiation proposal for holding a consultative conference and for discussing the way for reunification through the confederal system is a realistic overture, which correctly reflects the ardent aspirations of the entire nation for reunification and the basic tenor of the developing situation. It is a most just nation-saving measure which solves the problem of national reunification at an early date.

For the North and the South to explore a reasonable way to achieve reunification and national consensus is of drastic significance in solving the problem of reunification. This is because the North and the South cannot take joint steps in solving the problem of reunification without agreement on a method for reunification. Only when the two sides reach an agreement on the manner of reunification can they march together toward the common goal.

In particular, achieving a nationwide consensus on the way of reunification is becoming a more urgent problem because of the fact that the reunification stand of viewing national reunification as a realistic issue, the settlement of which is awaited, is confronted with the division stand of viewing it as the issue of the distant future.

When it comes to the way for solving the problem of reunification in our country, many problems arise, such as the problem of relations between peace and reunification, the problem of the existing systems in the North and the South, the problem of the type of a reunified state, and the problem of constituting a reunified government.

Proceeding from this, the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song, on the basis of his deep analysis of the question concerning national reunification, has made urgent the issue of achieving national consensus on the procedure for reunification.

In his New Year address, the great leader proposed that the national consensus on the way for reunification be reached on the confederal system.

This is firmly based on realistic feasibility.

As an excellent principle of solving the problem of reunification on the basis of our country's realities—where ideas and systems in the North and the South are different from each other—we have the 3-point principles of independence, peaceful reunification, and grand national unity, which the North and the South have already agreed to and which the world has recognized. Also, we have the proposal for founding DCRK which excellently embodies the principles.

Today diverse political forces and figures of the political and social circles in South Korea demand that the fatherland be reunified by the confederal system. This reality shows that although there can be differences in views on the way for reunification by the confederal system in terms of concrete details, the way can serve as a basis of national consensus.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song's proposal for convening a North-South political consultative conference and for discussing the way for reunification by the confederal system is the most reasonable and realistic overture in which these concrete realities, conditions, and possibilities have been fully taken into consideration.

The great leader's proposal for a political consultative conference is a reasonable formula for dialogue which makes it possible to reach an agreement on the way for reunification by pooling the opinions of the nation.

Setting forth the proposal for a conference, the great leader stated that leadership-level figures in the North and the South can hold not only multilateral talks but also bilateral dialogue within the framework of this conference.

In addition, he clarified the stand that if leadership-level figures of South Korea visit Pyongyang armed with a constructive way for reunification, he will warmly welcome them and wholeheartedly discuss together whatever proposals they advance.

This demonstrates the respected and beloved leader's lofty intention of trying to guarantee smooth progress in a political consultative conference with endless magnanimity and open-mindedness and to explore a way for reunification with leadership-level figures of South Korea in a heart-to-heart manner.

Indeed, the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song's new negotiation proposal for holding a conference is a chuche-oriented and patriotic nation-saving measure to open a way for reunification with our nation's own strength and is a proposal of epochal significance which enables the Korean people to vigorously expedite the implementation of the cause of national reunification.

For this reason, the proposal for a political consultative conference has aroused great support and sympathy among the people at home and abroad.

However, the South Korean puppets have turned away from our fair proposal at the instigation of the U.S. imperialists and have viciously challenged the aspirations of the nation for detente, peace, and reunification and the tenor of the times, seeking the lines of confrontation, war, and division since the beginning of the year.

Above all, the puppets openly declared that together with the U.S. imperialists, they would begin the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise earlier than the previous years and conduct it on the largest scale ever for a long period of time.

Well aware that this act would gravely affect North-South dialogue, the puppets raved that it was difficult to stop the exercise and that it was impossible to reduce its scale and postpone it. This clearly showed that the No Tae-u puppet clique, which actively follows the U.S. imperialists' aggressive strategy toward Korea, does not hesitate to inflict another war disaster and even nuclear calamities on the nation.

This act of the South Korean puppets runs totally counter to the basic tenor of our country's developing situation toward peace and peaceful reunification and the trend of detente.

On 17 January [1989], traitor No Tae-u, which seeks only permanent division, held a so-called New Year press conference, in which the so-called direction of state affairs is indicated, and make division-oriented remarks under the cloak of reunification. While talking about pulling down the barriers between the North and the South, the puppet traitor came out with the splittist theory of phases and the so-called northward policy, clamoring that the U.S. troops would be stationed until peace is systematically established. Since reunification is difficult for the time being, it should be realized in a step-by-step manner.

Meanwhile, the wretches have ruthlessly suppressed all South Korean patriotic forces, who have attempted to hold dialogue with us for reunification, under the pretext of the single channel of dialogue.

This is well demonstrated by the fact that they sentenced Rev Mun Ik- hwan, in his seventies, to a 10-year prison term on charges of violating the fascist National Security Law. He had visited Pyongyang and had returned home after doing good things in favor of national reunification. It is also shown by the fact that they have held trials of student Yim Su-kyong, a representative of the National Coucil of University Student Representativs [Chondaehyop] who had attended the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students [WFYS] and had returned home across the demarcation line with Fr Mun Kyu-hyon.

Persistently objecting to national reunification, traitor No Tae-u set forth the so-called Korean national commonwealth formula of reunification on 11 September to hide his splittist purpose by misleading public opinion.

Traitor No Tae-u's new formula is a proposal for the permanent division of the country aimed at thoroughly dividing our country into two Koreas and at infinitely prolonging the problem of the country's reunification.

Realities demand that the North and the South consult with each other, reach an agreement, and establish a single way for reunification which reflects the opinions and demands of all fellow countrymen.

Proceeding from this, we convened a joint conference of the authorities, parties, and organizations in the Northern half of the republic in Pyongyang on 28 September to promote the independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland and courteously proposed to the South Korean authorities, parties, and organizations that a national consultative conference of reunification, in which the authorities, parties, groupings, and walks of life in the North and the South sit face to face with each other and provide a common way for reunification, be called into session.

At the joint conference, we expressed willingness to discuss at the national consultative conference of reunification the ways for national reunification, which the authorities, parties, and organizations in the North and the South had put forward, the question of making public a joint national declaration on the way for national reunification, and other constructive proposals which are conducive to promoting the peaceful reunification of the country.

In addition, we made it clear that consultative conference sessions should be held alternately in Pyongyang and in Seoul and that the first conference should be held in Pyongyang on 20 February 1990. Also, we clarified in detail our opinions on the scale and form of the conference and on preparations for it.

Our proposal for convening a national consultative conference of reunification and for providing a common way for national reunification is the most reasonable and straightforward negotiation proposal which possible the facilitation of the country's reunification by pooling the nation's firm will for reunification and its lofty patriotic opinions. It is a realistic initiative, reflecting the urgent aspirations of the fellow countrymen for reunification and the basic tenor of the developing situation at home and abroad, and is a just nation-saving measure.

For this reason, the proposal for convening a consultative conference has aroused great sympathy not only among the Korean people at home and abroad but also among the world's progressive people who desire the reunification of Korea.

As the world well knows, our nation's aspirations for reunification have grown greater. With the immovable faith and will that all fellow countrymen become the members of one Korea and one nation, they have joined in the grand nationwide march toward reunification.

Shouts which were vociferously voiced at the 13th WFYS and the rally to promote national reunification in Pyongyang, the visit to Pyongyang by Rev Mun Ik-hwan, an adviser to the National Coalition of the Nation and Democracy and Chondaehyop [National Council Of University Student Representatives], and representative Yim Su-kyong's patriotic act of participating in the Pyongyang festival and returning home across Panmunjom together with Fr Mun Kyu-hyon, have unreservedly shown the irresistible desire of our nation for reunification and its will for national salvation and reunification.

Today our nation's movement for reunification is not confined to sentimental aspirations or mere debate, but has entered the stage of exploring a practical way for accomplishing the reunification of the country according to the 3-point principle of national reunification—independence, peaceful reunification, and grand national unity.

Realities urgently demand that we further accelerate the movement for national reunification and provide a common procedure for achieving it—a procedure which makes it possible to lead the will of the entire nation, keeping its strength, resourcefulness, and goals in mind.

Reaching an agreement on a common way for national reunification is not the task assigned only to certain strata, parties, or organizations, but it is nationwide work which should be carried out to reflect the opinions and demands of the authorities, parties, organizations, and people of all walks of life in the North and the South. For this reason, our proposal for convening a national consultative conference of reunification has enjoyed ardent support and welcome at home and abroad.

However, the puppet No Tae-u has turned away from our epoch-making peace proposal again, has accelerated the augmentation of nuclear armed forces together with the U.S. imperialists, and has frantically staged a nuclear war exercise for northward invasion.

On 9 December, we issued a statement of the DPRK Foreign Ministry to guarantee peace in the country under this dangerous situation and proposed to hold tripartite talks among us, the United States, and South Korea to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone—a way for easing tension and removing the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.

The spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry has issued a press statement and has urged the United States and the South Korean authorities to respond to our just negotiation proposal to denuclearize the Korean peninsula without delay. Also, he has proposed that if they had any reason to respond to it immediately, they take a practical action to refrain from military maneuvers which virtually contain the danger of nuclear war.

However, the U.S. imperialists have failed to give any answer to this proposal.

Indeed, the proposal for holding a political consultative conference of leadership-level figures in the North and the South, the proposal to convene a national consultative conference of reunification to provide a common way for national reunification, and the proposal to hold tripartite talks among us, the United States, and South Korea to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear- free zone—which we have put forth this significant year which concludes the 1980s—have given all Korean people in the North, the South, and abroad firm faith in national reunification and have opened a broad way for promoting national reunification.

Also, these epochal peace proposals have fully shown who genuinely desires peace in the country and peaceful reunification and who seeks division and confrontation.

Thanks to our peace proposals laid down this year, national reunification—the supreme desire of the nation—has been guaranteed more firmly.

In 1990, the Korean nation in the North, the South, and abroad will more vigorously fight to achieve peace in the country and its peaceful reunification, upholding the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song's policy of national reunification.

General Holds News Conference Concerning 'Wall'

SK1201005890 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2242 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—With no amount of illogical sophism can the South Korean authorities ever evade the responsibility for having built a concrete wall, a symbol of our national division and North-South confrontation and a shame to the nation, said Maj. General Kim Yang-kwon of the Korean People's Army, at an interview with home and foreign reporters in Pyongyang Thursday.

He said:

Spokesmen for the Unification Board and the Defence Ministry of South Korea insisted in a far-fetched manner that there is no concrete wall in South Korea and it is an antitank obstacle. This, after all, revealed the intention not to destroy the concrete wall.

Stating that the concrete wall is by no means an anti-tank obstacle, but an offspring of the "two Koreas" plot and anti-communist confrontation policy of the United States and the South Korean authorities, Kim Yang-kwon proved this with concrete facts:

Entering the 1970s, the United States put it forth as the key point of their Korean policy to create "two Koreas" with a view to keeping hold on South Korea alone at least.

Accordingly, the South Korean authorities, through a "special declaration on diplomatic policy" in June 1973, made the perpetuation of division their "Policy" and suspended North-South dialogue.

What they conceived to get the permanent division of one nation and one territory recognised within and without was to build the concrete wall south of the Military Demarcation Line.

As the anti-dictatorship struggle for democracy gained momentum and the sentiments for alliance with communism and reunification grew daily among the South Korean people in the 1970s, they needed to fabricate such evil laws as the "anti-communist law" within and build higher the barrier between the North and the South without for the purpose of blocking them.

On the other hand, for the permanent occupation of South Korea by the United States and stepped-up arms buildup, they needed to incite the consciousness of crisis for rendering credibility to their outcry over "threat from the North."

This was how the high concrete wall was built in the area south of the Military Demarcation Line [MDL].

Kim Yang-kwon explained the structure of the concrete wall.

The concrete wall which began to be built in 1977 along the whole length of the MDL is 10 to 19 metres wide at the bottom, 3 to 7 metres wide in the upper part and 5 to 8 metres high.

More than 800,000 tons of cement, 200,000 tons of steel and 3,500,000 cubic metres of mixtures were consumed in the building of the wall.

Antitank and antipersonnel mines are planted and wire entanglements and other artificial obstacles lie before the wall.

The wall has pillboxes, set-ups for installing heavy weapons and outposts at short intervals.

Underwater and concrete obstacles lie across the rivers where it is difficult topographically to build the wall.

Generally, a vertical concrete wall 2 or 3 metres high is enough to keep off tanks and armoured vehicles. But they built the wall 5 to 8 metres high with reinforcing bars as thick as your arm.

Tanks and armoured vehicles are able to climb a slope with an incline up to 30 degrees. But the reinforced concrete wall was built not only in the plain areas but also in the steep mountain areas.

Now the United States and the South Korean authorities are blaring that they "support" and "welcome" the opening of the wall of division in another country. That wall, however, is 3.5 to 4 metres high and 40 centimetres thick.

As the United States and the South Korean authorities are welcoming the opening of the wall of division in another country, they have no ground to refuse to pull down the concrete wall in Korea, said Kim Yang-kwon.

Stating that the removal of the concrete wall is a touchstone verifying the South Korean authorities' will for reunification, he stressed that if they truly have the intention to reunify the country and open the door, they must take a resolute step to pull down the concrete wall, the symbol of division and disgrace to the nation, which was built by them.

Officials Urge Pulling Down Concrete Wall

SK1101050090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0438 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—Pak Su-tong, chairman of the Central Committee of the Union of Agricultural Working People of Korea, and Paek Inchun, chairman of the Central Committee of the General Federation of the Unions of Literature and Arts of Korea, stressed that the concrete wall must be pulled down, first of all, if the cause of national reunification is to be powerfully pushed ahead.

In their statements to the press supporting the new nation-saving proposal put forward by the great leader President Kim Il-song in his New Year address they said that the proposal is an epochal save-the-nation step to bring about a decisive turning point, overcoming obstacles and difficulties laying in the way of national reunification.

The concrete wall in the area south of the Military Demarcation Line, Pak Su-tong said, is a product of the criminal act which could be committed only by the splittists who are trying to permanently divide Korea into "two Koreas" and completely cut the blood vessels of the nation.

If the South Korean authorities truly want national reunification, they must pull down the cursed concrete wall, an offspring of their policy of North-South confrontation and seclusionism, he stressed.

Paek In-chun said:

A North-South top-level conference in which the heads of the authorities and the leaders of political parties will take part is a most appropriate and reasonable form of negotiation in discussing and resolving the question of removing the barrier, realising free travel and opening all doors between the North and South.

Recalling that relevant measures to carry into practice the new save-the-nation proposal were taken at a joint meeting of representatives of the government and political parties of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, he stressed that it is another token of our sincere stand and efforts for the reunification of the country. He urged the South Korean authorities to show affirmative response to it.

National Agricultural Conference Continues

Kim Il-song Delivers Address

SK1201001490 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2233 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—The great leader President Kim Il-song today met and congratulated the participants of the national agricultural conference.

The participants warmly welcomed him with stormy cheers of "hurrah!"

Present on the occasion were Yi Chong-ok, Yon Hyong-muk, Kang Song-san, So Yun-sok, Han Song-yong, Hong Song-nam, Kim Pok-sin, Cho Se-ung, Kang Hui-won, Hong Si-hak, Pak Nam- ki, So Kwan-hui, Kim Hwan, Kim Chang-chu and chairman of the Agriculture Commission Paek Pom-su.

President Kim Il-song expressed deep satisfaction at and highly appreciated the output of more than eight tons of grain per hectare on an average on many cooperative farms across the country through a scientific and technological farming as required by the chuche method of farming.

He expressed the belief that all the officials and working people engaged in agriculture would bring about a great leap on all fronts of agricultural production including grain output and reap another bumper harvest in the first year of the 1990s by implementing the party's agriculture-first policy to the letter.

He had a souvenir picture taken with the participants of the national agricultural conference who had devotedly worked to implement our party's policy of agriculture.

All the participants were filled with the firm determination to display more unreservedly the advantages of our socialist agricultural system by bringing about a new upswing in socialist rural construction and agricultural production this year under the banner of the ideological, technical and cultural revolutions.

Report on Day Two of Meeting

SK1201002090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2226 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—The second-day session of the national agricultural conference was held today.

The floor was taken by Kim Yong-kwan, chairman of the Management Board of the Mangyongdae Cooperative Farm, Pyongyang; Ho Nam-sun, chairman of the Management Board of the Samjigang Cooperative Farm in Chaeryong County, South Hwanghae Province; Ham Chan-hwa, secretary of the primary party committee of the Chilli Cooperative Farm in Sukchon County, South Pyongan Province; Kang Myong-ok, chairman of the Management Board of the Migok Cooperative Farm in Sariwon City, North Hwanghae Province; and Yi Hui-sok, chairman of the Management Board of the Sogok Cooperative Farm in Sinhung County, South Hamgyong Province.

The speakers said that an unprecedented bumper crop was reaped last year with 9 to 10 tons of grain gathered from each hectare through scientific and technological farming as required by the great socialist rural theses and the chuche method of farming, despite a drought that lasted over 70 days.

They expressed their determination to effect a constant upswing in agricultural production, upholding our party's agriculture-first policy.

They stressed the need to control water and apply fertilizers on a scientific and technical basis and actively introduce high-yielding strains suitable to the soil of each farm so as to produce 11 to more than 12 tons of grain per hectare, upholding the instructions of the great leader President Kim Il-song that water is first, fertilizer second and strains third in farming.

They also referred to the need to markedly increase the scope and category of work done by farm machines and realize the comprehensive mechanization of farm work and thereby free the agricultural working people from arduous and toilsome labour.

The level of the management of cooperative farms should be steadily improved to meet the requirement of the developing reality in order to give full play to the superiority and might of our socialist agricultural system, they emphasized.

The conference continues.

Accomplishments, Plans Noted

SK1201111190 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1013 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 12 (KCNA)—The third-day sitting of the national agricultural conference was held today. The floor was taken by An Kum-hui, chairman of the management board of the Chongsan Cooperative Farm, Kangso District, Nampo Municipality; Kim Kum-ok, chairman of the management board of the Ipsok Cooperative Farm, Mundok County, South Pyongan Province; Yi Wi-hyong, chief engineer of the UNHA Cooperative Farm, Unjon County, North Pyongan Province; Yu Sun-ae, workteam leader of the Yangdam Cooperative Farm, Unchon County, South Hwanghae Province; and 7 others.

They recalled that they successfully carried out the state plan on all indices by doing farm work well as required by the farming method of chuche in hearty response to the party's correct policy of agriculture last year when an unfavourable weather persisted. They hardened their determination to complete irrigation at a high level, push ahead with mechanization of farm work and application of chemistry, and effect a great upswing in agricultural production so as to harvest 10-12 tons of grain per hectare on an average this year. They unanimously vowed to actively contribute to accelerating the full implementation of the socialist rural theses by giving full scope to the superiority and might of the collective economy.

The conference continues.

Pyongyang Mass Meeting Welcomes Defector

SK1201013290 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2222 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—A Pyongyang mass meeting was held today to welcome Yi Ok-sun who came over to the Northern half of Korea.

She was awarded an order of the DPRK and a large amount of monetary prize and presented with souvenirs at the meeting.

Sim Sung-kyong, vice-chairman of the Pyongyang municipal administration and economic guidance committee, made of speech there.

He said that here coming over to the Nothern half of Korea after deserting the rotten South Korean and U.S. societies is an expression of her resolute will and determination to live a life worthy of man, free from exploitation and oppression and a manifestation of her patriotic will to live stoutly for the country and the nation.

Yi Ok-sun said in her reply address:

Seeing the reality of the North where women live with no worry about life, having everything convenient, I came to know clearly that the society of the North is, indeed, an ideal society of which people had long dream and a paradise.

Noting that she is spending happy days in the bosom of the republic, she pledged herself to be intensely loyal to the great leader President Kim Il-song and dear leader Mr. Kim Chong-il who have enabled her to enjoy a happy life.

Defector Interviewed on Visiting 'Concrete Wall'

SK1101051290 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0431 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—It is impossible to accomplish the sacred cause of national reunification without pulling down before anything else the concrete wall, the symbol of national division and North-South confrontation, declared defector Chong Kyu-chin, former director of the Hwanam Chemical Company, Ltd. in Seoul, who had visited the concrete wall built South of the Military Demarcation Line, in an interview with a KCNA reporter.

When I was in South Korea, I had a chance to make a trip to the concrete wall early in October 1978 in my capacity as a deputy to the "National Conference for Unification", Chong Kyu-chin said, and continued:

Passing through the area near the Woljong railway station in South Korean Kangwon Province, I got to the concrete wall and I was taken aback.

In the previous year, I had heard from my colleagues that the reinforced concrete wall was being built in the areas along the truce line. But I had never dreamt that such stupendous artificial wall would appear before me.

The North side of the wall was vertical and its South side sloping. The wall built only a few metres off the truce line stretched to the east and the west as far as eyes could see. Indeed, it was a symbol of national division and North-South confrontation.

In the wall there were helmeted puppet army sentinels at intervals of some ten metres. In the upper part were installed heavy machine guns levelled at the North at intervals of 50 to 60 metres. Many loopholes were open in the middle of the North side of the wall.

Soldiers told me that inside the wall there were barracks for a large number of military personnel.

Nevertheless, the South Korean authorities now claim that there is no concrete wall in South Korea. What shameless villians they are! With no sophism can they cover up the stark reality.

On the concrete wall I looked over the North through field-glasses. But I could see in the North only barbed wire marking the demarcation line.

Not much penetration is needed to see who truly wants reunification.

The concrete wall is the eyewitness of history stripping bare the true color of the vicious splittists in the South to the whole world, Chong Kyu-chin said, and stressed:

If the South Korean authorities have a true intention for reunification, they, though belatedly, must pull down the concrete wall first of all.

Need To Build Socialism by Own Efforts Stressed

SK1201114790 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1007 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 12 (KCNA)—To effect a great revolutionary upsurge through a campaign for maximum increase of production and economy is not a simple economic and practical matter but an important political matter to add lustre to our socialist system, stresses NODONG SINMUN today, adding:

This is an important and worthwhile campaign to build socialism better by our own efforts through the full mobilization of all our potentials.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song said in his New Year address for 1990:

"The enormous tasks facing us at present are for building socialism better in our country, in keeping with the requirements of chuche, and the key to success in carrying them out can be found when full scope is given to the superiority of our socialist system in which the chuche idea is embodied."

In the article entitled "Our People's Grand Onward Movement Aimed at Building Socialism Better as Required by chuche" the author says:

Socialism can be built better in our country when nature, society and people are transformed more successfully as required by the chuche idea. Therefore, all the lines and policies and the tasks for socialist construction set forth by our party are subordinated to the application of the chuche idea and run through with the work for meeting the requirements of chuche.

All the tasks and ways for building socialism indicated by our party are for building our socialism better in keeping with the requirements of chuche.

Our party's lofty intention and tasks to build socialism better as required by chuche are reflected above all in the task to effect a new revolutionary upswing, holding the slogan of increased production and economy and in the militant tasks this year for providing the people with an independent and creative life more effectively by finding a better solution to the problems of food, clothing and housing for the people. And this intention is well reflected in the task to keep thoroughly implementing our party's strategic line for building socialism.

When the militant tasks put forward by the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song in his New Year address are successfully carried into effect, our socialism will be built better as required by the chuche idea and the superiority of our socialist system be given fuller scope.

First Expeditionary Party to Antarctic Departs

SK1101102890 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1016 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang January 11 (KCNA)—The first Antarctic expeditionary party of Korea left here today.

It will make observations of the meteorological, oceanographic and ecological phenomena of the Antarctica and get acquainted with all conditions for the building of a scientific research centre of our country.

South Korea

Specialists Claim North's Party Cadres Purged

SK1101143090 Seoul Domestic Service in Korean 1400 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Report by correspondent Yu Sung-chae from Tokyo]

[Text] Specialists on North Korean issues in Tokyo revealed that it seems some party cadres, including North Korea's Pak Song-chol, have been demoted or purged because they proposed government open policy to Kim Il-song.

Today, these specialists reported that recently, the young classes that belong to the so-called third generation partisans of North Korea's Workers' Party [WPK] proposed open policy to Kim Il-song. They include Pak Song-chol who was highly ranked in North Korea's hierarchy of power. They also reported that there was a large possibility that Chon Pyong-ho, who was promoted to full member of the Political Bureau of the WPK in 1988, and (Yi Hui-sil) who was a candidate for alternate member of the Political Bureau in 1986, have been purged.

These specialists indicated that movements of this kind that occurred within North Korea—where precautions are being taken in efforts to safegaurd the system—such as ideological control, due to reform in Eastern Europe, are sufficient to keep a close watch of North Korea's situation in the nineties.

PPD's Kim Tae-chung Seeks To Visit Pyongyang

SK1201073090 Seoul YONHAP in English 0624 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 12 (YONHAP)—Kim Tae-chung, head of South Korea's largest opposition party, indicated Friday that he seeks a visit to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean President Kim Il-song.

Pouncing on an offer by President No Tae-u on Thursday to allow direct contact with North Korea by political parties, Kim said his Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) will push for a visit to North Korea in the first half of the year to discuss reunification and exchanges. PPD sources said a PPD delegation to Pyongyang, if realized, will be most likely be led by the party head.

The sources said Kim Tae-chung will reveal deatails on his plans to visit North Korea in his news conference scheduled for Jan. 17.

"President No Tae-u said Thursday in our tete-a-tete at Chongwadae that he supports political party-level inter-Korean exchanges," Kim was quoted as saying. "The PPD has thus decided to make every effort to initiate party-level exchanges between the South and North in the first half of the year."

YONHAP Reports on North's Letter Proposal

SK1201094490 Seoul YONHAP in English 0914 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 12 (YONHAP)—North Korea Friday counterproposed that it will deliver to South Korea letters concerning North Korean President Kim Il-song's proposal for a high-level inter-Korean meeting at the truce town of Panmunjom instead of sending messengers to Seoul, which the South rejected. In a telephone message to South Korean Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun, North Korean Premier Yon Hyong-muk said Pyongyang will convey the letters at Panmunjom at 10 A.M. Saturday.

North Korea, proposing the dispatch of two messengers to Seoul to convey the letters, proposed a working-level officials' contact at Panmunjom to discuss its plan of sending messengers to the South's capital but South Korea formally turned down the idea Thursday. In a hot-line message Thursday, South Korean Prime Minister Kang said "It is an established institution between our two sides to exchange letters through Panmunjom." Kang said the the government would send two liaison officials to Panmunjom Saturday to receive the letters.

In a New Year's message, North Korean leader Kim proposed a meeting of high-level authorities, heads of political parties and social organizations from South and North Korea.

South To Ask North To Install 'Hot Lines'

SK1201074290 Seoul YONHAP in English 0633 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 12 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea will ask North Korea to install hot lines between senior military officers in the South and North in case high-level inter-Korean political and military talks take place, Vice National Unification Minister Song Han-ho said Friday.

Peaceful development of the Demilitarized Zone that divides South and North Korea, prior notice of large-scale military maneuvers and reciprocal invitations to observe the drills will also be proposed, Song said in a consultative meeting between government and ruling party committees on unification of the Korean peninsula.

"The high-level talk is likely to come true, since there are no big differences of opinion on the agenda or on details of managerial steps at the sixth preparatory contacts for it on Jan. 31 at the truce village of Panmunjom," said Song, senior South Korean delegate to the preliminary meeting.

But he expressed a fear that the preparatory meeting may be suspended again if the North raises problems that have nothing to do with the agenda, such as cancelling the "Team Spirit" annual Korea-U.S. joint military exercise and demolishing a non-existent wall on the southern side of the border.

The agenda of the high-level talks would include discussion on a non-aggression pact, a summit between Presidents No Tae-u and Kim Il-song, inter-Korean travel, communications and trade agreements, disarmament and confidence building measures.

Exchange of North-South Journalists Stressed

SK1201025390 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean on 10 Jan 90 p 3

[Editorial: "North-South Information Opening Is a Short Cut to Reunification—Exchanges of Journalists Should Be Realized in the New Year Without Fail"]

[Text] At every opportunity, the government has promised to open information about North Korea. Nonetheless, authorities have committed contradictory activities of continuously suppressing publishing houses and publishers on charges of publishing books introducing the realities of North Korea. How on earth could the problem of the North-South dialogue and reunification be discussed if we do not know the correct social realities of the countries' in which we live and an idea of each other's rule?

In connection with this, it is needless to say that the free and friendly exchanges of journalists is indispensable both in view of correct appraisal of the realities of the popular masses in the North and the South and in view of promotion of genuine mutual understanding. In this respect, even China and Taiwan, to say nothing of East and West Germany, have been more progressive than we have been. The reality of Korea has been grim to a degree that an editorial adviser of a newspaper was forced to stand trial in court only on charges of mapping out a plan to visit the North. Of course, in the 1970's, representatives of North and South Korea and North-South Coordinating Committee visited each other, and in 1985 when North-South home-visiting group and art troupes were exchanged, reporters from both sides have always covered each other's side. However, the point of view of the government was stringent in the selection of reporters, in scope of coverage, and in the criteria of the coverage and selection. Therefore, in a word, it was impossible to exchange free journalism in terms of genuine meanings.

In January 1989, the National Federation of Press Trade Unions proposed to exchange the North-South journalists to "gratify the people's right to know" and "ease distrust and antagonism." In addition, in November 1989, the Press Association submitted to the Unification Board a paper pleading to allow contact with the North Korean residents in a way for "exchange of the North-South reporters." However, it is said that no answer has been given yet. In spite of unfavorable conditions in terms of an objective point of view, the representatives of these two press organizations made up their mind to take on the vanguard to pull down the barrier of division by pooling their efforts from the beginning of the year.

Only when the freedom of the speech is guaranteed in the North and the South and when free visits of North-South journalists are possible can a decisive opportunity to tide over the division of cold war be seized. The North-South Korean journalists at large, however, have not cast off their deviated point of view toward each other.

The responsibility for this does not rest only with journalists. This responsibility rests with authorities of North and South Korea, because they have strictly censored correct reportage on information and, even in some serious cases, distorted it. At last, East and West Germany could tear down the Berlin Wall by making available each other's broadcast media. If North and South Korea really want reunification, they should, first of all, begin to exchange North-South journalists.

North-South Official Views Prospects, Problems

SK1201054290 Seoul YONHAP in English 0502 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 12 (YONHAP)—Reforms in Eastern Europe might have a negative impact on South-North Korean relations by pushing Pyongyang deeper into isolation, Seoul's chief delegate to the inter-Korean parliamentary meeting said Friday.

"The on-going changes in Eastern Europe will positively influence North Korea in the long run, but North Korea might shut its doors to the rest of the world more firmly for a short period," Chae Mun-sik said in an interview with YONHAP news agency. Outlining the prospects for inter-Korean dialogue this year, Chae said a patient attitude seeking step-by-step development in all channels of dialogue is essential for success given the situation in North Korea. Chae, a six-term lawmaker and former speaker of the National Assembly, is head of South Korea's delegation to the preparatory meeting to arrange parliamentary talks with North Korea.

Teams from the two Koreas are scheduled to meet at the truce village of Panmunjom on Jan. 24 for their 10th contact since 1988, when they resumed talks begun in 1985 on a get-together of parliamentarians.

"We will watch the attitude of North Korea at the next contact in that it will test the chance for development. In the past, the North did not appear at the conference table, or even if they did they only made verbal attacks on us, every January when the South Korean-U.S. military exercise 'Team Spirit' began," he said.

Touching on the differences between the two sides, Chae said Seoul will insist that a recommendation of a summit meeting between President No Tae-u and North Korean President Kim Il-song be included on the agenda and that it be a bilateral conference rather than a round-table conference.

"It is desirable for leaders from both sides to settle all pending issues at a summit and we should recommend it. Besides which, just like other modes of contact between the two Koreas, the parliamentary conference should be a meeting of delegates from both sides," Chae maintained.

No has called for a summit with Kim Il-song to solve pending issues but Kim insists on a meeting of all political leaders from the two Koreas.

Chae, rejecting the possibility of making concessions on the agenda or format of the conference, said, "Our side has so far made great concessions, and affairs concerning the two Koreas should be approached with reason rather than emotion." He said meetings to arrange parliamentary talks and a prime ministers conference will need more time to make progress than exchanges in other fields, such as sports, culture and science.

"What is important is that both sides understand each other through communications and personal exchanges. We should learn much from the lesson that the Berlin Wall started to come down through shared broadcasts between East and West Germany," Chae said.

Analysis on Downscaling of Team Spirit Exercise

SK1201082690 Seoul YONHAP in English 0806 GMT 12 Jan 90

["Analysis" by Pak Choung-chan]

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 12 (YONHAP)—Analysts and strategists say that the United States and South Korea, by downscaling this year's "Team Spirit" military exercise, may have finessed North Korea into serious discussions on disarmament and lowering tensions in the region.

Seoul and Washington announced on Wednesday that the two-week annual military drill, which starts on Mar. 14, will have 10 percent fewer participants and 10 percent less equipment than in any year since 1976.

Until last year, roughly 200,000 troops from South Korea and the United States annually took part in the defensive exercise, which North Korea calls "aggressive war games." The total comprises 130,000 men drawn from the Korean army and 70,000 U.S. soldiers, 40,000 of them stationed in Korea.

President No Tae-u, in a news conference Wednesday, said the reduction was made to demonstrate Seoul's eagerness to hold South-North dialogue and ease tension on the Korean peninsula. No invited North Korea, China and an international armistice watchdog commission in Korea to send observers to the exercise to verify its defensive character.

In announcing the cutback, the two allies made it clear that the step is designed to force comparable action by North Korea and hinted the military situation on the peninsula would decide further changes in the annual exercise.

Experts say the step and reference to more changes will induce Pyongyang to discuss arms reduction on a long-term basis and help efforts to lessen tension between the two Koreas. If North Korea sends observers, it will be a good start for disarmament talks and the establishment of hot lines and other measures could follow.

It seems far from coincidental that South Korean Government leaders have raised the possibility of arms reduction at the same time as scholars are recommending that plans be made to defend the nation without American help.

Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun, meeting with top commanders last December, called for preparations for arms reductions, a remark totally unthinkable in the past.

The smaller scale of "Team Spirit 90" also seems closely related to demands in the U.S. Congress for American troops to pull out of South Korea, a topic sure to be high on the agenda when Defense Secretary Richard Cheney visits Seoul Feb. 14-17.

President George Bush says he won't bow to the congressional demands, but government in Seoul is apparently preparing for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

A military source said the 10 percent cutback in the exercise was discussed last year as a means to support No's diplomatic outreach to communist nations and bring the North to the table with the South. North Korea has rejected all dialogue with South Korea while the military drill continues.

U.S. Ambassador's Remarks on Kwangju Criticized

SK1101052390 Seoul KYONGHYANG SINMUN in Korean 10 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by reporter Yi Yong-ho of the political desk; from the column "Reporter's Memo"]

[Text] On 8 January in Kwangju, U.S. Ambassador Donald Gregg, revealing the background of the ROK-U.S. summit talks which were held in February 1981 right after Mr Chon Tu-hwan took the reins of power, said: "At that time, the ROK military authorities were ready to execute Mr Kim Tae-chung, who had been sentenced to death, and the U.S. side was making every possible effort to block the ROK military authorities' moves to execute him.

"Such being the situation, President Reagan sent his assistant Allen to South Korea to block the ROK military authorities from executing Kim Tae-chung. Assistant Allen met President Chon and conveyed President Reagan's opinion to him. In the meeting, President Chon said to assistant Allen that 'to rescue Kim Tae-chung, the United States should invite me to visit the United States.'

"...Therefore, Mr Chon was not cordially treated as a head of state while visiting the United States. Nevertheless, at that time the media reported the visit as if honeymoon relations had been opened between the two countries, and the contemporary domestic press which were under strict government control were busy misleading the public."

This is indeed a surprise to us, because we have learned from this something more important than learning the historical facts which otherwise would have been buried in history books.

It is indeed surprising that the incumbent diplomat, who should respect the country of his residence and diplomatic norms and practices, unilaterally exposed the content of the negotiations that the two heads of state had in a past as recent as 10 years.

Hearing the report on Ambassador Gregg's remarks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9 January reacted negatively, saying "it is unbelievable."

A high-ranking government official said "I don't think that the U.S. ambassador, who should know diplomatic norms and practices better than anyone else, made such insolent remarks. I believe his remarks must have been misquoted." Yet, his face expressed perplexity.

If Ambassador Gregg's remarks are true, this tells us that the United States inevitably had to recognize the legitimacy of the Fifth Republic under Mr Chon Tu-hwan just to save Mr Kim Tae-chung's life, because a meeting of heads of state is a formal expression of mutual recognition of the legitimacy of their countries.

Mr Gregg's remarks that the United States—which looked, with arms folded, at the Kwangju uprising for democratization, in which as many as 200 people were killed, without taking any diplomatic sanctions—invited Mr Chon to visit only to rescue Kim Tae-chung's life, lack persuasive power.

Whether or not Mr Chon was treated as a head of state is not an important problem to be argued. Even if the U.S. side did not receive Mr Chon cordially, it is an undeniable fact that relations between the two countries during the Fifth Republic were closer to honeymoon relations than those during the Third Republic. This can be proven by the fact that during the Fifth Republic for 7 years the United States raised no issue about the Chon Tu-hwan regime.

When university students seized the office of the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul and staged a sit-in there in 1985, the United States kept silent to the end. In other words, the United States made no comment on the incident at all. On the contrary, since the beginning of the era of the Sixth Republic, the United States has tried to find excuses, saying that "there is nothing wrong with the United States."

In particular, the United States went so far as to issue a statement refuting Mr Chon's testimony made at the National Assembly last December, using insolent and insulting words, in a bid to persist in pleading its innocence with regard to the Kwangju incident.

Furthermore, Ambassador Gregg's intemperate remarks which exposed even the content of the course of negotiations for the ROK-U.S. summit talks, vividly show how hard the United States is trying to patch up the anti-U.S. sentiments caused by the Kwangju incident.

It is feared that the United States would repeat its misjudgment, for which it has to pay a tremendous price, by persisting in pleading its innocence too long and too hard.

U.S. State Department Welcomes No's Proposal

SK1101024890 Seoul YONHAP in English 0235 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Washington, Jan. 10 (YONHAP)—The U.S. State Department welcomed South Korean President No Tae-u's proposal for a summit with North Korean leader Kim Il-song Wednesday and said the U.S. hopes North Korea will respond positively to No's offer.

It was noteworthy that No accepted positive factors among offers on free cross-border exchanges and opening in Kim's new year message, said a spokesman for the department's East-Asian and Pacific affairs. Direct dialogue between the two Koreas is essential to bridge the gap between them, said the official, who declined to be named.

No, in his first news conference of the year Wednesday, said, "I welcome the proposal of the top North Korean leader on New Year's Day for free travel and total opening between the South and the North. A South-North summit should be held as quickly as possible to that end and I once more urge North Korea to positively respond to this." The inter-Korean summit is necessary to solve specific problems between the halves of Korea, he said.

The State Department, however, refused to comment on U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg's recent remarks on U.S. willingness to send a private mission to North Korea to improve relations between Washington and Pyongyang. Gregg told businessmen in Kwangju, 255 kilometers southwest of Seoul, on Tuesday that America will send an informal mission to North Korea.

U.S.-North Korea Sixth Round Meeting Discussed

SK1201034590 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 11 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by reporter Kang Tae-ho]

[Text] On 5 January, the United States and North Korea had the sixth round meeting between political counselors of their embassies in Beijing. The meeting was held upon the request of the U.S. side nearly 2 months after the fifth-round contact held shortly after Sigur, former U.S. assistant secretary of state, visited Pyongyang early last November.

According to what the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed in the wake of the official confirmation of the U.S. State of Department, the United States called on North Korea to dispatch an observation team to the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise whose plan is scheduled to be announced some time in mid-January. The North Korean side requested the U.S. side cooperate in the removal of the concrete barriers in the southern part of the Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] as urged by President Kim Il-song in his New Year address.

In efforts to build confidence, the United States has consistently called on North Korea to dispatch an observation team to the "Team Spirit" exercise. However, North Korea has refused to accept this request, stating that accepting it means acknowledging a nuclear attack exercise against North Korea, and demanded that one of the two alternatives—dialogue or a military exercise—be chosen, regarding the exercise as the heaviest obstacle to North-South dialogue.

What is interesting in this connection is that when the Soviet Union staged military maneuvers in the north Pacific last July, it proposed that the ROK, Japan, and southeast Asian countries observe its exercise, but the United States objected to the proposal. As a result, some countries dispatched their observation teams to the Soviet Union in spite of U.S. pressure. The reason for the U.S. objection to the Soviet proposal at that time was that the mutual dispatch of observation teams to military maneuvers is a means of arms control—a preliminary stage of disarmament—and is connected with the Soviet proposal for arms reduction and peace in Asia and the Pacific.

It has not been learned what stance North Korea took toward the proposal for the dispatch of an observation team, which shows the double-faced nature of the United States, at the recent contact. However, it seems that the issue concerning the "Team Spirit" exercise was not brought to hot debate at the meeting, in light of the fact that unlike the previous years, President Kim Il-song failed to refer to it in his New Year's address and that the question of reducing the scale of the exercise was under discussion between the ROK and the United States. In particular, in case the nature and scale of the exercise are included in the agenda items of discussion as part of the primary control of disarmament as shown in negotiations over arms reduction in Europe, there will be a great possibility for compromise.

What is noteworthy in the contact is that North Korea emphasized the exchange of free visits and mutual door-opening and requested for the U.S. cooperation in North-South talks to this end.

Also, North Korea accepted the U.S. demand that it join the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on the safeguarding of atomic energy. At the fifth-round contact, the United States strongly demanded this, warning against North Korea's possible development of nuclear weapons. In this connection, North Korea had adhered to the stand of principle that the nuclear weapons in South Korea should be withdrawn at the same time. At the sixth-round contact, however, North Korea revealed its negotiations with IAEA and separately proposed tripartite talks among North and South Korea and the United States to discuss the matter of withdrawing nuclear weapons from the South first. This is of significance in clearing up the suspicion of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, which has been greatly reported by the domestic news media. Also, it can be said to be considerable concessions on the part of North Korea. Unlike in the past, the U.S. Department of State, through its spokesman, stated that the contact was beneficial. This comment is interpreted as grounded upon North Korea's flexible attitude.

In particular, North Korea's request for U.S. assistance to North-South dialogue in the Beijing meeting—which is an unusual thing—conforms to the principle of giving priority to dialogue between direct parties in the North and the South—the principle the United States has emphasized. In response to North Korea's proposal for tripartite talks, the United States has stated that it is possible to hold U.S.-North Korean dialogue or to improve relations when considerable progress has been made in North-South dialogue.

In addition, the United States repeatedly urged North Korea at the meeting to take steps for building confidence in the DMZ, to prove its relinquishment of terrorism, and to repatriate the remains of missing U.S. soldiers during the 25 June War. With regard to the question of repatriating the remains of U.S. soldiers, the United States demanded their repatriation through the Military Armistice Commission and North Korea through an official delegation of the United States, but a compromising proposal for handing the remains of soldiers over to a U.S. Congress delegation through Panmunjom has been put forth. The question concerning the repatriation of the remains of U.S. soldiers seems to be a barometer gauging progress in U.S.-North Korean relations rather than an obstacle to their relations.

The other problems include taking measures for building confidence in the DMZ and North Korea's relinquishment of terrorism. These problems can be dealt with in high-level North-South political and military talks, which North Korea has already proposed, and in a declaration of nonaggression to be adopted at parliamentary talks. Also, having raised the problems is viewed as aimed at helping South Korea strengthen its stance in North-South dialogue. President No Tae-u's conception of North-South summit talks is grounded upon these moves.

It can be said that whether progress will be made in preliminary contacts for high-level North-South talks and parliamentary talks slated for late January will serve as a key to improving relations between North and South Korea and between the United States and North Korea. The U.S.-North Korean relations, which have a close bearing on North-South relations, are expected to develop in the wake of the expansion of exchanges in the academic, cultural, sports, and other diverse fields.

Furthermore, whether Ho Tam, chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland who was invited to visit the United States by former Assistant Secretary of State Sigur, will visit Washington; whether contacts in Beijing will be elevated to ambassadorial-level contacts as demanded by North Korea; and whether North Korea will be off the list of terrorist countries will all be negotiation cards, which the United States will use, and important factors affecting North-South dialogue.

North's Intent in Meeting With U.S. Analyzed

SK1201005190 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 10 Jan 90 p 3

[Editorial: "U.S.-North Korean Contact Analyzed"]

[Text] Our attention is drawn to the U.S.-North Korean diplomatic contact that began in Beijing on 5 January this New Year. This councillor-level working meeting between the United States and North Korea is the sixth known meeting of its kind since the first one in Beijing on 6 December 1988.

There are two things that arouse our interest in this most recent contact. One is that Kim Il-song requested the U.S. side help eliminate the "wall" so that the so-called "free visits" mentioned in his New Year's address could be realized. The other is that the United States informed the North Korean side of its willingness to open the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise, which has been held annually since 1982, to the Korean People's Army [KPA] and the Chinese People's Volunteers—the signatories to the Armistice Agreement—and invited them to this exercise as observers.

First, Kim Il-song's request to the United States to help remove the "wall," which he claimed is obstructing the so-called "free visits," sounds reasonable, but it in fact is a deceptive drama. Kim Il-song is staging propaganda at home and abroad that there really exists a "concrete wall" on the "South Korean" side like that built in East Germany. Kim Il-song, who has demonstrated his masterly art of carrying out the intrigue of purging all his political rivals and those whom he did not like—branding them as reactionaries, traitors, and imperialists—is now engaging in agitation and propaganda calling for the destruction of the nonexistent "wall."

He said in his New Year address that "the high concrete wall built on the south side of the Military Demarcation Line [MDL] should be destroyed in the first place." He mentioned that the "concrete wall" does not allow the people to make "free visits" but allows the KPA tank unit of some 3,500 tanks and the self-propelled artillery vehicles of over 2,000 artillery pieces to freely assault the South after the removal of the electronic checking line of the ROK Armed Forces. This is proven by his view of the current situation in which he said, "It is a great crime before history and the nation to defer reunification idling away time by dialogue and political negotiations without tangible progress." The wall exists not in the South but in the North of the MDL. The reinforced concrete walls are built like continuous ants' nests dug in the mountains and hills and beneath the lakes and buildings north of the truce line, which he built mobilizing the people in the North under the pretext of nuclear war. What is Kim Il-song going to do with these walls—within which he confined the army and the people, totalling blocking their political freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association for half a century—in this worldwide trend of freedom? To hide these wrongs he has been imposing upon the people, he invented the "concrete wall" in the South, and is keeping on staging an impostor's drama of machination propaganda to deceive the people and the world.

Second, the invitation to the "Team Spirit" exercise is not new. The commander of the UN Forces has proposed to the North to come and observe the exercise through the Military Armistice Commission meeting every year, but North Korea has rejected this and used the "Team Spirit" exercise as an excuse for rejecting North-South dialogue every year. In the history of the world, there have been quite a few precedences where even belligerent countries at war with each other allowed the observation of each other, and there was an exchange of observation groups between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces.

However, this sort of exchange is possible when both sides have the spirit of fair play. It may well be unworkable with the guerrilla-minded group which is ready to stab from behind and conduct disturbance and harassing tactics. Kim Il-song should not adhere to a revolution in which he depends upon the "South Korean students and people of all strata" but rather he should come to the table of peaceful negotiation.

No's Conference, Economy, Issues Analyzed

SK1101021890 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 11 Jan 90 p 2

[News Analysis by staff reporter Kim Hak-kyong: "No Voices Optimism on South-North Dialogues, Economic Growth"]

[Text] President No Tae-u yesterday was optimistic not only on inter-Korean relations but also on economic development in the 1990s.

He said a decisive moment for national unification will arrive within the next 10 years with per capita GNP increasing to $15,000 by the year 2000.

The presidential New Year press conference also presented details of policy programs for other fields, including national security and diplomacy.

No endeavored to induce the north to become a responsible member of the international community by inviting the north, China, and the four member countries of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to send observers to Team Spirit '90 to verify the defensive character of the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise.

The press conference was highlighted when No accepted the proposal of north Korea's leader on New Year's Day for free inter-Korean travel and total openness, calling for a prompt summit to discuss this and other pending issues.

No, commenting that he hardly understands the preconditions attached to it, urged the north again to show earnestness toward resolving such issues.

Spending much time to explain his economic policy, President No emphasized the necessity for compatibility of democratization and economic development, referring to the public criticism that his democratization formula hinders economic growth.

"I have no choice but to make the economy continue to grow and democracy take root in the country," he said, adding that this is the only way for another economic takeoff.

Noteworthy is that No views the current economic situation as a crisis which was brought about by the combination of political and social problems with intrinsically economic ones.

To overcome the economic crisis and achieve sustained growth, No called on the government, political parties and business leaders to set an example of moderation and sacrifice, so that workers and the general public will be inspired to restrain themselves and cooperate.

For the government side, the President suggested a six-point formula, including institutional reforms to ensure economic justice, the decentralization of economic power in large businesses, construction of more houses and apartment units for low-income families, the introduction of the local autonomy system and balanced growth of all regions of the land.

In parallel with this, No presented five urgent national tasks to be accomplished, expressing his determination to solve these tasks during his remaining tenure of office.

They are crime prevention, educational reforms, promotion of science and technology, environmental protection and easing urban traffic congestion.

Touching on his initiative of northern politics, No foresaw that the East European wave of reform toward freedom and prosperity is bound to reach north Korea also before long, expressing his hope that similar changes will take place in the north in an orderly and peaceful fashion.

He also made some new proposals designed to improve inter-Korean relations. He said that if it is difficult at present to allow free travel to all, then separated relatives and those of 60 years of age and older should be promptly permitted to visit their native places.

Other proposals made during the press conference include join development projects, including the development of Mt. Kumgang and a communications agreement between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Opposition Parties Interpret No's Remarks

SK1201024690 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 12 Jan 90 p 2

[The "Out and About" column: "On Political Realignment"]

[Text] The three opposition parties appeared to interpret President No Tae-u's remarks Wednesday on political realignment in three different ways.

The PPD [Party for Peace and Democracy], which is against any attempt to alter the present framework, assessed No's views as close to those of its party president, KIm Tae-chung.

It was probably happy to hear No speak of "the unreality of the idea of re-grouping the political circle into conservatives and progressives" and "the impossibility of seeking an artifical political restructuring."

But some officials pointed out that No's remarks are not unequivocal. They were suspicious because No also acknowledged a need for political restructuring, mentioning the negative aspects of the four-party system. They also noted No's statement that the DJP's [Democratic Justice Party] door is open to any party.

Other officials said No is straddling the issue, conscious of the rivalry between the PPD and RDP [Reunification Democratic Party]. But they argued that the emphasis is clearly on the preservation of the status quo.

The RDP, on the other hand, called No's comments disappointing. The party disregarded No's contradictory statements and simply focused on the point where he admitted a need to transform the present political structure.

Party officials criticized No for failing to project a vision for leading the nation into the 1990s. While admitting a need for political transformation, one official said, No is taking his time on this matter, which does not help stabilize politics.

Hwang Pyong-tae, a special adviser to party President Kim Yong-sam, said Kim has never referred to a new framework in which conservatives are pitted against progressives, thus implying that No's rejection of such a framework as unrealistic has nothing to do with Kim's perspective.

RDP officials were inclined to analyze the underlying meaning of No's claim that the DJP door is wide open in connection with former DJP Chairman Pak Chun-kyu's view that a political realignment needs to be oriented toward a two-party system.

Meanwhile, the NDRP [New Democratic Republican Party] appeared to be giving an extremely cautious interpretation of No's comments on political realignment.

No apparently took a opposite stance to party leader Kim Chong-pil's view that the restructuring should be predicated on constructive competition between conservatives and progressives.

But the party's response to No's view was not critical but rather friendly, describing it as an "optimistic wait-and-see stance."

The party seemed to believe that No's stance is not incompatible with its leader Kim Chong-pil's long-term perspective on political transformation.

What No opposed was, officials said, an immediate and artifical framework pitting conservatives against progressives, which party leader Kim also thinks undesirable.

The cautious reaction could be interpreted as reflecting Kim's long-term aim of drawing the DJP into the envisaged grand coalition of conservative forces. Apparently conscious of the DJP, the NDRP tried to slow down RDP president Kim Yong-sam's speedy move towards a merger between the two parties.

But some young party lawmakers could not restrain their criticism of No's outlook on political restructuring. They blasted No for his opportunism, arguing that No has not shown the will to spear-head a political transformation which he believes to be necessary. He intends to follow others rather than lead them and he should feel ashamed of this," a lawmaker said.

No, Kim Yong-sam Meet on Reshaping System

SK1201113790 Seoul YONHAP in English 0950 GMT 12 Jan 90

[By Hong Sang-pyo]

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 12 (YONHAP)—President No Tae-u said Friday he will carefully consider moves to reshape the four-party political system after he has reviewed opinions from various walks of life as he thinks "the restructuring is very important for the democratic development of the nation."

No was responding to opposition leader Kim Yong-sam's call for a new political structure during a four and half-hour meeting at Chongwadae, the presidential residence, that included discussions on pressing national issues, No's spokesman Yi Su-chung said.

The two agreed to improve cooperation between their parties through dialogue and compromise, easing political struggles and confrontation to promote democratic development and stave off economic and social difficulties in the 1990s, Yi said.

No affirmed that he is willing to consider allowing political parties to make limited direct contact with North Korea to talk about inter-Korean issues, but the two agreed that Pyongyang must not be allowed to exploit the contacts, Yi said.

They also agreed that the opposition parties should cooperate with the government's "Northern policy" diplomatic outreach to improve relations with socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and China, and policies toward North Korea to promote the reunification of the Korean peninsula, Yi said.

No and Kim, head of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), agreed that the government should be the main channel for dialogue, contact, exchange and cooperation with the North on inter-Korean matters and reunification of the Korean peninsula, divided at the end of World War II, Yi said.

The talks covered realignment of the political structure, inter-Korean relations, measures to get over economic hardships, revision of so-called undemocratic laws and local elections.

No and Kim agreed that the leader-and region-oriented rivalry among four politicial parties has triggered uneasiness and should be remodeled to fulfill the people's aspirations, but they differed on such details as format, method and timing.

No insisted it be carried out prudently, saying artificial and hasty realignment may deepen political instability, the spokesman said.

Kim, who is moving to reshape the four-party system along with Kim Chong-pil of the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) and possibly to merge their two parties, said political, social and economic instability as well as distrust in politics could be deepened if the four-party structure continues, Yi said.

He said Kim also said the current political structure is unable to effectively cope with the issue of reunification or changes in the international arena, insisting realignment should not be a reshaping of the existing parties but "an alliance of a new dimension" mustering the leading forces in society.

Kim Tae-chung of the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) strongly opposes restructuring, fearing it will reduce his status and isolate him.

No and Kim also agreed to hold local elections in a fair atmosphere in the first half of this year, as was agreed in a meeting Dec. 15 between No and the three opposition leaders, after the National Assembly completes its special session slated for February.

They agreed that follow-up steps on liquidating remnants of former President Chon Tu-hwan's rule also be debated in the Assembly session.

Kim called for the release of long-serving prisoners who have renounced communism and the president said he would positively consider the request, Yi said.

The follow-up steps include revision of so-called undemocratic laws—the stiff National Assembly law and the law on the Agency for National Security Planning—and compensation for victims of the military crackdown on the 1980 pro-democracy protests.

The meeting with the RDP leader was the second of a series of private talks No plans with opposition leaders. He met Kim Tae-chung Thursday and is to meet with Kim Chong-pil Saturday.

Korea To Send Official to UN Group in Beijing

SK1101025690 Seoul YONHAP in English 0245 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 11 (YONHAP)—A South Korean government official is to be assigned to a United Nations agency in Beijing this year, a source at the Economic Planning Board (EPB) said Thursday.

EPB will send one of its officials to the Chinese capital as an investment promotion officer with the United Nations Industry and Development Organization (UNIDO), the source said. UNIDO is seeking to establish the Beijing office with funds granted by its members, including South Korea. The office is designed to promote business and technological transfer to China from the West.

It will be the first time a South Korean Government official has been posted to Beijing since the communist regime was established in China in 1949. Negotiations between Seoul and Beijing on exchanging trade offices is at a stalemate due to China's negative attitude despite growing bilateral trade.

* Prospect for RDP-PPD Merger Analyzed

902C0028A Seoul CHINSANGGWA NAEMAK in Korean No 1, Oct 89 pp 18-23

[Article by Yi Il-chun, free-lance contributor: "What Is the Prospect for an RDP-PPD Merger?"]

[Text] **Ever since the 13th presidential election, there has been a persistent argument about the question of merging the RDP [Reunification Democratic Party] and the PPD [Party for Peace and Democracy], and this question is now emerging as the greatest issue in opposition circles. Inside the RDP, Choe Hyong-u, former RDP National Assembly**

floor leader, and young assemblymen have openly come out with a call for a merger, and reportedly, the merger issue is a potentially explosive one. How would this merger move, which is being looked at with "fretful eyes" by the two Kims, the presidents of the two opposition parties, end up?

Strong Call for Opposition Merger Following By-Election

The call for a merger of opposition parties, a predestined task for opposition parties and a latent political issue, is rising its head again. The fuse that rekindled the call was the outcome of the 18 August by-election in the Yongdungpo B electoral district in Seoul.

The by-election resulted, "as expected," in the victory of the DJP [Democratic Justice Party] and the defeat of the opposition parties. Political observers view the outcome as a defeat particularly for the RDP among the opposition parties. The PPD was the runner-up, but it was consoled by the fact that this time it obtained more votes in this electoral district than in the 26 April general election. In the case of the RDP, on the other hand, the outcome of the by-election was a great shock because the party fell far back in terms of the ranking as well as in terms of the number of votes polled.

The RDP's miserable defeat led to a reshuffling of the party hierarchy and criticism against the guiding principles of the party. Particularly, the criticism against the party line drew attention because it took the form of a strong attack by the party's young turks on party President Kim Yong-sam, who had been regarded as a sacred cow. The RDP's post-election agony was dramatized by the party caucus held on 29 August.

During the caucus, many assemblymen including even some influential senior members, vented their pent up dissatisfaction with the party line and the mode of party operation like water gushing from a floodgate. They poured out their complaints without missing major points so outspokenly that party President Kim felt embarrassed and chagrined. Some said, "in reality, the holders of the three executive posts stepped down taking the responsibility for the outcome of the by-election in the Yongdungpo B electoral district, but the party presidents and vice presidents should be held responsible." Others said, "the door to free speech within the party should be opened." Still others demanded that the party "regain its feature as a traditional opposition party."

The RDP ranks only third in strength in the National Assembly, but it may be said that in the public image it actually enjoys a higher prestige than what is due for its actual strength. The following cases are cited as concrete examples of the improved prestige of the RDP: Through its activities in the National Assembly special committees on Kwangju and on the Fifth Republic, the RDP improved its public image, and it somehow managed to occupy the center of the political stage during the controversy over whether a mid-term appraisal of President No's performance should be postponed or not, although the appraisal failed to materialize.

In this way the RDP enjoyed a higher prestige than was due as the second-ranking opposition party. But with the withholding of a mid-term appraisal of President No's performance as a peak, the RDP's popularity began its downward slide. The case in which the RDP bought a candidate with money in a by-election on an east coast electoral district was the starting point for the downturn. In an attempt to save his party's "preposterous predicament," President Kim tied up with President No, whom he had ridiculed as one "who should step down." Subsequently, before and after his June Moscow visit, he maintained a still closer relationship with President No. Following his talks with President No immediately prior to his departure for a visit to Moscow, Kim even went so far as to indicate his readiness to study or accept the DJP plan to dispose of the issue of how to deal with the six officials of the Fifth Republic—the key issue in cleansing the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic—by way of having the National Assembly file formal charges against them.

Subsequently, he kept mum throughout the July public security issue-dominated political tempest, in which PPD President Kim Tae-chung was in hot water, and thus he took a position closer to the government and its party. In his 1 August press conference, Kim Yong-sam expressed his "resolute position" with regard to the case of Assemblyman So Kyong-won, and cooly looked away from Kim Tae-chung's PPD when it asked him for help. The reaction to this change in the party line of the RDP appeared in the form of inner criticism against the party leadership, and the RDP's miserable defeat in the by-election in the Yongdungpo B electoral district amplified this criticism in explosive proportions.

Choe Hyong-u, Chang Sok-Hwa at the Core of Merger Move

"Other Parties have their solid support bases whereas in the RDP only those unreliable fickle supporters' who may bolt for any reason are loosely joined." "We do not know what kind of party the RDP is." Voices of self-criticism like these dominate the atmosphere within the RDP. In this connection, there are two factional lineups in the RDP. One is the "Democracy Study Group" made up of young turks in the National Assembly including Assemblyman Chang Sok-hwa, who was the first to call for an opposition merger; the other is the "Group of Democratic Friends," for which Assemblyman Kim Tong-chu acts as its representative. But, as far as the move for a merger of opposition parties is concerned, primary attention is now focused on Assemblyman Choe Hyong-u.

What was noteworthy of all remarks and suggestions made during the 29 August party caucus was the call for an opposition merger made by Assemblymen Choe Hyong-u and Chang Sok-hwa.

Assemblyman Choe said, "the current four-party system is unable to contribute to the good of the people and the country because it is based on regional ties rather than on policies." He then asserted that "the only way for us to ultimately serve the people and take the reins of government is a merger of opposition parties." He declared that he "will a take the road of a gallant politician like Lech Walesa to achieve an opposition merger."

Assemblyman Chang Sok-hwa, on the other hand, used the following logic to stress the need for an opposition merger:

"In the presidential election the opposition parties missed the chance to come into power. They have also failed to play a proper role in their status as the majority over the ruling party. They have neither been able to hold the ruling party in check and keep an eye on it, nor cleanse the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic and settle the Kwangju issue. The public criticism of these failures is mounting. If the opposition parties fail to feel responsible for their failure in various elections due to their disunity, it would be tantamount to an act of irresponsibility betraying the wishes of the public. What the opposition party can hope for is a chance to take over the reins of government through their merger. It is quite clear that unless the opposition parties merge, they would also lose in the local assembly elections next year. An opposition merger is a political fate ordained for opposition politicians."

Needless to say, the targets of the opposition merger are the PPD and the RDP. At present, the NDRP [New Democratic Republican Party] is included among the opposition, but it is not included in the targets of the merger.

As a matter of fact, a PPD-RDP merger is not only the ardent wish of the majority of the people but also in a sense, if we may so, a necessity and inevitable.

When we look further back in our inquiry, the split into two parties was from the beginning a betrayal to the public and was arbitrary in a sense. Actually, the PPD and the RDP are one and the same body on the unbroken conservative party lineage in our country with their roots in the Korea Democratic Party founded after liberation. The split did not stem from any difference in ideology or political line but was caused by partisan stratagems purely based on the conflicting interests of individual politicians.

Treacherous Opposition Split Stemming From Two Kims' Ambition for Power

Only about 1 and ½ months before the 13th presidential election in December 1987, the opposition party split into the RDP led by Kim Yong-sam and the PPD headed by Kim Tae-chung.

The split was caused by the ambition of the two Kims for the presidency.

The 13th presidential election, which was held under the direct presidential election system won by the citizens revolt in that summer, offered the best chance for the opposition party to come into power. However, the chance was predicated upon the absolute condition that the opposition party field a single candidate.

But, unfortunately the opposition party had two influential candidates, who refused to yield even an inch to each other because each of them did not want to miss the lifetime opportunity. The overwhelming majority of the people demanded that a single candidate be fielded, but the two Kims did not lend an ear to this demand. In the end, the opposition party broke up to field separate presidential candidates. The end result was the defeat of the two Kims. The rare chance offered through the citizens revolt was snatched away by the DJP.

The number of votes garnered by each of the presidential candidates graphically showed the depth of the treacherous nature of the ambition of the two Kims for the presidency and the split of the opposition party. The two Kims failed to come into power despite the fact that they polled 55 percent of the total votes between them. On the other hand, Candidate No tae-u became president, although he polled only 36.6 percent of the votes. As a result, the desire of the majority of the people to put an end to the de facto military dictatorship which had lasted for a quarter of a century came to nought due to the personal ambition of the two Kims.

There was another shocking experience in the by-election in the Yongdungpo B electoral district, although the intensity of the shock was far less than that from the bitter experience in the 1987 presidential election. DJP Candidate Na Ung-pae was returned with 38.7 percent of the total votes, whereas the PPD and RDP candidates lost although the combined total of the votes they polled was 48.8 percent. Needless to say, it is a mistake to anticipate that if the opposition parties had fielded a single candidate, he would have obtained all the votes that went to the two candidates. But it is a common knowledge that surely, such a single opposition candidate would have won. Another bitter experience in the by-election in the Yongdungpo B electoral district, whose outcome was virtually a rehash of what happened in the 13th presidential election, was behind the call for an opposition merger made within the opposition camp following that election.

DJP in Crisis, With Emerging Factions, Rising Criticism

In addition to the fact that the RDP suffered a greater miserable defeat than the PPD in the by-election in the Yongdungpo B electoral district, the peculiar inner situation of the RDP is said to be the reason that the call for an opposition merger was first made in the RDP. According to this theory, the relatively free atmosphere of the party lends itself to the formation of factions, and dissenting views manifest themselves in the form of an unreserved critical attitude.

Currently, what appears to be a sense of crisis is prevailing in the RDP. This sense of crisis is so serious that it cannot be cured by symptomatic treatment alone, such as a reshuffling of party posts. RDP assemblymen except for those hailing from Pusan are saying that "if things are not changed, the result of the 14th presidential election will be the same as that of the by-election in the Yongdungpo B electoral district, and the RDP might be totally decimated in all districts including the Kyongnam area." Behind this pessimism there is the peculiarity of the RDP, namely, that whereas the DJP has a basic advantage as the party in power and the PPD has a solid power base in the Honam area, the RDP is a party in which only undependable "fickle supporters" who may bolt for any reason are loosely joined. Each of the DJP, the PPD, and the NDRP has its own peculiarities associated with its name, but within the RDP there is the voice of self-criticism that "we do not know what kind of party the RDP is after all."

In connection with this inner atmosphere of the RDP, the "Democracy Study Group," a group of those young assemblymen who have persistently criticized the party line, is currently drawing attention. In addition to Assemblyman Chang Sok-hwa, who was the first to make a call for an opposition merger during the 29 August party caucus, the group includes these other assemblymen as its members: Kim Chong-kil, Chong Chong-hun, Kang Sam-che, Kang Sin-ok, No Mu-hyon, Kim Kwang-il, Paek Nam-chi, Pak Tae-kwon, Kim Un-hang, Yu Sung-kyu, Sin Yong-kuk, and Yi In-chae.

As of now this group has little drawing power due to lack of a distinctive leader, but it may be called an elite group of many of the RDP young turks who have distinguished themselves as "stars of the hearings." Depending on circumstances, there is the possibility that this group will have a strong say in party affairs. It has made critical remarks without hesitation about the Kim Yong-sam leadership, while persistently calling for intraparty democracy. When the call for a merger of the two opposition parties gains momentum in the future, chances are high that the "Democracy Study Group" will, itself, take on an important role.

The "Society of Democratic Friends," although different in character from the Democracy Study Group, has its own voice. This group has 18 assemblymen as its members, and depending on political circumstances, there is the ample possibility that it will air its own independent views with regard to various pending political issues.

However, all things taken together, as far as an opposition merger issue is concerned, Assemblyman Choe Hyong-u is at the center of attention. He was the closest of all close aides to party President Kim, so close that he used to be called President Kim's right-hand man, and until last month he had played his role as what may be called the field command tower, in his capacity as RDP floor leader. It was quite natural that attention was focused on him when he, this same Choe, came out with a call for a coalition of opposition parties. This is because as of now any argument calling for an opposition merger rubs RDP resident Kim in the wrong way and runs against the party policy.

In some quarters Assemblyman Choe's abrupt call for merger is interpreted as a reaction to party President Kim's action in replacing him as RDP National Assembly floor leader, but that does not necessarily seem to be the whole truth. Claiming that an opposition merger is the only way to serve the nation and seize power, Assemblyman Choe told the caucus that "this is the way to love President Kim and the way to be patriotic to the country and save the party."

For Assemblyman Choe, who has grown to be a senior member of the party and has his own faction, although loosely organized, it is fully surmised that he must be anxious to walk his own path as a political leader, independent of the aegis of President Kim. He may be seeking such an opportunity in an opposition merger.

Assemblyman Choe, who has taken upon himself the task as the new standard-bearer in the move for an opposition merger, has enthusiastically set out to undertake active long-range tasks, such as rallying people of the same mind. At a press conference following his replacement as floor leader, Choe reiterated that he "will become the standard-bearer of the move for an opposition merger with the unburdened stand of a man freed from his party post." He is now said to be secretly making extensive contacts to rallying people of the same mind while hurriedly looking for an office building which will serve as the center for the merger movement.

Signs of RDP, PPD Merger Advocates Tieing Up With Assemblyman Yi Chan-chong, Yi Chol

According to a source who is taking part in the merger move, among the RDP National Assembly members, more than 20 are showing a positive reaction to the move toward an opposition merger, and in the PPD also, over 10 assemblymen are said to be sympathetic to the move. Reportedly, the PPD assemblymen who the RDP pro-merger group claim are sympathetic to the merger move, are assemblymen from constituencies in Seoul and from the Honam area returned from the at-large constituency.

When the merger move becomes ripe to a certain extent, it is highly possible that the move will be linked to Yi Chan-chong and Yi chol, who have been enthusiastically calling for an opposition merger. Since the time of the 1987 presidential election these two independent assemblymen have consistently called for fielding a single opposition candidate and a merger of opposition parties. Refusing to deviate from their creed, they finally went so far as to bolt their party. Currently, as a precondition for an opposition merger, they are not only calling for "the stepping down of the two Kims but also going one step further and demanding a restructuring of "the system of one No and three Kims."

Advocates for an opposition merger with the RDP are not yet going so far as to call for the two Kims to step down. But there is an ample possibility that such a call will be made when the merger move makes headway. This is because as a practical matter, when the merger move goes into the implementation stage, the presence of the two Kims are likely to operate as a stumbling block.

How tenacious is the desire for power on the part of these two men was fully demonstrated in the 13th presidential election. It is common knowledge among political circles that this desire of theirs is as tenacious as ever. Needless to say, the possibility of some dramatic development cannot be ruled out altogether. But at least, as long as the present state of affairs continues, neither of the two would make any concession, and in this event, it will be correct to expect that there is little possibility for the PPD and the RDP to merge into one party or field joint candidates in elections at all levels.

The call for the retirement of the two Kims is also related to a shift in generation. Critics say that with these two men, who have continually been the stand-bearers of the opposition for nearly 30 years beginning in their forties, with their presence, have sapped the vigor of the opposition parties in our country, standing in the way of the emergence of second-generation leaders. As of now, merger advocates are not openly demanding the retirement of the two Kims, but below the surface, their advocacy presumes the possibility of their retirement. For this reason, not only the two Kims but also the PPD and the RDP, each of which is completely under their respective personal control, have taken a stand opposed to merging their two parties or are at least skeptical of any merger.

The two Kims—Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam—are not only unhappy about the merger call but also have the fear that this call might spread. The two Kims are taking pains to pretend to be indifferent to the merger call, arguing that the current situation demands that efforts be made to solve multitudinous tasks, such as cleansing the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic while adapting ourselves to the four-party system chosen by the people, rather than spending time in discussing an opposition merger. But in reality, they are watching the merger call with fretful eyes.

Two Kims Say Cleansing of Evil Consequences of Fifth Republic, Democratization Are Foremost Tasks

PPD President Kim Tae-chung said that "it is not desirable to discuss an opposition merger at this moment, and put aside the first and foremost tasks of eliminating the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic and realizing democracy." RDP President Kim Yong-sam also takes the attitude of ignoring the merger call by saying, that "if they (the PPD leaders) had not broken up the Democratic Party and bolted, there would have been no merger call." However, an opposition assemblyman advocating the merger of the opposition parties has retorted, "some people say that the call for a merger of the opposition parties will have the effect of obscuring the issue of eliminating the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic, but will it be possible to do this without an opposition merger?"

During a 4 September press conference, PPD President Kim Tae-chung said: "It is not desirable to discuss an opposition merger at this moment while putting aside the first and foremost tasks of cleansing the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic and realizing democracy. RDP President Kim Yong-sam also takes the attitude of ignoring the merger call from the beginning by saying, "if they (the PPD leaders) had not broken up the Democratic Party and bolted, there would have been no merger call." The floor leaders of the opposition parties expressed similar stands respectively.

Answering questions regarding the possibility of an opposition merger during a joint press conference of the floor leaders of the four parties at the Press Center in August, the floor leaders of the PPD and the RPD expressed the same view that "it is a matter that should be considered only after the elimination of the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic and democratization have been completed." The press conference was hosted by the foreign corespondents club in Seoul. PPD Floor Leader Kim Won-ki said that "when differences in policy become distinct after democratization is achieved, parties of an identical color will merge." RPD Floor Leader Yi Ki-tae also said he thinks it "practically impossible to merge the opposition parties while proceeding with the tasks of eliminating the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic and democratization, the foremost tasks at this moment."

We get the impression that the merger call is quickly dying down because of the opposition from or the skeptical attitude on the part of the leadership of the opposition parties. Particularly because when the merger call was made from within the RPD for the first time, it appeared insubordinate in nature," the party leadership reacted with alarm. The party leaders brushed aside the merger call by charging that such a call "will only obscure the issue of eliminating the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic" and went so far as to brand it as an act of treachery. They even deliberately circulated rumors that the merger advocates are "come-ons," the trump card played by the Chon clan.

The extent of the alarm the leadership of the RDP, the epicenter of the merger tremor, felt about the merger call was typically illustrated during the 6 September RDP policy seminar in Yangpyong. Taking the floor at the seminar, a novice assemblyman added fuel to the merger dispute by asking these questions: "Some people say a merger of the opposition parties will have an effect of obscuring the issue of cleaning up the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic, but will it be possible at all to do this without an opposition merger?" and "they say the time is not ripe yet, but when will the merger take place?"

But the moderator abruptly invoked cloture before the debate went into full swing. The reason for the cloture was "to give the speakers and the party president time to drink juice." A reporter who covered the seminar on that day said, "it seemed that the sponsor of the seminar quickly noticed that party President Kim Yong-sam felt uncomfortable about the merger debate."

As a matter of fact, the argument that at the present stage the call for an opposition merger is fraught with many problems is valid in many ways. There is some truth to the argument that the cleaning up of the evil consequences of the Fifth Republic and democratization are more pressing than an opposition merger. It is also understandable that since the standard-bearers of the merger give the impression that their leadership is weak it is difficult to pick up sympathetic followers.

Yet the call for a merger of the opposition parties in itself has validity and appears inevitable. The memory of the missed chance in the 1987 election through a split, and the failure to field a single candidate is still vivid in the minds of many citizens. It is certain that as the enforcement of the local self-government system in 1990, the 1992 general election, and the 1993 presidential election approach, the merger issue will develop and expand from a latent issue into a realistic theme.

* Military Reorganization Plan Revealed

* New Structure Explained

902C0053 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean 25 Oct 89 p 5

[Article by Han Ki-pong]

[Text] An outline of the military reorganization plan (known as 818 Plan), which has been much criticized recently, has been unveiled to the public. On 24 October, Minister of National Defense Yi Sang-hun made a formal announcement of the reorganization plan that has been studied thus far, and said he will rush to create General Staff National Defense Headquarters and appoint its chief, which are the key factors of the reorganization plan, as soon as the plan is approved by the National Assembly.

According to the Ministry of National Defense, the planned military reorganization is part of the development of long-term defense systems, and in general, it is aimed at reorganizing the military's upper level structure into a more policy-oriented, efficient system run by a select few, while the troops under their commands will be organized into a combat-oriented, light-weight system.

Chain of Command

The minister of national defense will be responsible for both military administration and military command, which is the way it is now; but the responsibility for military command will be delegated to the national defense chief of the General Staff and the responsibility for military administration will be delegated to the chiefs of each military department.

Thus, through delegation from the minister of national defense, the national defense chief of the General Staff can exercise the power to control strategies of key operational commands of each military department. Depending on the effects of the reorganization, the structure of the key operational commands could change, but presently it consists of the First, Second, and Third Army Headquarters, Strategic Command Headquarters of the Navy and Air Force, and Headquarters of Special Forces. In other words, the national defense chief of the General Staff can bypass the chiefs of each military department and control strategies of the aforementioned commands.

Except for the power to control strategies, the chiefs of each military department will carry out their traditional duties, such as personnel administration, budgeting (including distribution of resources), administration of military justice, inspection, education and military training, preservation of military discipline and morale, etc.

The minister of national defense will retain his existing rights to personnel administration, budgeting, use of information, etc.

A close look at the functions of the upper level of the organization shows that the Ministry of National Defense will be responsible for development of national defense policies, acquisition and distribution of resources, and execution and control [of other duties]. The National Defense Headquarters of the General Staff will be responsible for reporting projected needs of military forces to the Ministry of National Defense and for the applications of military power. The headquarters of each military department will be responsible for preservation and development of the military force, military administration (including personnel administration), and supply of munitions.

According to the Ministry of National Defense, such a new organization and function of the military will be in line with the principle of civilian government because the national defense chief of the General Staff and the chiefs of each military department will be reporting to the minister of national defense, who will be assisted by the national defense chief of the General Staff in the area of commanding the strategic units.

Moreover, it is said that since the key power of the chiefs of each military department will be divided and restrained, the reorganization could be an effective way of preventing power concentration.

Structure of the National Defense Headquarters of the General Staff

The structure of the National Defense Headquarters of the General Staff will be based on the present structure of the Headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and part of its manpower will be transferred from the headquarters of each military department through reduction and adjustment of the personnel while maintaining the current level of the full strength. It will adopt a system in which the chiefs of headquarters are controlled in order to make the system of joint operations work, and will organize the following four units: Strategic Planning Headquarters (which is a combination of the Strategic Planning Bureau and the Bureau of Weapons System, both of which are currently under the Headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff); Intelligence Headquarters (which is a continuation of the Intelligence Headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff); Strategic Headquarters (which is a unification of strategic headquarters of each military department); and Support Headquarters (for personnel and military supply). Besides, it will create the following four offices: Office of the Combat Readiness Inspection which will take over the functions of the present Office of the Special Inspector that will be dissolved; Office of the Civil Psychological Warfare; Office of the Command Control Communications; and Office of the Secretary.

There will be first and second deputy chiefs under the national defense chief of the General Staff, and their military background will be different from that of the chief. Thus, if the chief is from the Army, the deputies will come either from the Navy or from the Air Force. The ratio of the strength of the General Staff will no longer be based on the ratio of the full strength of each military department, but will have a ratio of 2 to 1 to 1 for the Army, Navy and Air Force, respectively, which is said to ensure preservation of the traditional three forces and a balanced growth. The full strength of the National Defense Headquarters of the General Staff will be reportedly 1,000 some people.

Background

The military reorganization was previously attempted four times since 1969, but was held back because of the concerns over conflict of interests within the military and concentration of power when it was proposed to unify the functions of the military administration and military command.

However, because of the characteristics of the modern warfare, which require development of high-tech weapons that lead to an intensive surprise offensive as well as close cooperation of strategic elements among the military units, it has become necessary to maximize the combined war power of the three military departments. Hence, the renewed development of the reorganization plan. Another objective is to enhance the economics of managing the national defense resources through unification and abolition of overlapping functions of each military department. In addition, because of the expected withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea, it is said, the reorganization is urgent in order to prepare for the transfer of operations and to cope with strategic circumstances of the future.

Joint Force vs. Unified Force

"Joint" and "unified" are military terms, and the Ministry of National Defense says the concept of our military reorganization plan is that of "joint." In general, the following military systems exist: Advisory System of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Korea and Japan); Controlled System of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.); System of the National Defense Chief of the General Staff (England, West Germany, France, and Australia); and Unified System of the Chief of the General Staff (System of Unified Military, North Korea, Israel, Canada, Turkey, and Taiwan).

The proposed reorganization plan is a European type; however, in view of the fact that the NATO nations have a system in which the national defense chief of the General Staff has the operational power at peacetime (the commander in chief of NATO takes over at wartime), the plan also carries some characteristics of the unified military system, in which its commander has the operational power at both wartime and peacetime. The Ministry of National Defense calls it the "Korean System of Joint Military."

As suggested in various military theses thus far, the military thinks it is desirable to place both functions of the military administration and the military command under the commander in chief in a unified system in order to deal with North Korean threats. However, the Ministry of National Defense stresses that in order to eliminate the possibility of hampering the civilian control and to promote a balanced growth of each military department, the unified military system has been ruled out.

Regarding the timing of creating the National Defense Headquarters of the General Staff, Minister of National Defense Yi Sang-hun said, "I will submit the reorganization proposal when the given conditions are fully met at the National Assembly." At present, because of the oppositions from the three opposition parties, the plan could possibly be revised to give reduced power to the national defense chief of the General Staff.

* Impact, Prospects

902C0053 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 25 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Kim Hyong-pae]

[Text] The Ministry of National Defense announced its military reorganization plan (the 818 Plan) on 24 October, and repeatedly stressed, "The objective of this plan is to enhance [the military's] combat readiness in a modern war which is characterized by an intensive surprise offensive."

In the process of making final decisions on the plan, the Ministry of National Defense studied four types of most common military systems in the world: 1) Uncontrolled System of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Korea, Japan and Argentina); 2) Controlled System of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (United States); 3) Joint System of the General Staff (England, West Germany, France, and Italy); 4) Unified System of the General Staff (Turkey, Israel, Taiwan, and most communist countries). Of these, the ministry focused on the types 3) and 4), and concluded that "the Unified System of the General Staff (a unified military system) is most desirable," thereby justifying its plan as a pure attempt to consolidate the war power.

However, this explanation indicates that the military reorganization proposal by the Ministry of National Defense is the first phase of the military reorganization and is prepared to meet the immediate need to obtain the National Assembly's approval.

In other words, it is revealed that our military favors the System of the Single Chief of the General Staff, in which the power of both military administration and military command is consolidated.

This is also revealed when the Ministry of National Defense said, "But if the power of military administration and military command is given to the national defense chief of the General Staff, the concentration of too much power could hamper civilian control, and elimination of the headquarters of the three military departments could lead to disorder and friction. Thus, we have finally decided not to adopt this system."

Since the bill of military reorganization will be laid before the National Assembly, the following items may be particularly noteworthy: Of the types 3) and 4), namely the Israeli and West German military systems, the Ministry of National Defense decided not to choose the West German system, in which the minister of national defense exercises the power of both military administration and military command through the chiefs of each military department and the national defense chief of the General Staff controls the national defense plans; instead, the ministry's basic model was the Israeli military system, in which the national defense chief of the General Staff can exercise the power of military command without going through the chiefs of each military command.

Also, regarding the recent plans to create the Headquarters of Unified Force, the Ministry of National Defense sensed a rise of doubts and negative movement in political circles and among the general public. The Ministry of National Defense repeatedly stressed, "The announced plan is not for a unified military system but for a joint military system," thereby trying to dissipate the criticism that it was only a tentative plan aimed at obtaining approval from the National Assembly.

In connection with this, at the main session of the National Assembly on 14 October, Minister of National Defense Yi Sang-hun said, "The new military system being proposed by the government is a system in which the power of military administration and military command is unified under the minister, but only the power of military command is delegated to the national defense chief of the General Staff," thereby clarifying the government's firm position in using the Israeli system as a model insofar as the power of military command is concerned.

It has been pointed out that the objective of this plan is to consolidate the military organizations to increase efficiency in management and distribution of national defense resources and to prepare for the future policy changes of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea and the [expected] transfer of the operational power. This is apparent in the reorganization proposal that is based on the Israeli military system insofar as the power of military command is concerned.

However, the military reorganization plan failed three times in the past—once immediately after the Nixon doctrine in 1971 when former President Pak Chong-hui was in power, once immediately after the end of the Vietnam war in 1975, and once during Chon Tu-hwan's reign—because of such negative effects as too much power assigned to the national defense chief of the General Staff as a result of overconcentration of the military power. In view of these experiences, a great deal of criticism is expected in the legislative process.

The government, too, is keenly aware that if the military power is concentrated in the Army, it could cause more serious doubts in the political circles and in the Navy and Air Force, whose members are concerned about the past experiences wherein the military power was abused by some of the Army generals even under the present system of the three military departments which is viewed as the most ideal in a civilian government. And, in fact, there were the events of 16 May, 12 December, and 17 May, that add worries to the general public. Thus, the government expects hardships in the legislative process.

If this plan is implemented, the power of the headquarters of each military department will be limited to the supportive functions of military administration, such as construction and maintenance, and the 650,000 troops of the key military divisions and most of the national defense budget of 6.5 trillion won will be reverted to one person, the national defense chief of the General Staff. Thus, the voice of criticism is rising high.

In connection with this, the Ministry of National Defense said that in order to preserve and develop the tradition of the three military departments it is "currently in the process of developing detailed regulations for the implementation of the reorganization plan, including direct presidential orders. For example, we plan to raise the ratio of the personnel in the National Defense Headquarters of the General Staff to 2 to 1 to 1 for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively, rather than keeping the ratio according to the full strength of each department, and will hire two deputies from the Navy and Air Force to assist the national defense chief of the General Staff, the three of whom will form the office of the command, so that the individual concerns of the

Navy and Air Force can be reflected to the maximum extent in the process of key policy development and decisionmaking."

The general public and the political circle, which does not relate the military reorganization plan with the government party's political reorganization plan, acknowledge the necessity for a consolidated war power, but still demand a "pan-national public hearing" on the military reorganization plan. This is because of the concerns over the possibility of weakening of the civilian control, military experts point out.

Burma

Government Soldiers Die in Explosion at Pangkan

BK1201023390 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 12 Jan 90 p 9

[Text] Mae Sot—Four Burmese soldiers were killed and some seriously wounded in a huge explosion at a Burmese military barracks in Pangkan on Sunday [7 January], border sources said.

A series of explosions was reported on Sunday afternoon while Burmese troops were inspecting weapons and munitions seized from a Karen rebel camp at Palu. The weapons were left behind by fleeing rebel troops when Burmese forces overran their camp last month.

Sources said a convoy of Burmese military trucks had earlier taken the weapons to their base at Ban Pangkan.

Meanwhile, Burmese government troops yesterday released two Thai villagers later identified as Bun Siriphum and Surin Bang-ngoen, who accidently crossed into Burma.

The two men told Thai authorities Burma was constructing a road from Ban Palu to a destination they did not know.

Meanwhile Burmese troops torched two Karen villages located across Mae Sariang District in Mae Hong Son Province last Saturday leaving about 200 people homeless, Karen sources have said.

The two villages, with 30 and 50 houses respectively, are just a day's walk from the Karen National Union [KNU] headquarters south of Manapler.

The villagers, said the sources, somehow got wind the Burmese were coming and fled before they arrived.

Manapler, apart from being KNU headquarters, is also the main base of the anti-Rangoon National Democratic Front, the Democratic Alliance of Burma and the All-Burma Students Democratic Front.

Burmese ground forces have never come so close to Manapler in earlier attacks, the source said.

Information Committee Holds 73d News Conference

BK1101161790 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1330 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] U Soe Lwin and 27 persons who were rescued by a Korean fishing vessel held the 73d news conference with local and foreign journalists today at 1200 noon at the Bayintnaung Hall of the Yangon [Rangoon] Division Military Command Headquarters.

The news conference was attended by members of the Information Committee of the State Law and Order Restoration Council; deputy commander of Yangon Division Military Command Headquarters; managing director of the News and Periodicals Enterprise of the Information Ministry; directors, deputy directors and chief editors; foreign broadcasting services and news agencies including KYODO of Japan, ANTARA, UP, UPI, REUTER, AFP, ANSA, YOMIURI, TASS, XINHUA, JIJI Press of Japan, Tokyo Broadcasting Service [TBS], ASAHI SHINBUM and NEWSWEEK.

At the news conference, U Soe Lwin who returned to Myanma [Burma], related their experiences and feelings to local and foreign journalists and then answered questions raised by them.

In the afternoon at 1430, the Information Committee of the State Law and Order Restoration Council met with local and foreign journalists and explained that in holding a news conference this week there is nothing in particular that the committee would like to explain and said that the journalists are to ask what they wish to know. Next the Information Committee answered questions asked by the journalists.

First, in response to the questions raised by the reporter from ANTARA and YOMIURI newspaper, they explained that matters concerning candidature lists are announced daily with the press releases from the Multiparty Democratic General Elections Commission on television and radio programs and in newspapers the following day. In answer to a question by ANTARA's correspondent, the committee explained that in the matter involving captured Joint Secretary Soe Myat Thu of the support committee of the ABSDF [All Burma Students' Democratic Front], further action will be taken when all the evidence is received.

In response to a question by NEWSWEEK's correspondent, the committee went on to explain that there are companies supporting the insurgent groups at the border and that they know only when people like U Soe Lwin who returned from the border tell them about it. They are aware that the support is not politically motivated and that it is only given as support for refugees on humanitarian grounds.

In answer to a question raised by the XINHUA correspondent, the Information Committee explained that the reception centers opened to accept people who had fled to the border have not been dismantled as yet and that if no crime is committed there is nothing to fear.

In answering the UPI correspondent's question, the committee explained that the change in name from the Union Bank of Myanma to the Central Bank of Myanma will be done in accordance with a law that is to be prescribed. The news conference ended at 1500. The details of the news conference will be broadcast after the end of this news.

Malaysia

French MP Visits, Speaks on Cambodian Problem

BK0901085390 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English 0718 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Jan 9 (OANA-BERNAMA)—France is waiting for "new developments" before convening another round of talks to help resolve the thorny Indochina conflict, a French parliamentarian said here Tuesday [9 January].

Jacques Baumel said given the important role and major influence which France could wield in finding a solution to the conflict, it would continue to find ways to facilitate an agreement between the warring factions in the region.

France hosted a series of protracted talks between the factions last year but they ended in a deadlock.

Baumel, who is leading a five-member delegation from the Commission of Defence of the French National Assembly on a four-day visit, told Malaysian members of Parliament at a meeting at Parliament building here, that however France would remain neutral in such talks and would not support any of the factions.

He said any proposals to end the conflict would not have satisfactory results without the relevant factions themselves working out a compromise.

"Our objective is to bring these people together in a round-table meeting to end the conflict," he added.

He agreed with ASEAN's four-point plan to end the problm—verifying the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, fair representation of all the factions, economic construction of Kampuchea with international assistance and bringing them together through peaceful negotiations.

Earlier, the delegation called on Deputy Foreign Minister Dr Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan. Dr Abdullah Fadzil told reporters that during the meeting, they discussed bilateral cooperation and the Kampuchean problem.

France supported the efforts undertaken by Malaysia and five other ASEAN members to continue to seek a political solution to the Indochina problem, he added.

Cooperation With E. European Nations To Increase

BK0901090690 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English 0644 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Jan 9 (OANA-BERNAMA)—Malaysia will step up economic cooperation and bilateral relations with East European countries following a change in their administrative ideology from communism to democracy, Deputy Foreign Minister Dr Abdullah Fazil Che Wan said Tuesday [9 January].

"If necessary and if the situation permits, we will strengthen our delegations to countries who have already established relations with Malaysia," he told reporters after meeting four French parliamentarians who called on him at the Foreign Ministry here. He said Malaysia was currently monitoring developments in the Eastern Bloc countries before making a new stand.

He was confident the change in ideology successfully brought about by the people in the Eastern Bloc countries would further facilitate establishment of economic relations between them and Malaysia. He added that Malaysia welcomed the change in ideology among the Eastern Bloc countries.

Cambodia

Hun Sen Addresses Svay Rieng Meeting 7 Jan

BK1101123590 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 10 Jan 90

[Text] A solemn meeting was held at the Svay Rieng provincial sports stadium on the morning of 7 January 1990 to mark the 11th anniversary of the 7 January National Day in the presence of Comrade Hun Sen, member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and minister of foreign affairs. Also present were Comrade General Sin Song, alternate member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau and minister of the interior; Comrade Kim Yin, member of the party Central Committee and director general of the radio Voice of the Cambodian People; Comrade Heng Samkai, member of the party Central Committee and secretary of the Svay Rieng provincial party committee; Comrade Em Saman, alternate member of the party Central Committee and director general of the Cambodian News Agency SPK; Comrade Yim Chhayli, alternate member of the party Central Committee and deputy minister of public health; and comrades from the provincial party committee, provincial people's committee, provincial seat, the delegation from Vietnam's Long An sister province, humanitarian organizations, and international organizations fulfilling their duty in Svay Rieng Province, and some 10,000 cadres, personnel, and workers of offices and units around the province as well as local people, monks, and students.

After saluting the national colors and paying respects to the memory of fallen cadres, combatants, and people who sacrificed their lives for the cause of the motherland and after the monks had made a prayer blessing the presidium members, Comrade Heng Samkai, secretary of the Svay Rieng party committee, took the floor to say:

[Begin recording] Through the 11 years of efforts to defend the motherland and protect the achievements of the national society under the correct leadership of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party [KPRP] in addition to the assistance made in the spirit of the great internationalist proletariat accorded by the brothers and friends near and far the world over, especially the Vietnamese friends, not only have our people overcome the consequences left behind by the genocidal regime and obstructed and frustrated all the enemies' perfidious maneuvers and inflicted one setback after another on them, but our paople have also won immense victories in all fields, creating new advantages and new forces for the revolution to advance toward a new historic stage, namely, the stage in which the Cambodian forces themselves are taking full charge of the revolutionary tasks and destiny of the motherland in place of the repatriated Vietnamese volunteer troops. At the same time, they have cast a profound influence on the position and prestige of the State of Cambodia in the international arena and ensured that the majority of public opinion recognizes the realities and provides support for the struggle of our people, thus contributing to the common cause of the Cambodian revolution.

The people of Svay Rieng have made great efforts and produced immense achievements in all fields, especially the immense revolutionary achievements in the implementation of the fifth party congress resolutions and the resolutions adopted by the first provincial party committee congress. In 1989 in particular, under the clear-sighted leadership of the beloved KPRP, the cadres, party members, combatants, and people of our Svay Rieng Province overcame difficulties to create many great and new achievements in all fields.

In attacking the enemies, we have firmly upheld the spirit of mastery. In combat readiness, we have succeeded in preventing the enemies from infiltrating the provincial perimeters. We have attacked the enemies outside the provincial perimeters, realizing excellent results in defending the portions of the border entrusted to us by the central authorities. In the recruitment field, we have also experienced a great achievement by persuading 3,251 people, or 108.40 percent of the annual plan, to join the army. This presents an increase of 1,567 people more than the previous year. We have sent 1,200 troops to supplement the regular forces and 2 battalions to man defense posts along the Cambodian-Thai border. Moreover, we have sent some 500 militiamen and 250 militant workers to defend and work at the border. We have also recruited more than 500 men for the mobile police forces and sent 1 battalion to the border at the request of the Interior Ministry.

The people throughout the province are proud of and satisfied with the party and state for deciding on various new policies, especially the policy on land ownership and management. All of this has encouraged the people to become more conscious in implementing the plans and targets set by the province in all fields of work.

In particular, despite the fairly protracted drought last year, the monsoon rice growing campaign throughout the province managed to achieve 11.58 percent of the plan. The monsoon harvest may produce 142,000 metric tons of grain.

In the field of beautifying various district seats and townships, many buildings such as the party school, schools, hospitals, irrigation works, and roads have clearly showed the historic change of outlook of Svay Rieng Province under the new regime. [applause] [end recording]

Afterwards, Comrade Chairman of the Council of Ministers Hun Sen took the floor to address the meeting participants. We present an excerpt of his speech as follows:

[Begin recording] On this joyous occasion, on behalf of the party and government and in my own name, I would like to express sincere admiration at the achievements made by the people of Svay Rieng Province over the past 11 years.

Just to think of 7 January makes us remember those days that took place more than 11 years ago, days which caused us to live a new life over the past 11 years, a life permeated with both joy and hardship.

First, I would like to make an appraisal, a comparison of some questions concerning the transition from one regime to another, for this is most important for us. If we failed to make a correct appraisal, we would become either overly proud or self-deprecating. For this reason, it is necessary that in order to assess something it is necessary for us to have a basis for clear comparison. We cannot race alone and do not want to see anyone race alone without competitors. Racing alone would not allow us to see whether we are running fast or slow, because there are no competitors.

We know that Pol Pot destroyed everything, including human lives, property, and social structures. He destroyed everything. Therefore, as far as we are concerned, as far as our new regime is concerned, we have inherited nothing but the countless serious consequences left behind by the Pol Potists. If the Pol Potists destroyed everything, what did we get? We would not mind if they did not leave behind material and technical foundations and production bases. But they left behind thousands of consequences that the new government, our people have to resolve. Tens of thousands of orphans, hundreds of thousands of widows, and millions of people without support were left behind for us to take care of.

The danger of famine threatened the lives of the Cambodian people throughout the country. It was a threat not just within a family, a village, a commune, or a district, but a threat all over the country. Ruin and exhaustion were a general occurrence. At the same time, every Cambodian became a refugee in his own land. This is unprecedented in the world.

Usually, a refugee flees from one country and takes refuge in another country. But in Cambodia after liberation, all Cambodians were refugees in their own country because under the Pol Pot regime we were evacuated from the east to the west, from the north to the south, and from the cities to the countryside. As a result, right after liberation, we were all exhausted and starved and could not engage in any production work as we were too busy traveling under the most trying conditions in search of family reunions and to return to our respective hometowns. This was the problem we experienced. The government inherited nothing but ruins from the Pol Potists. We did not have any banks nor material foundations. There was no food left, because before they fled, the Pol Potists burned down food stocks, rice fields, and the rice in the fields. The day of liberation was in the dry month when the rice in the field is the most flammable.

As for the people—besides the government which had nothing in hand to help solve the people's livelihood—what did the people get from the Pol Pot regime? When they impounded our property and pooled it in the cooperatives, what did they take from us? At that time, many families turned in motorcycles, bicycles, cattle, carts, hoes, knives, and other instruments for production. But after we toppled the Pol Pot regime and dismantled its collective labor and collective kitchen cooperatives, what did we get back? Some families got carts minus the buffaloes. Others got the oxen without the carts. Others received the plows without the draft animals. And others yet got nothing at all.

When they confiscated our pots and pans and stored them in the mess halls and common kitchens, they took away from us many dishes, spoons, pans, and pots. But when we attacked and broke down this collective pot and collective cooking stove system, we retrieved incomplete sets of kitchenware. Some got the pots without the covers while others got the spoons without the plates. This was the situation all of us experienced. What did we get, both the government and the people? Virtually nothing. We went through the most trying moments and had to solve virtually everything ourselves. There were hundreds of thousands of orphans and people without support for us to take care of. The people were generally broken up, exhausted, and traumatized at that time. This is what I want to point out about the difference in the inheritance of each period.

I ask my compatriots to make a comparison between two different regimes so that we can correctly label them. We started off after the Pol Pot regime. Therefore, we must compare our life today with that under the Pol Pot regime. This is a must. However, we must also compare our regime to that of Prince Sihanouk. We must also make a clear comparison between the two in order to make a correct appraisal. Otherwise, we might become opinionated or smug or we might become self-deprecating, thinking that we are not capable, not able to resolve problems, becoming grateful to and nostalgic over the Sihanouk regime, and wishing for its return to Cambodia.

Truthfully, we do not oppose the yearning for the regime of Prince Sihanouk. I who am prime minister, the head of the current government, still reminisce over the past I experienced in the Sihanouk era generally known as the time of peaceful development. However, we must make a clear comparison in order to see what we have done and what more we can do? I would like to examine, to compare three main points between us and the Sihanouk regime.

First, let us look at the point of departure, that is, the point of inheritance between our regime and that of Prince Sihanouk. There is a marked difference between the two regimes. Sihanouk inherited many things from the French in addition to aid from France and Western countries intended to strengthen the hold of Sihanouk. As for us, not only did we fail to inherit anything good from Pol Pot, but we were left with countless untoward consequences that we have to resolve as described above. Therefore, there is also a big difference even from the point of departure.

The second point deals with the section of road traveled. Prince Sihanouk traveled for 16 years in total peace, whereas we have been traveling in the situation and under the circumstances of a country which is both in peace and at war. Certainly, we have always claimed that peace has prevailed in most of the territory and most of the time, while the war has been only spotty and sporadic. But, large or small, a war is a war. It has proved to be nefarious for the lives of the people, their property, and national reconstruction efforts.

It is true that there is no war in Svay Rieng, but it takes place in Battambang, in Siem Reap. It certainly has some impact on the reconstruction of our motherland, the reconstruction of villages, communes, and localities in Svay Rieng Province. Therefore, there is a difference between Prince Sihanouk and us on the portion of the road to be traveled. It can be said that when he started off, Prince Sihanouk was already riding a car, a motorcycle, and he was traveling on a fine, asphalt or concrete road, whereas we set off barefoot on a road strewn with difficulties, with thorns and potholes, for the past 11 years.

Third point: Prince Sihanouk built the country for 16 years or, if we counted from 1953, he had 17 years to build the country. As for us, we have been building the country for just 11 years now. We still have 5 or 6 more years to go to equal Prince Sihanouk. I would like to tell you, all venerable monks and dear compatriots, that 11 years is not enough to rebuild a devastated country like Cambodia. I would like to tell you that we cannot compare our present living conditions with those under Prince Sihanouk's regime, because we did not inherit anything from Prince Sihanouk or the French. We should compare our life in the past 11 years to the life under the Pol Pot regime because we inherited the Pol Pot regime. We started our travel from the overthrow of the genocidal Pol Pot regime.

I do not to wish to make a large-scale, global comparison or appraisal. I would like to take this opportunity to urge the compatriots to compare some points around ourselves, around our families, around our hometown, because this would be easier. If we compare the growth of the material and technical foundations, the development of the gross national product, or the increase of the national budget, it is difficult to go through all the details. We do not have enough time to do it. For this reason, I invite you to engage in a simple, down-to-earth comparison. Let us close our eyes for a moment and then reopen them. We close our eyes to recall what we had 11 years ago and we reopen our eyes to see what we have today.

Today, as there are some venerable monks present among us at this meeting, I propose that all compatriots, especially the Buddhist faithful, and all venerable monks meditate for a moment to recall whether we had Buddhism 11 years ago, whether we could engage in almsgiving 11 years ago? Certainly, everybody knows that under the Pol Pot regime we did not have any traditions or religious freedom. Monasteries were destroyed and many monks were murdered or disrobed and forced to do hard work. There were almsgiving ceremonies in those days. But today we [words indistinct] and religious belief has been revived over these past 11 years. I clearly told Prince Sihanouk: You do not have to tell me, I have done it. I have brought religion back to the country.

Sihanouk said to me: Excellency, bring back religious belief to the country.

I said: You do not have to tell me, I have done it.

Did we have such things 11 years ago? We Cambodians like to give alms and we respect Buddhism. In particular, we Cambodians are most grateful toward our parents. When our parents become old we organize religious ceremonies and make merit for them. We respect them because we are grateful to them. We do not want them to work. We keep them at home and take them to the temple on holidays. We make merit for them and give them the four necessities of life. When they die, we hold 7-day and 100-day memorial services. On All Saints Day we go to the temple to make merit and give food to the monks so that their souls can enjoy the merit thereof. In Cambodia we make merit for our parents from the time they are alive until their deaths. Did such a practice exist under the Pol Pot regime? No. They forced our parents to work like cattle and we did not have any opportunity to take care of them. Today, we can do so; the right to do so has been returned to us now.

I would like to tell you that Buddhism is closely linked to the present authorities. If the Heng Samrin regime sinks, Buddhism will also sink. If all of us want to preserve Buddhism, we must help preserve this government. Let us meditate: What did we have 11 years ago and what do we have today as far as religion is concerned?

In the fields of education, art, and culture, let us close our eyes and think. Eleven ago did our children, brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces have the opportunity to go to school as now? Certainly, if we close our eyes a bit, we will have the bitter reminiscence that our children were mobilized into young boys' and young girls' groups forced to perform hard work without a chance to go to school or receive any parental care because they became the children of the Angka [Pol Pot's organization] placed at the disposition of the Angka. They were underage children used by the Angka to work without care. They were subject to all kinds of maltreatment.

Now, let us open our eyes and look around us. What do we see? We see our children, grandchildren, nephews, and brothers in colorful uniforms, dressed in green skirts or pants and white shirts, wearing caps with scarves around their necks. They have become the masters of schools and are learning in all levels of education from primary to higher education. We have been reborn. This is our pride, a big hope of our party and state.

We remember that there were some illiterate people under the regime of Prince Sihanouk. The subsequent 5-year war also created more illiterate people. Under the Pol Pot regime along with slaughtering the educated people, intellectuals, students, and teachers, learning was prohibited. Consequently, there have been many illiterate people in our country. This has made it necessary for us to invent many learning methods. Along with reopening schools for the children and youths, we have launched campaigns to fight illiteracy under the personal leadership of the general secretary of the party Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State, namely Comrade Heng Samrin himself.

We have special courses, extra-work study, and supplementary education. We are now succeeding in our efforts to eliminate illiteracy and the party and state are launching another campaign to prevent the danger of forgetting how to read and write.

Therefore, we see that we have wrested back what we have lost during these past 11 years. Allow me to inform all venerable monks and compatriots that Prince Sihanouk himself had acknowledged that the Hun Sen government did a great job. He acknowledged that what we are doing is better than what he did before, when there were only some 900,000 students, whereas we have as many as 1.8 million students at all educational levels. In a situation in which many teachers were lost and many schools destroyed, we could enroll so many students.

This is the point about what we have done and how much have we done. Prince Sihanouk said: You are smart to do what you have done. His Excellency Hun Sen is smart.

He said: Because you are smart, you last long. An ignorant person like Pol Pot is not going to last long. So acknowledged Sihanouk.

Let us recall what we had during the Pol Pot time? What else besides the black-clad art performers of the Angka did we have? Everything was centered around the Angka, be it music or songs.

Now we have wrested everything back.

In conclusion, I would like to appeal to the party committees and people's committees at all levels concerning three main points:

First, do not let the enemies attack us by surprise. It is imperative to firmly grasp the enemy situation even though we are in the rearguard. You must have good preventive measures to attack the enemies from afar. Do not let the enemies attack you unprepared. Prepare a strong rearguard to support the front. This is an important point.

Second, prepare all conditions, including troop recruitment and the training of armed forces, to be ready for combat in the region and ready to supply forces to the front line. At the same time, carry out well all the rearguard duties, such as sending combatants to the front, sending food to the front, and preparing conditions to buy paddy to have food available in support of the front. Everything for the front.

Third, never let the people go hungry without learning about it and without finding a solution for it. This year's production work is good in some places and bad in some others. For this reason, party committees and people's revolutionary committees at all levels must firmly grasp this point. Never let the people starve to the point of dying, becoming exhausted, or becoming unable to engage in productive work. You should grasp this firmly. Find ways to resolve the problem wherever there is a problem. Do not let the people starve unnoticed or let the starvation problem take place unsolved. This is my additional appeal to party committees and people's committees at all levels. [applause] [end recording]

The meeting wound up in an atmosphere of great solidarity, friendship, and joy.

Hun Sen Awards Promotion to Prey Veng Cadres

BK1001064890 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 2300 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] On the afternoon of 6 January at the office of Prey Veng Province's People's Committee, a ceremony to award promotion to five provincial cadres, who have actively contributed to building defense networks along the Cambodian-Thai border, was held under the chairmanship of Comrade Hun Sen, member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and foreign minister.

After observing the national anthem and paying tribute to the souls of cadres, combatants, and people who have sacrificed their lives to the cause of the motherland's rebirth, Comrade Toch Sak, deputy secretary and chairman respectively of the province's party committee and people's committee, read the Council of Ministers' decree on awarding promotion to cadres, combatants, and people who have contributed to building the defense networks.

The meeting ended in an atmosphere of cordiality following Comrade Chairman Hun Sen bestowing stripes on the five provincial cadres.

1989 Industrial Production Said To Top Plan

BK1101060090 Phnom Penh SPK in English 0436 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK January 11—The total value of industrial production in Cambodia last year exceeded the yearly plan by 10 percent or 26 percent more than 1988's. This has increased the income for the state by 8 percent over the yearly plan, or up by 33 percent over the previous year.

Fine achievements were seen in the production of the power plants, textile mills, foodstuff workshops and the consumer goods workshops.

However, some factories and enterprises still face difficulties in their production due to the insufficiency of raw material and the oldness of machinery and equipment.

The industrial and handicraft establishments in all provinces raised the value of their production to 1,865 million riels (Cambodian currency). The figure chalked up an increase of 4 percent over the yearly plan or 42 percent over the previous year.

In the year-end meeting to review the industrial work in 1989, the "Societe Khmer Distillery" (SKD) and the industrial and handicraft service of Kompong Cham Province were distinguished in the production and awarded the "Laureate Banner" of the Council of Ministers.

SPK Reports 1989 'Enemy' Troop Losses

Battambang, Siem Reap Provinces

BK1201065090 Phnom Penh SPK in English 0413 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK January 12—Last year, the Cambodian People's Armed Forces in Battambang Province (300 km northwest of Phnom Penh) put out of action 2,147 enemy troops, including 836 killed, 613 wounded and 69 others captured.

They seized 558 assorted guns and a good quantity of war means and destroyed a number of enemy hideouts.

The number of misled people who returned to the nation's fold last year rose to 649 representing a threefold increase over 1988. They included 350 ex-Pol Potists, 246 ex-San Sannians and 53 Sihanoukists.

The regional army units in Varin District, Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province (300 km northeast of Phnom Penh) on Jan. 1 killed 33 Pol Potists, wounded 28 others and seized 11 assorted guns and a quantity of war means in a fighting in Sre Noy Village.

Banteay Meanchey Province

BK0901124290 Phnom Penh SPK in English 1105 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK January 9—In 1989, the Cambodian Armed Forces of Banteay Meanchey Province, 360 km northwest of Phnom Penh, wiped out 1,182 enemy troops, including 629 wounded and 368 captured. They also destroyed 500 hideouts and seized 595 assorted guns, 16 tons of cartridges and shells and a quantity of other war means. During the same period, the province received 1,057 misled people who deserted their ranks and reported themselves to the nation's fold, bringing along 547 assorted guns.

Losses Among 'Enemies' in Kompong Thom Noted

BK1001065390 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1200 GMT 9 Jan 90

[All figures as heard]

[Text] While carrying out their fighting and readiness to fight, the Armed Forces of Kompong Thom Province have harmoniously cooperated with local authorities from all institutions in serving as the core for the people to attack the enemies and carry out the proselytization campaign, thus achieving successive victories.

In fact, in all of 1989, as a result of the province's stage-by-stage campaign to search out and destroy the enemies both inside and outside the provincial terrain, the enemies lost their concentrated bases and suffered due losses. According to the provincial military command's concrete statistics, in 1989 the Armed Forces throughout the province put out of action 2,119 enemies of all stripes, including 702 killed on the battlefield, 500 wounded, and 65 captured, and seized 452 assorted weapons and a large quantity of war materiel.

Simultaneously with these serious defeats, 848 soldiers of the three reactionary groups laid down their weapons and turned themselves in to our authorities and people, bringing along 383 assorted weapons and a large quantity of war materiel.

ANS Claims Control of Part of Kompong Thom

BK1201035090 London BBC World Service English 0215 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] One of the anti-government factions in Cambodia has said that it now controls large parts of the central Kompong Thom Province, north of the capital, Phnom Penh. The spokesman for the group, which is loyal to Prince Sihanouk, has been speaking in Bangkok to BBC correspondent Jack Thompson.

[Begin Jack Thompson recording] The spokesman, Mr (Ek Sereivat) of the Sihanouk National Army, or ANS, said they now control 1,200 square kilometers of territory in Kompong Thom. They also control a 25-km stretch of road just west of Kompong Thom City, which means that the important provincial capital of Siem Reap in the northwest of Cambodia is now cut off from Phnom Penh. Mr (Sereivat) gave this as one reason for the failure of the Cambodian army to get reinforcements up to the frontline. Hence, the somewhat desperate plea by the Cambodian prime minister, Hun Sen, at the weekend for yet more recruits.

Mr (Sereivat) said of newly trained soldiers sent to the western provinces, only a fifth got through. The rest, said Mr (Sereivat), defected to the guerrillas. He said the ANS itself had received more than a thousand defectors in the last 3 months. The Cambodian army, obviously suffered from low morale, the troops didn't see why they should sacrifice themselves for the Phnom Penh government, which is only serving the interests of its Vietnamese masters.

This, of course, is a tendentious course of events in Cambodia, though the ANS are somewhat less prone to exaggeration than the Khmer Rouge, with whom the Sihanoukists are in an uneasy alliance. Mr (Sereivat) gave me a breakdown of how the ANS believes the Cambodian army's 40,000 men are deployed. About 17,000 of them are serving in Battambang Province and about 4,000 of those would probably have been involved in heavy fighting at the weekend when the Khmer Rouge attacked the provincial capital. [end recording]

Role of UN Seat in Peace Process Downplayed

BK1201120990 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0430 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Political commentary: "Why Does Cambodia's UN Seat Need To Be Left Vacant?"]

[Text] In the quest for a solution to the Cambodian problem, the Heng Samrin-Hun Sen regime has demanded that Cambodia's seat at the United Nations be vacated in exchange for the acceptance of the UN role in Cambodia. Hun Sen has painstakingly requested this but has rejected joining the three Cambodian parties at the United Nations even if we allowed him to do so. This has created differences of opinion on a settlement of the Cambodian problem. Why does Hun Sen want the UN seat left vacant while preserving his regime? This stance undoubtedly stems from a piece of expert advice from the Vietnamese for a well-defined purpose.

We, the noncommunist resistance fighters, do not understand the reason why the settlement of the Cambodian problem requires the vacancy of Cambodia's UN seat. The important point of the settlement is how to organize a truly free and just election. We believe that although the UN seat is occupied by the Cambodian resistance forces, this will in no way force the Cambodian people into voting against their will for the party occupying the seat.

Does Hun Sen think that the people will cast their ballot in favor of the party holding the UN seat, or that the United Nations, having a role in organizing and supervising elections, will secretly lend a hand to that party? If this is the case, we are very pleased to invite Hun Sen, regardless of his stinking involvement with the Vietnamese, to sit with us, the Cambodian resistance group, at the United Nations.

In fact, Hun Sen well realizes that the demand for the vacancy of the Cambodian seat has nothing to do with a just election, but, as we have previously mentioned, Hun Sen, at all the talks, always presents points that are definitely unacceptable to the Cambodian resistance with the aim of stalemating the talks. The world has already seen through this malignity of Hun Sen.

Hun Sen has clearly realized that his regime's defeats both on the battlefield and in the political arena stem from the shortfall of support from the international community. That being the case, Hun Sen and Vietnam have pretendedly softened their positions, but there is still no clear sign that they want peace because Hun Sen, his family, and his small group of aides in Phnom Penh are drunk with power. If a solution was found, Hun Sen, his family, and his servants would be unable to retain this power and rule for an extended period of time.

We, the noncommunist Cambodian resistance forces movement, do not reject the proposal of Gareth Evans [Australian foreign minister]. We understand that the proposal, in combination with the vigorous offensives launched by our resistance forces, will make the process of the talks move forward. We want to settle the Cambodian problem peacefully since we are always concerned about the suffering of the Cambodian people who are continuously experiencing the adverse effects of the war. However, we cannot be duped by Hun Sen's tricks, because if we are, the communist Vietnamese will swallow up our country. On the other hand, we want to expose the insidious nature of Hun Sen, who acts under the Vietnamese command and who always dupes the Cambodian people and world opinion with his tricks, for the purpose of prolonging the war in Cambodia in accordance with Vietnam's strategy.

Shelling of Battambang Defense Posts Reported

BK1001034890 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] On the morning of 4 January, following our attack to cut off a portion of the route between Kop Khmaoch and Don Pei, our national resistance forces intercepted a Vietnamese enemy reconnaissance company after it was sallying out 300 meters from Kamping Puoy, forcing it to retreat in disarray back to their position.

On the same day, our national resistance forces fired artillery shells on Pich Changva, Don Pei, Ta Hen, Prey Khmaoch, Pong Ro, Ampil Pram-doeum, and Bavel which were the Vietnamese-puppet positions defending Battambang Town from northwest.

In the two attacks, we killed 16 enemy soldiers on the spot and wounded 22 others, and we destroyed many guns and some war materiel.

Results of Route 56 Attacks 6-8 Jan Reported

BK1201043690 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] On 6, 7, and 8 January, our national resistance forces attacked and cut Route 56 in many places—from Tuol Kruos to Sre Tang Yar, from Sre Tang Yar to Sre Peang, from Sre Peang to Tuol Kruos, and from Tuol Kruos to Pramaoy.

We have repeatedly attacked and cut this road, and greatly and increasingly hampered activities along this only strategic road for supplying food, ammunition, and fighting forces to Brigade 94 in Anlung Reap and the border. Trucks carrying war materiel, food supplies, and soldiers, and trucks pulling artillery pieces of Brigade 94 along Route 56 have been successively ambushed by our national resistance forces and attacked with mines. Many of the trucks have been damaged or destroyed.

In a period of 3 days, from 6 to 8 January, we destroyed 15 Soviet-made ZIL-130 and ZIL-131 large military transport trucks and many tonnes of weapons and ammunition, including batteries of rockets. We also killed or wounded over 50 enemy soldiers.

Route 56 is currently transformed into a cemetery for Vietnamese and puppet soldiers, and a site for burning Soviet-made large transport trucks, all sizes of weapons, and all types of ammunition belonging to the Vietnamese enemy and puppets.

Gold Said Stolen From Party Political Bureau

BK0401033490 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 3 Jan 90

[Excerpt] Recently, there was a theft of gold right inside the Political Bureau of the puppets' party Central Committee. This news was spread among the people and masses in Phnom Penh City. Reports said wives of big shots of puppets Heng Samrin and Hun Sen working in the Political Bureau of the puppet party Central Committee stole many ounces of gold. [passage omitted]

Northwest Battambang Defense Line Said Attacked

BK1201042290 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Following the attacks that completely cut off the stretch of road between Kap Chen and Don Peou, a company of Vietnamese troops left Kamping Puoy on the morning of 4 January to inspect the road. They were ambushed and routed by our national resistance forces 300 meters from their position.

Also on 4 January, our national resistance forces fired artillery shells on Pich Changva, Don Peou, Ta Hen, Prey Khmaoch, Pongro, Ampil Pram Daeum, and Bavel, which are a network of positions of the Vietnamese enemy and puppets defending Battambang Town from the northwest.

In these two attacks, we killed 16 enemy soldiers on the spot and wounded 22 others, for a total of 38 casualties. We also destroyed a number of weapons and war materiel.

Indonesia

Daily Views Regional Impact of Noriega Surrender

BK1001114190 Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 5 Jan 89 p 5

[Editorial: "The Story of the Former Panamanian Strongman Ends"]

[Text] Finally, on Thursday morning at exactly 0850 West Indonesian Time [0150 GMT], former Panamanian strongman General Manuel Antonio Noriega, who had been in hiding at the Vatican Embassy in Panama City since 24 December, surrendered to U.S. military forces who had been besieging him. He will later be tried on charges of smuggling drugs into the United States.

This is a tragic story of another son of man. He was initially "raised" by the United States through the CIA to help movements which subsequently succeeded in toppling the Colombian Government in 1958. Now, his life has to end in a court of a country that once raised him.

The disobedient child of Washington, who for some time tried "to kill" his master or the one who raised him, will in fact have to be sentenced in a court of his own master. Tragically, he is not charged with "disobedience" but with committing criminal acts.

He is to be tried by Washington not as a "hero" [preceding word in English] of his nation and people but rather as a drug trafficker. Obviously, the reversal of the status of the former Panamanian strongman can serve as a historic lesson or experience for leaders of other countries.

According to Washington officials, the former Panamanian strongman surrendered voluntarily to U.S. military forces who had been besieging him around the Vatican Embassy in Panama City for a week. The former Panamanian strongman appeared to prefer being tried in the United States to being tried by the new Panamanian Government itself.

The former Panamanian strongman's decision was probably based on the assumption that a trial in a country that emphasizes basic human rights would be more fair [preceding word in English] than a trial by his country's new government. Nevertheless, the career of the former Panamanian strongman will end no matter what happens.

This is because he may be given a total jail term of 145 years. He will be tried by a Florida court on drug smuggling and trafficking charges.

Indeed, whatever way the former Panamanian strongman has to choose, he will no doubt have to face a condition which could end his career. At first, it was widely predicted that the former Panamanian strongman would be given political asylum in a third country.

However, Washington insisted that the Vatican hand over the former Panamanian strongman to stand trial in the United States. In the meantime the new Panamanian Government, itself installed by Washington, also demanded his arrest to face charges of killing 10 officers who attempted a coup on 3 October last year.

However, new Panamanian President Guillermo Endara said that his country would be unable to ensure the personal safety of the former Panamanian strongman. This implied that the new Panamanian Government had indirectly allowed Washington to take the former Panamanian strongman.

The end of the career of a Panamanian named Manuel Antonio Noriega will certainly have wide political implications on the future political development of Panama. Washington will no doubt be able to regain its hegemony over Panama.

This will not rule out the possibility of its political maneuver in Central America becoming stronger. Certainly, Nicaragua and Cuba must study and consider the U.S. policy in Central America as early as possible. The two countries must anticipate what will happen or make new moves.

If the two countries are not critical enough to observe the development and shift of the international policies of the superpowers, they will certainly face consequences that will be far more serious than previously expected. In any case, Washington will certainly continue to ensure that this strategic region is developed and maintained in such a way so as to prevent it from posing a threat to the United States.

This is not much different from what the Soviet Union is doing in Europe. Any geographical region of strategic importance must be taken into account by every country in undertaking foreign policy moves. Are not such political maneuvers also undertaken by many regional countries in Southeast Asia in particular and in the Asia-Pacific region in general?

Back to the fate of former Panamanian strongman General Manuel Antonio Noriega whose career has ended. The political ramifications of the action will no doubt have wide implications not only on Noriega's own country but also on neighboring countries.

Nevertheless, one thing that should be studied and made as an empirical experience is the fact that any country wanting to become independent must first strengthen its national power. Without national power and resilience, its leader will meet the same fate. One will simply be a "paper tiger" before one's nation and people.

Islamic Group Member Jailed for 7 Years

BK1001093590 Jakarta THE JAKARTA POST in English 5 Jan 89 p 12

[Excerpts] Jakarta (JP)—Dede Saefudin alias Ade, 26, was sentenced to a seven-year prison term for subversion by the East Jakarta District Court yesterday.

Dede, a member of the Warsidi radical group and known as the contact man for the subversive movement, was guilty of trying to undermine the legal government and the state Pancasila ideology together with other members of the radical group, the court chaired by Judge Mrs Jusniah said.

The public prosecutor had demanded a 10-year sentence for Dede, who is married with one son. [passage omitted]

At the close of the 20-minute reading of the verdict, Dede nodded acceptance of the sentence. The Warsidi group clashed with police and troops last February in Lampung during which 32 people were killed.

Laos

SRV 'Reactionaries' Found Guilty of Espionage

BK1101130490 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 1200 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] As already reported, in late August 1989, 68 armed, exiled Vietnamese reactionaries illegally infiltrated Lao territory from Thailand and were completely put out of action by the regional armed forces and local people of Saravane Province. Of the 68, 38 were captured. All 38 were brought to the Supreme People's Court in Vientiane today for prosecution in accordance with the laws. Through the prosecution before the court, all 38 Vietnamese reactionaries were found guilty of committing offenses against the criminal law by intruding into territory, encroaching upon the sovereignty of Laos, carrying out espionage activities, and sabotaging the peace and tranquillity of the Lao people.

The Supreme People's Court has, therefore, passed the following judgments: Of the 38, 2 have been sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment, 4 to 12 years of imprisonment, 5 to 10 years of imprisonment, 10 to 8 years of imprisonment, and the remaining 17 to 6 years of imprisonment.

U.S. Headquarters Alleged

BK1201115290 Vientiane KPL in English 0956 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Vientiane, Jan 12 (OANA-KPL)—The supreme court tribunal of the Lao PDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic], at the trial of 38 Vietnamese reactionaries, yesterday passed the verdict of imprisonment ranging from five to fifteen years. These armed Vietnamese were previously arrested in 1989 in the south of Laos.

Tran Quang Do and Le Van Tien respectively commander and deputy commander of the two Vietnamese reactionary companies received fifteen years in jail. Two other men received 12 years imprisonment, six received 10 years, eleven received 8 years and the seventeen guilty men received 6 years imprisonment.

The trial was open to the public and representatives of foreign missions accredited in Laos.

The trial presided by Chief Judge M. Ket heard the accusation. Since the accused men were Vietnamese, there was a need for an interpreter. The lawyer of the accused was Kham-ouan Keophouthon, a lawyer of the bar of Vientiane.

The men were accused of having violated the Articles 51, 61 and 64 of the penal code of the Lao PDR. The nature of their deeds were related to acts of violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and disturbance of public order. They were accused of having mindfully used arms to sabotage public and private properties and having the intention to destabilize the Lao PDR and its neighbour.

On behalf of the defendants, Mr. Kham-ouan asked the court's clemency saying that the accused were simply agents of the Vietnamese reactionary organization whose leader and headquarters are in California (USA). And being soldiers, the defendants had no choice but to obey the military disciplines and orders.

The attorney Phai Oula, in the accusation statement, pointed out the gravity of the defendants' acts of jeopardizing the independence and sovereignty of the Lao PDR. They were fully armed and premeditatedly entered the Lao territory with an intent to subvert and destabilise a friendly country. The defendants have caused damage to public and private goods in Laos, he added.

Having heard all sides, the court was adjourned, and reopened in the afternoon. The Chief Judge M. Ket pronounced the verdicts.

LFNC Sends National Day Greetings to Cambodia

BK1201062990 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 1200 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] The Lao Front for National Construction [LFNC] Central Committee recently sent a greetings telegram to the president of the National Council of the Kampuchean United Front for National Defense and Construction [KUFNCD] in Phnom Penh.

The telegram says: On the occasion of the 11th founding anniversary of the State of Cambodia, we, on behalf of the LFNC Central Committee and multiethnic Lao people, extend our warm regards and best wishes to the National Council of the KUFNCD and fraternal Cambodian people. During the past 11 years, under the correct and clear-sighted leadership of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party headed by beloved Comrade Heng Samrin, the heroic, fraternal Cambodian people have maintained the traditions of militant and victorious solidarity and scored great victories in national defense and socialist construction, thus further bringing prosperity and civilization to the land of Angkor Wat. The implementation of national reconciliation and withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteer troops from Cambodia have testified to the State of Cambodia's goodwill and endeavors to settle the Cambodian problem through peaceful means and have proved the stability and strength of the new regime in the State of Cambodia and its capabilities of defending and constructing the country.

The LFNC Central Committee and multiethnic people proudly commend the victories and successes registered by the fraternal Cambodian people and regard them as their own victories and successes. We wish further strengthening of the special solidarity, friendship, and comprehensive cooperation between the Lao and Cambodian peoples and we wish the National Council of the KUFNCD more new and even greater successes in carrying out its noble duties and tasks.

Philippines

Ileto Dismisses Report of Coup Set for 25 Jan

HK1001094190 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 10 Jan 90

[By Vic Pambuan of Mobile 13 from Malacanang Palace]

[Text] National Security Adviser Rafael Ileto has dismissed a report that rebel soldiers will mount a new coup d'etat on 25 January to coincide with the 57th birthday of President Corazon Aquino. Speaking in an interview, Ileto said the report may be part of the rebels' disinformation campaign intended to scare and confuse the public and create greater instability in the country.

According to Ileto, he has not received any intelligence report concerning a rebel plan to mount fresh attacks, adding emphatically that his intelligence units keep very up-to-date files.

[Begin Ileto recording in English] Well, some of them are disinformation—actually, deliberate information that are not true—being spread out, and that is to confuse. That is possible. In any war, you are bound to get information, and it is up to our intelligence units to assess whether they are true or not. [end recording]

Ileto also expressed his confidence in retired Army Brigadier General Mariano Adalem as presidential consultant on military affairs cum National Intelligence Coordinating Agency director. He said that Adalem has the proper training and experience to defend the president and Malacanang Palace in times of crisis.

[Begin Ileto recording in English in progress] ...Adalem very much. He is new in the game, but I think because of his experience, he will be able to come up. [end recording]

At the same time, Ileto maintained that despite the presence of rebel soldiers in Mindanao, the military is in full control of the situation, and that peace continues to reign in all parts of Mindanao. He also said that black propaganda directed against the Aquino government is part of a psy-war campaign launched by the president's political enemies to confuse members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Defense Issues No Statement on Coup Participants

HK1101141990 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog 1300 GMT 10 Jan 90

[Text] Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus has said that the Department of National Defense [DND] has not sent him an official statement regarding reports that some foreigners assisted leaders of the coup. Further, the DND has not issued an official request to the Department of Foreign Affairs to investigate the matter. It will be recalled that there were reports saying that some American soldiers joined the Reform the Armed Forces members in an hotel which the latter occupied at the height of the December 1989 coup.

Manglapus also confirmed the dismissal of Leonides Caday from the Philippine panel that will hold exploratory talks on the U.S. bases. Caday has been recalled as consul general in Los Angeles after issuing a passport to Eduardo Danding Cojuangco. According to Manglapus, Malacanang will recommend his replacement.

The Philippine panel will meet next week to formulate the guidelines for the exploratory talks. [passage omitted]

Two Generals Want Dismissal of Rebellion Charges

HK1201020990 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Suspected coup plotters, retired Generals Felix Brawner and Jaime Echevarria, moved for the dismissal of the rebellion charges filed against them. Brawner and Echevarria, through counsel Alex Padilla and Merito Fernandez, claimed that they cannot be held liable for the charges since there was no valid complaint. Because the alleged complainant, Secretary Fidel Ramos, has no affidavit complaint for which charges of rebellion was based, Padilla added that the trasmittal letter of Ramos to the Department of Justice endorsing the filing of rebellion charges against his client cannot be taken as a formal complaint as contemplated by the rules of court. According to the rules of court, for a complaint to be valid, it must be in the form as stipulated by law and duly sworn by the complainant. Since the transmittal letter of Secretary Ramos does not conform to the rules of court, Padilla said, it cannot be treated as a formal complaint. The trasmittal letter was based on a recommendation by General Renato de Villa who, in turn, got a report from Colonel Ramon Gavino based on the investigation report of Colonel Benjamin Libarnes. But none of these officers were presented as prosecution witnesses. Hence, the content of the letter is pure hearsay.

Armed Forces Personnel Dropped From Roster

Colonel Noble on List

HK1001014790 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Rebel Army Colonel Alexander Noble has been dropped from the Army roll. This according to Major General Manuel Cacanando, commanding general of the Philippine Army. Noble is now considered dropped from the Army rolls because of his absences without leave. Noble reportedly led the 120 Army officers and soldiers who left their posts in Agusan and Surigao Norte Provinces to reinforce the rebel troops in Mactan Air Base in the December coup attempt. Noble was the erstwhile commander of the task force, Naibusayan, a unit composed of natives and based in the Agusan provinces. Cacanando, however, said that he did not know if a rebellion charge has been filed by the government against Noble.

The former Army colonel escaped from his government captors in Samar Island a few days after the coup attempt failed. Noble is now reportedly hiding in one of the two Agusan provinces. A reward of 500,000 pesos was put up recently by the government for the capture of Noble.

Total of 1,456 Deleted

HK1101060190 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 11 Jan 90 pp 1, 15

[By Roy C. Sinfuego]

[Text] A total of 1,456 officers and men of the Armed Forces have been dropped from the roster while 156 others have been convicted by military courts and sentenced to hard labor for violation of the Articles of War and their involvement in foiled coups since 1987, it was disclosed yesterday.

Military tribunals have meted out other penalties to 554 other AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] officers and men for violation of the Articles of War and their participation in the coup attempts.

President Aquino as Armed Forces commander-in-chief, meanwhile, delegated to Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos the power and authority to retire AFP officers and men.

Ramos said yesterday that of the 2,559 military personnel charged before military courts for involvement in four coup attempts, 554 officers and enlisted personnel were punished for violation of Articles of War No. 105, 1,456 were dropped from the roster, while 282 others are still undergoing trial before AFP courts martial.

Sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and hard labor, dismissal, and forfeiture of all benefits were Lt. Col. Domingo Bayan, Maj. Benjamin Rome, Maj. Crispin Galacgac, Captains Rodolfo Moral, Jesus Sampol, and Manuel Rodis.

Meted 12 years imprisonment and hard labor, dismissal, and forfeiture of benefits were Col. Oscar Canlas, Majors Rudy Rodolfo, Ruben Sagmit, Ananias David, and Delfin Genio Jr., and Captains Federic Tarte, and Nonito Calizo.

Sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, dismissal, and forfeiture of benefits were Col. Bertuldo de la Cruz and Lt. Col. Rodolfo Calzado.

Ramos said those sentenced to eight years imprisonment and hard labor, dismissal, and forfeiture of benefits for involvement in the Aug. 28 failed coup were Lt. Col. Reynaldo Beroya, Majors Clifford Noveras, Nestor Senares, Alejandro Lapinid, Captains Victorio Pangani-ban, Loreto de la Cruz, and Teofilo Milleza, and Lts. Abner Dimabuyo and Rosueto Ricaforte.

Sentenced to six years imprisonment, dismissal, and forfeiture of benefits were Col. Romeo Javelosa and Maj. Francisco Ovilla.

Eleven officers led by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Federico Pasion were reprimanded and their military record moved 40 files lower.

Ramos said that the power delegated to him by the President is not an "additional power," adding that under the new system, retiring AFP personnel merely will no longer have to go to the Office of the President for approval of their retirement.

De Villa Puts Camp Aguinaldo on Blue Alert

HK1001104790 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 1000 GMT 10 Jan 90

[Text] Camp Aguinaldo has been placed on blue alert for the first time since the aborted coup d'etat on 1 December. The order was issued by General Renato de Villa, Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] Chief of Staff, a few hours before he left for Cebu.

Under the blue alert status, half of the camp's force is placed on full combat posture, while the other half is allowed to take home leave. Camp Aguinaldo remained on red alert even during the Christmas season as a precaution against attacks by right-wing and leftist factions. According to Colonel Juanito Rimando, AFP spokesman, the Armed Forces cannot lower its guard as threats from rebel soldiers continue to exist.

Meanwhile, Southern Command [Southcom] authorities also placed its entire force on alert in the wake of reports of a new coup in Davao. Here is Sel Baisa with the details.

[Begin recording] Southcom authorities placed its entire force on full alert following rife rumors of a new coup in Davao. According to reports reaching Camp Aguinaldo, a battalion of Army and Navy men was sent from Zamboanga to Davao to beef up the military force there. Major Hermogenes Espera Jr, Southcom spokesman, said the move is also aimed at strengthening the military's campaign against the insurgents and secessionists. According to Espera, government soldiers are conducting a 24-hour surveillance of renegade soldiers, especially those serving under Colonel Alexander Noble. Espera also denied reports that Southcom was negotiating for the surrender of Noble. [end recording]

De Villa on Military Aid in Enrile Prosecution

HK1001013790 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] Chief General Renato de Villa said the military will help the Department of Justice prosecute Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for his alleged participation in the December coup attempt. De Villa gave the assurance to senior state prosecutor Aurelio Trompe. This after a new witness against Enrile surfaced yesterday.

De Villa said the military will provide documents regarding Enrile's alleged participation in the coup attempt. The new witness Manolo Caisip told prosecutors at the Department of Justice that he saw Enrile in the company of about 100 rebel soldiers at the height of the coup attempt. Caisip is a waiter at the Silahis International Hotel and was among those who served in a catering service at the residence of Enrile in Dasmarinas Village on December 1, the first day of the coup attempt.

De Villa Warns Against Protecting Rebels

HK1001091590 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 10 Jan 90

[Text] General Renato de Villa, Armed Forces Chief of Staff, has ordered all military unit commanders not to allow rebel soldiers to use their camps and warned soldiers against fraternizing with military adventurists.

In his speech before officials and members of the Vizayas Command in Camp Lapu Lapu, De Villa promised that rebel soldiers will be punished, and said those who help in the capture of rebel troops who are still at large will be rewarded. He added that his department is already studying a reward system for informers and for those who directly capture rebel soldiers. At the same time, De Villa stressed that rebel soldiers should not be given the chance to obtain any quarters or space which they could use to regroup. General De Villa warned that if any Armed Forces unit is found protecting any rebel soldier, its commander will be held responsible.

Ramos, De Villa on Rebel Soldiers' Hit List

HK1101050790 Baguio City Mountain Province Broadcasting Company in English 0330 GMT 11 Jan 90

[Text] Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos has confirmed that he and General Renato de Villa, Armed Forces chief of staff, are among those that top the hit list of rebel soldiers. Ramos made the revelation at a news conference in Camp Aguinaldo. He also said that the military rebels [words indistinct] are, this time, on the principle of conducting isolated hit-and-run tactics. He added that he believes the renegade troops are after him and De Villa because they were responsible for foiling the December 1 coup try. However, Ramos expressed the hope that the rebels will not harm foreigners and investors in their desire to get him, De Villa, and other ranking military officers.

Ramos Rejects Peace Talks With Communist Rebels

HK1001105590 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 1000 GMT 10 Jan 90

[Text] Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos has again rejected a proposal to hold talks with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army, saying that the rebels must first renounce violence before peace talks can be conducted.

[Begin Ramos recording in English] It is not just peace, which is the absence of violence or the stopping of fighting. It must be peace with justice. It must be peace that will result in the protection, in the reinforcement of our democratic system. What kind of peace will it be if it will end up with the loss or deterioration of our democratic form of government? [end recording]

Report on CPP Memorandum on Political Trends

Part One

HK1001123190 Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English 4 Jan 90 pp 1, 3

[Part 1 of a "Special Report" by Malou Mangahas and Sonora Ocampo on National Democratic Front draft memorandum dated 26 December 1989, entitled "Carry Out Rectification, Further Strengthen the Party, and Intensify the People's Revolutionary Struggle," issued from Utrecht, The Netherlands]

[Text] The Philippine revolutionary left, like the rest of the socialist world, has watched astounded as the Soviet Union-installed communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed like dominoes in cathartic social upheavals in the last year of the last decade.

The Communist Party of the Philippines [CPP] and the umbrella National Democratic Front [NDF], although widely perceived as inspired by the doctrine of Mao Zedong, found the convulsions halfway around the world as too close to home to ignore.

Not a few cadres voiced concern that aftershocks would creep into the local movement, and spell rough sailing for an organization already shaken by internal strife and problems.

'Wait and See'

Some expressed doubts that advancing the nationalist democratic cause was still valid. Others were more circumspect, adopting a "wait-and-see" attitude rather than knee-jerk reactions that could put the CPP and NDF in a bad light here and abroad.

Crucial questions arising from the East Bloc upheavals needed to be answered:

Is socialism, as Western observers and liberal thinkeres declared, on the decline?

Are so-called "liberation movements" guided by the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thinking a lost cause?

Analysis

In its first-ever analysis of the East Bloc turmoil and its effects in the country, the CPP declared that "no amount of mocking of the so-called failure of socialism" in Eastern Europe and elsewhere could deter it from pursuing its Marxist-Leninist ideology and waging revolution in the country "in a self-reliant and independent way."

The TIMES obtained the document, a 19-page draft memorandum dated Dec. 26, 1989, from the NDF based in Utrecht, the Netherlands. Entitled "Carry Out Rectifications, Further Strengthen the Party and Intensify the People's Revolutionary Struggle," the memorandum dealt lengthily on the crisis in the entire world, the achievements and short-comings of the CPP, and the crisis of the Philippine political system and prospects for revolution.

Satur Ocampo, suspected chairman of the United Front Commission of the NDF and CPP central committee member who was captured last year, also shared with TIMES his view of the dramatic changes across Europe, and their impact on liberation movements outside and in the Philippines.

'New Thinking'

Both the CPP central committee and Ocampo acknowledged that the "new thinking" espoused by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev—perestroyka (economic restructuring) and glasnost (detente)—was the propelling force for the East Bloc upheavals.

The new thinking, said the central committee, was "of the widest influence" on the European events.

The CPP and Ocampo also attributed the turmoil to the failure of the governments in the European countries of Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania to improve the lot of their peoples—to forward the cause of socialism.

Discredited

The CPP conceded that in a number of cases, communist party leaders had "been split and discredited."

"The Soviet Union put them in power after World War II, and very few faces have changed in the leadership since they assumed power," according to Ocampo.

These governments had failed to sustain their "leading role in revolutionizing their societies," partly attributed to the fact that they did not lead successful social revolutions, he explained.

Socialism in the East Bloc was implanted by the Soviet leader Josef Stalin.

Ocampo believed that "the object of change was the 'command administration system' identified with Stalin (and) largely followed in these countries."

The CPP cited that governments had failed to improve technology and equipment, and the general economic conditions.

Not Ready

"It seems that the ruling parties in Eastern Europe were not as ready to act as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by taking stock of their national situations, properly identifying the people's needs, and instituting bold steps towards socialist 'self-renewal'," Ocampo said.

He added: "Thus, their peoples took the initiative, and the ruling parties had to undertake urgent reforms under intense pressure or to give way to popular coalitions."

The CPP central committee also blamed the "evils of capitalism" and "long-term subversion" by its "agents of counter-revolution" for the political turmoil in socialist nations worldwide.

It also said that not only the socialist world was in an upheaval. "The entire world is in crisis—capitalist, socialists, and Third World countries."

"In gloating over the crisis in the socialist countries, capitalist countries seek to obscure their own crisis and their responsibility for the crisis in Third World countries," it charged.

The central committee and Ocampo parted ways on the issue of Gorbachev and the impact of the turmoil, although Ocampo stressed that "in my present situation as political prisoner, I don't have the means to make a deeper study of the developments in Eastern Europe" and that he based his views "on the limited information I get."

Criticized

The central committee criticized Gorbachev's doctrine as mainly aimed at promoting Soviet interest to build a Soviet national economic power in a peaceful environment, but could merely lead to the Soviet Union and the United States turning into "super partners."

It said that Gorbachev, in pursuit of detente, had made the Soviet Union appear as a "benign superpower...promoting ideological and political disarming far ahead of disarmament agreements of greater significance than the intermediate nuclear forces (INF treaty) which involves only three percent of all nuclear weapons."

These initiatives, particularly on disarmament, had been hailed worldwide.

But according to the CPP, Gorbachev's doctrine "proposes that super rivals can become super partners."

Arms Race

"Both the U.S. and Soviet Union retained their capacity to kill humanity several times over and improve on existing weapons in a more subtle form of arms race," it continued.

Factions

In CPP's opinion, the pro-Aquino ruling coalition has "steadily narrowed" over the years, while those that remain maintain an "uneasy partnership." For instance, it noted that "the military faction of (Defense Secretary Fidel) Ramos" and the civil faction of "Senate President (Jovito) Salonga" are "uneasy major partners."

The CPP referred to "the (Sen Aquilino) Pimentel faction" as having been rejected by the "Aquino faction (that) has cynically won over to its fold unreliable elements of the Marcos faction," obviously referring to the political party splits and revamps of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino [Struggle of Philippine Democrats] and Partido Demokratilong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan [Philippine Democratic Party-Strength of the Nation].

Ranged against the pro-Aquino factions, the CPP said, is the "coalition of factions" of Vice President Salvador Laurel, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile, "and Marcos' political heirs, especially Eduardo Cojuangco and Gen (Fabian) Ver."

This early, "all major political factions are engaged in maneuvers and counter-maneuvers," in view of the 1992 presidential elections, the CPP said.

"What makes their interfactional strife increasingly volatile is the deteriorating socio-economic conditions, the increasing discredit and isolation of the Aquino faction, and the rise of the revolutionary mass movement," it asserted.

Not only is the political strife between and among these factions limited to civil forms, they have also been building "their own private armed organizations and their connections with factions within the Armed Forces," the CPP said. Meanwhile, a parallel process unfolds, it noted, with AFP factions seeking to build "their own connections with Washington, the major civil factions and financiers among the big compradors and landlords."

Divided Military

Four "definable" factions exist within the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines], the CPP said. These are those that revolve around Mrs Aquino, Ramos Enrile, and the late President Marcos. At the same time, "due to widespread discontent within and outside the AFP," the CPP noted "a strong current independent of these military factions but willing to cooperate with anti-Aquino factions in a coup against the Aquino and Ramos factions."

Without citing bases for its assertion, the CPP said the U.S. government "has unwittingly made a series of mistakes by promoting the fascist politicization of the AFP under the Marcos regime." A split within the military followed and led to Marcos' overthrow, but Mrs Aquino was supposedly prohibited by the U.S. "from removing fascists and anti-Aquino factions of the AFP."

In all four AFP factions, as well as among officers in the "independent current," the CPP acknowledged that the common sentiments are their being "strongly pro-U.S. and anti-communist." While "bad for the ruling system," the CPP said the U.S. "wants to make use" of the fractiousness of the military to promote in particular the extension of the military bases' agreement beyond 1991.

The December coup attempt—"far bigger, more destructive and closer to success" than the Aug 28, 1987 putsch—was in the CPP's opinion "bound to fail by design." It mocked the coup attempt as a "coup d'theater," saying that "no special ground units of sufficient size" were assigned to seize Malacanang and senior civilian and military leaders, as a power grab should entail.

Part Two

HK1001123590 Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English 5 Jan 90 pp 1, 6

[Part 2 of a "Special Report" by Malou Mangahas on National Democratic Front draft memorandum dated 26 December 1989, entitled "Carry Out Rectification, Further Strengthen the Party, and Intensify the People's Revolutionary struggle," issued from Utrecht, The Netherlands]

[Text] Alongside the social turbulence sweeping most socialist nations in Eastern Europe, the Communist Party of the Philippines [CPP] noted that two political currents were unfolding in the world: resurgent and advancing national liberation movements in the Third World, and socio-economic and financial crises in capitalist countries.

Even now, the CPP central committee, in a draft memorandum dated Dec. 26, 1989, said victory after victory had been achieved by revolutionaries in Latin America and Africa.

Most of the Third World, long integrated into the world capitalist economy and debt-strapped, had "not been lifted from conditions of underdevelopment and poverty," compared to "a mere handful" of newly industrializing economies, it cited.

This, the CPP stated, "cannot prove the beneficence of capitalism for the entire Third World," but illustrated that "socialism is bound to gain the upper hand on a world scale, simply because the world cannot afford too many capitalist countries."

Rearrangement

Among capitalist nations, the CPP said a socio-economic crisis was invariably discernible, with chronic unemployment, housing shortages, and cutbacks in unemployment benefits and social services among its "manifestations."

Also, it observed that the "crisis of overproduction on an international scale" in developed countries had resulted in "a rearrangement of economic and financial strength." For instance, the CPP said, Japan and Western Europe, notably West Germany, had become "the biggest capitalist creditors," while the United States, "the single largest debtor in the world."

The U.S. primal superpower of the Western world, was now trekking a path of overconsumption and military overspending, such that it had "declined from a position of being able to dictate economic and security policies to its capitalist allies to that of having to arrive at a consensus and combing with equable and increasingly strong partners," the CPP said.

Bleaker Future

China, in the CPP's opinion, exemplified what bleaker future awaited socialist nations now buffeted by political turmoil, and likely to yield to proposals for the restoration of facets of capitalism in their economies.

Under Deng Xiaoping in the 80s, the CPP recalled that China undertook reforms, "including the return of capital to the Chinese bourgeoisie and the enlargement of private capital through loans from state banks, the dissolution of the agricultural communes and effective privatization of agriculture, the promption of free enterprise and free market."

The result, the CPP said, had been "grave imbalances" in the Chinese economy, with consumption far outpacing production, the construction of non-productive fixed assets, and unduly wild importation of high grade consumer goods. Foreign investors and lenders, big businessmen and rich peasants "were pleased," but China's foreign debt rose rapidly from $15 billion in 1985 to $45 billion in 1989.

Evils of Capitalism

Economic liberalization had also spawned such "evils of capitalism," as profiteering, gross disparities in personal income, inflation, corruption and shortages, causing widespread social unrest and stirrings for political liberalization.

"Eventually," the CPP said, China has had to adopt austerity measures as its economy became overheaded.

The "get-rich ahead of others" line was soon embraced by China's middle class, and "it became fashionable to call Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao Zedong as outdated even in leading circles," it observed.

This "bourgeois liberal trend" gained headway until it took the form of a "counter-revolutionary attempt" to overthrow the Chinese communist party, and peaked at the mass actions of Tiananmen Square.

"What is ironic about the counter-revolution," the CPP noted, "is that the bourgeois liberals took advantage of the social discontent brought about by the evils of capitalism, and gained hegemony over the mass actions."

Worst Form

Capitalist nations, saddled by a crisis of overproduction, had sought to relieve themselves by disposing of their surplus capital and surplus commodities, and by extending large amounts of loans to the Third World, the CPP said.

This gave rise to "the worst form ever of finance capitalism in the entire history of modern imperialism," it added, citing that the political independence gained by the Third World had been so undermined by their governments' having to submit to exactions of their foreign creditors.

According to the CPP, capitalist countries "are bleeding the people of Third World countries mainly through debt service." "The former now find no need to put in new productive investments, especially because they are given the option of converting unpaid loans into equity in local enterprises in the Third World.

The foreign debt, the CPP said, was "an important neocolonial lever of the capitalist powers for extracting economic and other privileges" in Third World nations.

In the Philippines, it cited that foreign debt "is the instrument by which the people are subjected to economic strangulation and misery and by which the extension of the U.S. military bases are being forced on the Filipino people against their sovereign will."

Destabilization

Social unrest in many Third World nations resulted from the foreign debt burden, spontaneous and violent mass actions in some Latin American and African countries, the CPP said. [sentence as published] By itself and combined with related economic issues, foreign debt had the effect of destabilizing the Third World, it added.

Even socialist nations such as Hungary, Poland and Romania had to grapple with the adverse effects of foreign debt.

The Polish United Workers' Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party "have been repeatedly split and discredited among the people because of the economic mess wrought by submission to demands of their capitalist creditors," including the International Monetary Fund, while Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown mainly "due to large amounts of foreign debt incurred, the squandering of oil resources, and then the drive to pay back the foreign debt at the expense of the people's well-being."

One positive probability was spotted by the CPP in the socialist countries' joining capitalist and Third World nations in the same international and financial organizations.

In these fora, the CPP said socialist and Third World countries "will be able to join up more effectively in taking action against their unbreakable debt burden and in demanding a new international economic order."

Revolutions

Despite the predominant influence over the world polity and economy of capitalist powers, the CPP stressed that revolutionary movements with socialist perspectives were "marching on firmly," and that "all the socialist countries are with them."

Namibia had achieved independence, the counterrevolutionary forces in Angola and Mozambique "are weakening," the state of Palestine had been proclaimed, the Contras are "fizzling out" in Nicaragua, El Salvador revolutionaries are "successfully waging peace and armed offensives, and the Philippine revolutionary movement "is tenaciously fighting and advancing," the CPP cited in a series.

Major armed conflicts in the Third World had been settled or scaled down, resulting in a truce for the Iran-Iraq war, and the pullout of osivet troops from Afghanistan, and Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, it said.

Cuba, too, was in the process of withdrawing from Angola, which she helped defend from South Africa and Unita forces. The CPP hailed the Soviet and Vietnamese pullouts as "a wise decision that saved them a great amount of resources for economic reconstruction."

World in Crisis

With capitalist, socialist and third World nations trapped in crises of various sorts, the CPP said its task "can only be to study and learn lessons" as it pledged to pursue its national democratic revolution "in a self-reliant and independent way."

Capitalist nations, it said, were not likely to voluntarily give up their economic and security interests overseas, nor let go of their "ideological and political weapons against the cause of national independence and socialism."

Socialist nations, for their part, will for some years more remain "preoccupied with themselves in a state of political and economic disarray," and possibly in some cases, veer away from "anti-imperialism and proletarian internationalism," it said.

But the CPP considered itself "in an advantageous position to benefit from the positive and negative experiences of other parties ahead of it in achieving victory in national and socialist revolutions."

When it wins, the CPP said it "will be able to see with greater clarity how to undertake socialist revolution and construction...(and) prevent the restoration of capitalism through an all-rounded revolutionary process, avoiding both bureaucratic and ultra-democratic excesses."

Meanwhile, the business of waging revolution in the Philipplines continued, with the CPP itself admitting reversals on account of its own "errors and weaknesses."

On the contrary, the CPP said the coup "was obviously designed to minimize casualities between opposing military factions, induce officers and men to change sides or stay neutral, and let the civilians take most of the casualties."

Nonetheless, the CPP judged that the U.S. emerged as the chief winner and beneficiary of the "shakedown" process that followed the rebellion. "The outcome of the coup attempt once more demonstrated that the United States held the ultimate extraterritorial power in a neocolony, and that Aquino was at the mercy of the United States and was more than ever beholden to her foreign master," it said.

Because "persuasive flights" of U.S. F-4 Phantom jets muffled the guns of rebel soldiers, the CPP said the U.S. has delivered to the Aquino administration the message that "she must extend the tenure of the U.S. military bases or else suffer the consequences."

"With their pragmatist view," the CPP, in an apparent back-handed compliment, said "U.S. officials can consider themselves smart and successful in being able to manipulate competing civil and military factions within the Philippine ruling system."

However, the CPP submitted that "the fractiousness of the AFP and the increasingly violent strife of the reactionary factions clearly manifest the disintegration of the ruling system."

Other Winners

Next to the U.S., the CPP said that with every coup foiled, Mrs Aquino and Ramos "have been winners...but the latter has always been the bigger winner."

It warned that the proclamation of a state of national emergency, "promotes the conditions for further militarization" and the suppression of democratic rights, a situation that should enable Ramos to "create the occasion for him to grab martial law authority, should Aquino pose a big problem to the U.S. in any way."

Ramos' lead role in quashing the rebellion, though he is also a big issue to the rebel soldiers, showed, according to the CPP, that "more than ever, Aquino has become dependent on Ramos and she cannot remove him from his office, despite the fact that he is a major cause of factionalism and dissension within the AFP."

"Neither can Aquino wipe out anti-Aquino and Anti-Ramos factions within the AFP despite her tough talk," the CPP said, "because thereby she would merely hasten another coup attempt."

While the AFP "is in disarray," the CPP sustained the New People's Army's decision to intensify its tactical offensives as correct. "Principally, campaigns of annihilation and secondarily, campaigns of attrition can be waged effectively on a wide scale," it said.

However, it cautioned that "at the same time, the Party must see to it that imbalances between military and mass work are corrected."

Part Three

HK1001123990 Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English 6 Jan 90 pp 1, 6

[Part 3 of a "Special Report" by Malou Mangahas and Sonora Ocampo on National Democratic Front draft memorandum dated 26 December 1989, entitled "Carry on Rectification, Further Strengthen the Party, and Intensify the People's Revolutionary Struggle," issued from Utrecht, The Netherlands]

[Text] For 21 years, the shifting tides of Philippine politics saw the ebb and flow of an armed struggle being waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines [CPP] and its broad alliance under the National Democratic Front [NDF].

From a ragtag band of First Quarter Storm activists and remnants of the Huk rebellion in the late 60s, the CPP-New People's Army [NPA] grew and by the mid 80s was claiming a membership of 30,000 nationwide. The group also claimed that it led a "mass base" of six to seven million.

But now, the CPP is acknowledging that its "errors and weaknesses" have limited the growth in its membership over the past years.

Weaknesses

In a draft memorandum dated last Dec. 26—the CPP's founding anniversary—the central committee of the Marxist-Leninist party recognized the "escalating attacks of the enemy," but stressed that "by virtue of its own errors and weaknesses, the party membership has not registered an overall significant increase."

Certain regions in the country reported an expansion, others a diminution, of CPP members, but the document did not cite absolute figures.

Satur Ocampo, suspected chairman of the NDF united front commission, captured last year, sharing candid views of the revolutionary movement, also admitted to the TIMES that of late, the rate of expansion "may not be as much as desired," particularly in terms of membership from the middle class.

Shortcomings

However, both the CPP and Ocampo said that these "shortcomings" were "being rigorously corrected."

"The party makes periodic assessments to push positive advances and correct slacks in its expansion work," Ocampo said.

He also said the limited expansion did not indicate "a pattern of decline in the party's membership."

"In the two decades of its existence, the membership has had periods of expansion and contraction as can be expected of an organization engaged in a life-and-death struggle," he added.

Pipe Dream

The CPP, on the other hand, dismissed as "a mere pipe dream" the government's "boast" to defeat its revolution by 1992.

The central committee said the "worst" of the party's errors was the "recurrent hysteria" and "deadly panic arising from mere suspicion or speculation" that has led to the liquidation of scores of alleged government agents among its ranks.

Also, the document called the formation of large NPA units as "premature" because of the lack in resources and mass support.

It likewise noted the "sectarian tendency" of the NDF.

An apparent point of trivia cited in the 19-page paper was the supposed need to "prohibit over-recording and dependence on computer equipment" in the methods for keeping information.

This concern was apparently raised by the CPP in view of the series of seizures by government forces of CPP documents contained in computer diskettes.

Errors

Among the other errors and weaknesses admitted by the CPP were:

—Dearth of theoretical and political training" of CPP members.
—"Bureaucratism which dampens the initiative and development of advanced mass activities and Party members."
—"Laxity" of party cadres in security, resulting in the arrest of major CPP leaders.

The "recurrent hysteria in anti-infiltration campaigns" against suspected government agents within the party's ranks had resulted in lapses in the implementation of "clear guidelines," the CPP said.

These guidelines covered "pre-arrest investigation, determination of prima facie evidence, investigation of the arrested suspected suspect, trial, evaluation of evidence, calibration of penalties and the appeal process," the document stated.

It added that "the legal and judicial system of the revolutionary movement is being developed for the benefit of the revolutionaries and the masses," while "legal and paralegal training is being undertaken."

According to the CPP, the determination of the party, the NPA and other revolutionary forces to win total victory is so strong" that there has been a tendency to hasten the formation of larger units, companies and even battalions, without sufficient consideration of logistics, reserves and mass support."

However, it said the size, number and mode of deployment of large fighting units "must take into account the necessity of having at the same time the smaller local guerrilla forces (squads and platoons), the armed propaganda teams, the people's militia, and most important of all, the organized mass base."

Premature

The "clearest manifestation" of the "prematureness" of forming larger NPA units, the CPP said, is their absorption of "best cadres and most resources at the expense of mass work in the localities."

Without logistics and mass support, it judged that larger NPA units "can be rendered passive, highly visible and vulnerable to the superior military forces of the enemy."

A "large disproportion" of CPP cadres in "mass organizations" and "the far larger number of people under the governance of organs of political power" compared to those posted in the countryside was also a problem of uneven cadre distribution, the CPP said.

The "neglect of theoretical education" was blamed by the CPP for "major errors and shortcomings in political work," although it stressed that it was "determined to expand and improve the quality of membership on a nationwide scale—both in urban and rural areas."

In citing that the NDF had a sectarian tendency, the CPP said that "most Party members should arise from the ranks of workers and peasants." The alliance building was being concentrated on the intelligentsia class. The CPP bared its "acute need for educated cadres who can be assigned to work among the toiling masses, the people's army, and in spheres requiring professional and technical competence."

To "combat bureaucratism," the document said the CPP intended to "strengthen itself organizationally and take the necessary measures" that could result in a reshuffle of "tested and competent cadres... into organs of leadership."

This, the CPP said, should put "into full play the initiative, creativity and resourcefulness" of its rank-and-file.

Democracy

Likewise, the CPP said it was not "consciously promoting inner-party democracy, as well as democratic consultations and consensus with allies and non-party people" through appropriate, clandestine venues.

The CPP blamed the arrests of some of its leaders on "the laxity of party cadres and members which started in 1984 and peaked in 1986 and 1987, especially during the ceasefire."

In view of the series of arrests, it said the "urban basing and style of work" of "party personnel on the enemy wanted list" were "under serious study and action is being undertaken to ensure security."

"Because it is engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the enemy," the CPP said it must adopt "strict but not excessive security measures." Either paralysis or commandism could result from "excessive security measures," it warned.

Obstacles

Ocampo, on the other hand, pointed out some "obstacles" to alliance building, and certain CPP tactics that had elicited adverse reaction from the people.

He noted that the broad united front against the dictatorship of the late President Marcos and the United States towards the mid-80s suffered some "fallout" after the ouster of Marcos in February 1986 when some political groups opted to support either wholly or critically, the Aquino presidency.

But he predicted the emergence this year of a new broad alliance of the revolutionary left and various progressive forces because of the "undeniable failure of the Aquino regime to institute fundamental reforms" and the "increased U.S. imperialist domination and intervention in the nation's internal affairs." He apparently referred to the U.S. planes that provided air cover for government troops during the December failed coup attempt.

The CPP-NPA, however, had to overcome certain "obstacles" such as the "perception and open criticism of some political forces that the party seeks to dominate every broad progressive alliance, on the one hand, and the party's own queasiness about the "underhanded maneuvers of some forces within the alliance to drag it into "unduly compromising its political stand, for the sake of maintaining unity."

Excesses

On the adverse middle class reaction to so-called "Sparrow" killings of the NPA urban hit squad, Ocampo said that "corrective measures" had been adopted by the party to curb "certain excesses" in the past years.

"The basic rationale of NPA urban partisan operations is to protect the people's organizations and the masses from military, paramilitary and police elements known for their abusiveness and their responsibility for crimes against defenseless civilians," Ocampo said.

"For as long as the enemies of the people perpetrate the crimes that call for NPA partisan intervention, I think that this policy of instituting swift revolutionary justice will continue," he added.

Ocampo also explained the revolutionary taxation, which has often been assailed as a form of extortion by the insurgents.

He said revolutionary taxation was prescribed for landowners, businessmen, and enterprises operating in CPP-NPA strong-holds or areas where the NDF had set up alternative or shadown governments.

"Taxation is part of the exercise of political power," he said: "In the revolutionary movement, taxation has two main purposes: To redress the people's grievances over the landowners' and businessmen's excessive profit-taking and exploitative practices, and, to finance the requirements of the people's revolutionary projects."

Ocampo said the "cocercive power" was used only against arrogant and uncooperative "class enemies," who actively fought the movement.

He said, however, that the implementation of the policy "undergoes periodic review towards refinement and rectification of errors and excesses."

Ocampo believed that none of the CPPs "failures" had serious effects on the movement.

"Along its growth trail, the CPP has had failures big and small. But I cannot think of any such strategic character as to be considered 'devastating.' In fact, the party has continued to grow because of its great capacity to overcome difficulties and to correct its organizational and political errors," he said.

The CPP central committee asserted that despite the errors and problems, there were two reasons "why the enemy has no other way but to lose—he is for the oppression and exploitation of the people...his military and paramilitary forces can concentrate attacks on the equivalent of only 12 guerrilla districts at every given time."

Where government troops choose to concentrate their strength, the CPP said they can wreak havoc and disorganize CPP forces.

"But in concentrating on certain areas, they leave the other wide areas open for revolutionary work," it said.

"When they concentrate, they cannot occupy an entire area with impunity. Moreover, space temporarily conceded to the enemy is in due time recovered by the revolutionary forces," it added.

Part Four

HK1001124590 Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English 7 Jan 90 pp 1, 6

[Part 4 of a "Special Report" by Malou Mangahas on National Democratic Front draft memorandum dated 26 December 1989, entitled "Carry on Rectification, Further Strengthen the Party, and Intensify the People's Revolutionary Struggle," issued from Utrecht, The Netherlands]

[Text] Despite its recent organizational setbacks, the Communist Party of the Philippines [CPP] asserts that its fortunes will improve with the increasingly volatile and troubled political and economic situation in the country.

Conditions for the revolutionary left's advance, and eventual victory, remain "exceedingly favorable," according to the CPP central committee, because of these factors: interfactional strife within the Armed Forces and the pro-Aquino coalition, the "new and deeper level of political and economic crisis," and the sheer "perseverance" of its revolutionary forces.

In the next two years, the CPP said it is "possible" for "a people's uprising" to unfold, ignited by one or a combination of developments—"grave abuse" of civil liberties, a "mock or real" coup attempt, or the extension of the United States' military bases in the country, or "so many possible issues or incidents."

For the moment, however, while it remains the most potent armed threat to the government, the CPP conceded that it would maintain its profile as a minor player in urban-centered politics. Given "the current level of strength" of the progressive forces it leads, the CPP said "the best" it could aspire for is "a share of power in a government still under the hegemony of non-communists."

The CPP also anticipates "surprise attacks" against its personnel and organizations in "the legal democratic movement," in light of what it perceives to be a "trend to tighten military control in Metro Manila and other urban areas."

It is not remote, in the CPP's view, for "another bare-faced fascist dictatorship" to evolve out of the Aquino administration, amid the worsening political and economic crisis.

Critique of Aquino

Not a word of praise came from the CPP central committee, in its draft memorandum dated Dec. 26, 1989, for the Aquino administration.

It said the present dispensation was "fundamentally similar to that of the Marcos regime...pro-imperialist and reactionary...pretending at first to be liberal democratic but increasingly oppressive and exploitative of the working people and the middle social strata."

The CPP said that the Aquino Administration was "incapable of solving the fundamental problems of the people, but capable of aggravating them," adding that "it had failed to cleanse the country of the stench of corruption and bloody crimes of the previous regime, but is surpassing it in corruption and human rights violation."

"Under economic and financial conditions worse than under the Marcos regime," the CPP observed that "the Aquino faction, especially the relatives, has tended to monopolize bureaucratic loot," even as rivalries of factions within the ruling coalition, and those of the Aquino and anti-Aquino factions, "have intensified and have discredited them in the eyes of the people."

According to the CPP central committee, the objectives of perestroyka to make the Soviet Union be guided by world market prices in dealing with other countries, even socialist nations, might likely result in socialist nations getting "the worst of two worlds."

It foresaw that "some socialist countries in Eastern Europe are likely to deteriorate further into the conditions of underdeveloped countries in the Third World."

Because of the Gorbachev doctrine's "all Soviet national interest," the CPP said its effects now on socialist nations had been adverse.

Aside from the "rapid overthrow of rulers of the ruling parties" in these countries, there is also "the weakening of the anti-imperialist and proleerian international bond of the Warsaw Pact countries," it said.

Centrifugal Forces

The crisis in the East Bloc, it also said, had given rise to such "centrifugal forces" that were "adverse to socialism."

These "trends" included "bourgeois liberalism, nationalism, religious differences, (and) cynicism."

The CPP warned that the Gorbachev leadership was "not immune to the stormy climate in Eastern Europe" and may soon meet "social turbulence" that could cause its eventual fall. This turbulence, it added, included the leadership's failure to deliver ample supply of basic consumer goods and high-grade consumer goods.

Disarray

The committee also warned that because of the "state of political and economic disarray" of the socialist countries, the U.S. and its allies had been encouraged to interfere in the affairs not only of socialist countries, but also of Third World countries.

It cited that the U.S. had shown increasing aggressiveness by launching a military intervention in the Philippines to save the Aquino government from the soldiers' rebellion.

The U.S. also waged "a full-scale war of aggression to overthrow the (Manuel Antonio) Noriega regime in Panama."

'Bold Innovator'

On the other hand, Ocampo viewed Gorbachev as a "bold innovator" whose doctrine was "two steps backward, one step forward" [as published] to put socialism "back on track."

Ocampo said the Soviet leader wanted to erase "aberrations in the practice of socialism" so that "(Karl) Marx's vision of a liberated society where the individual can develop his/her fullest potentials in both body and spirit" can be attained.

"How this is to be carried out in concrete steps, while warding off the incursions of pernicious capitalist ideas and practices, will be the subject of intense debate worldwide," he said.

While noting the failings and pitfalls of rigid socialism, Ocampo refuted western observations that socialism or communism was either dead or dying.

"Western observers derisive of the socialist system are wont to proclaim too soon the decline of socialism worldwide as a consequence of the dramatic events in Eastern Europe. I don't believe there is sufficient basis for this prognosis," he said.

"While there may be some segments of the population who wish socialism away, by and large the peoples of Eastern Europe want political and economic reforms within the socialist system."

"Socialism represents the successful advance from capitalism. At this stage of its development, still a short period as compared to the full growth of capitalism from the 1840s, socialism has the inherent capability to adapt to current challenges and to achieve new breakthroughs. Far from it to decline, much less to revert to capitalism," he added.

New Road

Ocampo said that Gorbachev began charting a new road for socialism's advance out of what the Soviets have adjudged as a period of stagnation under (Leonid) Brezhnev.

He cited as among Gorbachev's initiatives within the Soviet Union, the institution of limited terms of office for top officials of the party and the government to prevent anyone from holding on to power for too long, further democratizing elections to the Soviet parliament, and developing a system of socialist justice attuned to universal principles of human rights and due process.

In a nutshell, Ocampo said socialism with a "human face" was the Soviet Union's and East Bloc's answer to the United States and its allies' economic political and military hegemony.

Said Ocampo: "On the world front, Gorbachev's boldest initiatives in the area of disarmament and peacemaking have won international applause."

"If this worldwide support were maintained, the U.S. would be impelled to pursue disarmament with more concrete actions or face international opprobrium. The question is: will U.S. imperialism let go of its hegemony in many areas of the world, such as Southeast Asia, because of sheer pressure for world peace?"

Pampanga Mayors Declare War Against Rebels

HK1101053990 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 11 Jan 90 p 7

[By Dionision Pelayo]

[Text] Pampanga mayors have declared a "total war" against communist rebels following the killing of the mayor of Mexico town last week, PC-INP [Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police] authorities in Central Luzon said yesterday.

Lt Col Francisco Jamorabon, PC-INP Regional Command 3 civil military operations officer, said the Pampanga town mayors agreed to fight the New People's Army [NPA] after communist rebels admitted responsibility in the killing of Mexico Mayor Javier Hizon on January 5.

Hizon and his security escort, Pat Rogelio Hipolito, were shot dead in front of the mayor's house at Barangay Parian by communist guerrillas. The NPA said Hizon was punished for his "crimes against the people."

Jamorabon said Hizon is credited with organizing the first Citizens' Armed Forces Geographic Unit in Pampanga and is known as an anticommunist local official.

Brig Gen Cesar Nazareno, PC-INP commander in Central Luzon, ordered local constabulary and police commanders to intensify the search for Hizon's killers.

Nazareno also met with Pampanga mayors to plot the course of action that would be taken against the rebels, following Hizon's killing.

He warned the mayors to be "extra careful" to avoid being "targets of opportunity" by the communist guerrillas.

Nazareno fielded elite teams to seek the rebels in their lairs and flush out those who have mingled with the population.

Contribution From U.S. Bases Said 'Exaggerated'

HK1201042790 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 12 Jan 90 p 1, 7

[By staff member Chay Florentino]

[Text] The direct contribution to the Philippine economy of the U.S. military bases had been "exaggerated" by previous conversion studies, Jose Abueva, chairman of the Executive-Legislative Bases Council, said yesterday.

Speaking before the Rotary Club of Manila, Abueva said that findings of a University of the Philippines [UP] research team which concluded a study last October indicated that estimates of three earlier studies showed "rather generous" assessments of the economic impact of the bases.

These studies, he said, were made by Jose Cuyegkeng of the Center for Research and Communications in 1988, the Economic Development Foundation and Charles Lindsey, both completed last year.

About 10,000 Filipinos are said to benefit directly and indirectly from the bases, according to these studies.

American officials have also claimed that between $500 million and $1 billion is poured into the Philippine economy by the bases.

Considering that estimates of the direct benefits of the military facilities were based on the "depressed state" of the economy in 1985, Abueva said the importance of the bases was over-emphasized.

Lindsey and Cuyegkeng, according to the UP study, conceded that with successful growth, "the relative importance of the bases could decline."

The UP study said the application of a multiplier effect overstated the economic impact of the entire bases compensation package.

At best, only the Economic Support Fund component should be subjected to the multiplier exercises, the study said, considering that a large portion of the package consists of military equipment which requires substantial imports and has no effect on future productivity.

The previous studies, Abueva said, also failed to consider the "flowback" aspect of the aid, that is, that part of the aid which returns to the donor country through payments to foreign consultants and importations. For instance, 33 cents out of every dollar of U.S. aid goes back to the U.S. the UP study said.

Abueva added the relation of grants and loans to the bases has been overemphasized. Considering that the U.S. insists on calling the compensation package as "aid," he said one could argue that "even without the bases, the aid would continue," as in the case of Singapore and Indonesia which no longer host bases.

The bases council, Abueva said, expects to complete all feasibility studies by June and be ready to implement plans by September this year.

"The bases council is working on the assumption that there should be a comprehensive conversion plan by September this year in anticipation of the termination of the Military Bases Agreement in September 1991," Abueva told reporters.

He admitted, however, that funding for the conversion studies remains to be an obstacle to a speedy implementation of the council's plans.

Resolution No. 1 signed by President Aquino authorizes the council to raise P7.5 billion which, according to Abueva, is not enough. The rest of the funding requirements will have to come from the private sector.

Part of the money is also supposed to be taken from the proceeds of the sale of military camps, Crame and Aguinaldo in particular.

Abueva said that although Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos has agreed in principle that certain elements of the military will move out of Metro Manila, the transfer is still being discussed.

Meanwhile, an official at the foreign office said they are sending Washington three letters to express the Philippine Government's concern about the U.S. honoring its commitments made during the 1988 bases negotiations.

Mrs Aquino is sending U.S. President George Bush a letter expressing her Government's "grave concern" over US appropriations for the Philippines for fiscal year 1990.

She expressed the hope that Washington would honor its pledge to deliver $200 million for the Multilateral Aid Initiative and deliver $481 million as promised in the Manglapus-Shultz agreement of 1988.

The second letter was by Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus. Philippine Ambassador to the U.S. Emmanuel Pelaez handcarried the letter to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker when he left for Washington Wednesday.

Manglapus also expressed concern that the U.S. Congress had not exempted the Philippines from the Berry Amendment. The amendment says U.S. bases overseas can buy only U.S.-made goods.

A note verbale focusing on the compensation aspect of the bases package has also been prepared by the foreign office.

Government Launches Foreign 'Propaganda' Campaign

HK1001100790 Quezon City MALAYA in English 8 Jan 90 pp 1, 2

[By Ellen Tordesillas]

[Text] The Aquino government is launching an international propaganda program that includes a campaign to discredit its local and foreign critics, documents obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs [DFA] show.

The diplomatic corps, meanwhile, has agreed to bring to the attention of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus his department's lack of a mechanism to keep diplomats informed in times of crisis, highly reliable source said yesterday.

The propaganda campaign will be directed by the Foreign Information Council, headed by Manglapus, and will utilize facilities of Philippine embassies and consulates all over the world.

The council, which was created last April, was activated in the aftermath of the December failed coup which tarnished the government's image and scared away foreign investors and tourists.

The documents sets the following six objectives for the council:

—Discredit critics and detractors of government both at home and abroad.
—Minimize perceived impact of communist insurgency and the Muslim secessionist movement in the South.
—Highlight the commitment and achievements of the Philippines in the field of protection of human rights.
—Project the Philippines as a stable working democracy, sufficiently strong and resilient to resist attempts at political change through violent and undemocratic ways.
—Enhance the country's image as an important and growing economy with attractive and profitable areas for investment, high-quality products, and a vibrant trade and entrepreneural sector.
—Project the excellent record of the Philippines as a debtor country which has consistently honored its obligation and which has a good potential to grow out of its debt problem.

The council identified its overseas audience as foreign media outlets, policy makers, opinion makers, business community, and Filipino community.

The campaign will emphasize that the "vast majority of the Philippine military are loyal to the Constitution and only a minority of the Armed Forces joined the foiled coup attempt, most of whom were deceived, coerced, and intimidated to join by ambitious officers."

However, a retired military officer who talked on condition of anonymity, said that only 20 percent of the military is committed to a cause. That 20 percent, he said, is divided into pro-government soldiers, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement, and the Marcos loyalists. "The remaining 80 percent are fence sitters and are willing to support whichever of the committed factions wins," the officer said.

The documents also said the council will emphasize "that the Philippine democracy restored by the 1986 EDSA [Epifanio de Los Santos avenue] revolution has withstood the most severe tests and challenges to its existence and legitimacy, demonstrating the basic strength and stability of the political system and the unique Filipino tradition and experience of centuries of a pluralist and constitutional democracy."

A Western diplomat who asked not to be named said more than 50 heads of diplomatic missions in Manila met last week at the residence of the Papal Nuncio on Taft avenue to discuss their experience during the December coup.

He said almost all of them complained about the DFA's lack of a system of informing foreign missions about what was going on during the last coup. He also said nobody was manning the DFA at the time.

"I called up the DFA to find out what was going on and what the government has to say in order that I could inform our nationals, but there was no one I could talk with," the diplomat, who was trapped in his Dasmarinas home without food, complained.

Only U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Platt did not complain during the meeting, he said.

The diplomat also said despite Manglapus' announcement that all foreign missions would be assured of protection, no one came to to protect his embassy or his residence.

"Maybe they just provided protection to one or two embassies, and they thought that was enough," he said.

The diplomat said their complaints will be relayed to Manglapus by Monsignor Bruno Torpigliani, dean of the diplomatic corps, with the recommendation that a mechanism be set up to give them situationers in times of crisis.

Aquino Expresses Confidence in Economy's Growth

HK1101025990 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 10 Jan 90

[Text] President Aquino expressed confidence that the economy will stand firmly on the growth track and expand by 6.0 percent this year. The president made the observation while presiding over the first meeting for the year of the National Economic and Development Authority [NEDA] board. The NEDA board meanwhile approved an action plan for rural development aimed at upgrading rural income through the complementary growth of agriculture and industry in the countryside.

Aquino To Go to Samar 25 Jan To Launch Project

HK1001121390 Quezon City GMA 7 Radio-Television Arts Network in Tagalog 1030 GMT 10 Jan 90

[From the "GMA News" program; passages within slantlines denote passages in English]

[Text] The government will release 60 million pesos for livelihood and development projects in Samar, the poorest of all the provinces. The Philippine Assistance Program has chosen this program as its pilot project. Veronica Baluyot reports:

[Begin recording] The National Economic Development Authority, with Mrs Aquino presiding, approved a comprehensive and integrated development program to improve the livelihood of the people in Samar. The president will go there on 25 January, her birthday, to launch the Samar island development program.

In a news briefing, Press Secretary Tomas Gomez said that half of the P60 million peso fund will come from the Presidential Special Fund, while the other half will come from the Technology and Livelihood Reform Center. He added that this project will be critical in the next pledging session of the Philippine Assistance Program.

[Gomez] /Because this is the first manifestation of the product of the first pledging session in Tokyo, we have to come up with results, because the next pledging session is going to come sometime in July./ If we have nothing to show, nobody will want to help us. [end recording]

Cebu Governor Asks for More Security on Seas

HK1001063990 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0600 GMT 10 Jan 90

[Text] Cebu Governor Emilio Osmena asked the military to beef up security in the western part of its seas. According to him, the area is being used by rebels as an entry point from Negros Island. He made the request to Armed Forces Chief Renato de Villa when the latter visited Cebu City. There is just one group of constabulary soldiers guarding the western seas of Cebu, while several military detachments are stationed on the eastern side, Osmena added. De Villa directed Cebu's military commander to immediately act upon this request.

Campaigners Warned Against Carrying Firearms

HK1201051390 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0400 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Conrado Balweg, leader of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, and his followers, were today warned by Malacanang Palace against carrying firearms while campaigning against the Cordillera Region organic act. The warning also said that Balweg and his men can be arrested and their arms seized for further violation. At the same time, President Aquino directed Armed Forces Chief General Renato de Villa to verify the reported carrying of firearms by Balweg and his followers.

Meanwhile, the president promised to visit the Cordillera region after the plebiscite of 30 January. According to Press Assistant Secretary Lourdes Siytangco, the pres[illegible]'s current schedule does not allow for a visit to the region before the plebiscite.

Manila Police To Form Aerial Patrol Unit

HK1001024490 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 10 Jan 90 pp 1, 13

[Text] Manila Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez Jr formed yesterday an aerial patrol unit under the Western Police District (WPD) to increase its capability to cope with crimes, insurgency, and other threats to peace and order.

In his second executive order this year, Lopez created the unit which will initially use a rented helicopter. His first executive order created the river and bay patrol unit also under the WPD.

He said he plans to acquire later a fleet of helicopters to be used in aerial inspection, surveillance, and "hot pursuit" of criminals.

Lopez said he got clearance to form the group from Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos and other top military officers.

City Council President Pro Tempore Pete de Jesus said the creation of this latest patrol unit completes police coverage on land, sea, and air that would make the WPD at par based on organization with law enforcement agencies in big cities in the United States.

Lopez told Col Ernesto Diokno, WPD superintendent, to make arrangements for the training of police officers who will be assigned to the new unit, including those who will pilot the helicopters.

In an effort to draw up a comprehensive plan to combat crime, insurgency, and rebellion, Lopez said he will convene the city's Peace and Order Council today.

Lopez, council chairman, will preside with Brig Gen Alexander Aguirre, PC [Philippine Constabulary] Capital Regional Command chief, as a guest speaker. A view of the overall crime situation will be provided by WPD officers.

Lopez is also expected today to turn over to the WPD the first speedboat to be used by the river patrol unit in maintaining peace along waterways in the city's jurisdiction.

Budget Deficit Rose to P17.2 Billion in 1989

HK1001084790 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 10 Jan 90 p 11

[By staff writer Ray S. Enano]

[Text] The 1989 budget deficit rose to P17.231 billion as of December 15 from only P11.346 billion at end-November as the government funded unprogrammed expenditures and accelerated its deficit spending.

Latest data available from the Bureau of Treasury (BTR) showed that the government incurred a deficit of P5.885 billion from December 1 to 15 alone after keeping down the deficit to only P11.346 billion in the first 11 months of 1989.

A senior government official attributed the hefty increase in the budget deficit to larger interest payments on domestic borrowings and the unprogrammed requirements of the Salary Standardization Law.

The increased expenditures have earlier prompted the government to revise the budget deficit target to P20.1 billion from the original program of P15.3 billion by the end of 1989.

The data showed that expenditures as of December 15 reached p160.432 billion compared to revenues which totalled p143.201 billion.

The full impact of the high interest rates on Treasury Bills and the funding required by the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) have caused the sharp rise in the budget deficit.

In addition, the government has to raise funds in the amount of P6.6 billion to meet the requirements of the wage hike. Part of the funding was raised from savings of various government agencies and the adoption of economy measures signed by President Aquino.

The national government was forced to maximize the use of the remaining deficit for the remainder of 1989 to minimize carryovers to the 1990 budget program.

The maximum use of the deficit was necessary to avoid further inflationary pressures next year and give the Central Bank enough room to continue the base money level in the next performance test period in March.

The maximum use of the budget gap also implied that government accelerated its pump priming activities in a short period of time.

Jan-Oct 1989 Trade Deficit at $2.2 Billion

HK1001101790 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 7 Jan 90 p 17

[By Oscar Quiambao]

[Text] The country's trade deficit reached an all time high of $2.2 billion from January to October 1989—more than double the $1.074 billion during the comparable period in 1988, latest data from the Central Bank show.

The merchandise trade gap is expected to rise further when figures for the November-December period are tabulated as exports earnings fell very much short to cover import payments.

During the 10-month period, exports totalled only $6.44 billion as against imports of $8.645 billion.

Although exports expanded by 12.2 percent from the previous year, the growth lagged behind imports which posted a rate of 26.8 percent growth.

In October alone, imports soared 32.6 percent to $969 million compared to exports of only $665 million.

All major commodity groups showed increased values with raw materials and intermediate goods representing 43.8 percent or $801 million of the $1.828 billion upturn in total imports.

The increase in raw materials and intermediate goods imports reflected higher purchases of semi-processed raw materials (particularly chemicals, iron and steel and textile yarn and fabrics) and unprocessed commodities such as wheat and metalliferous ores.

Likewise, arrivals of capital goods expanded by $646 million while imports of consumer goods grew by $257 million due mainly to increased demand for passenger cars and motorcycles and dairy products.

The increased volume and prices of crude and products resulted in the $233 million rise in the total value of mineral fuels and lubricant imports.

Mineral fuels and lubricants remained the principal import, followed by non-electrical machinery, base metals, electronic machinery apparatus and appliances and chemical elements and compounds.

The growth in exports was principally attributed to a $766 million rise in shipments of manufactures led by electronics and garments.

Foreign sales of mineral products registered an increase of $70 million in the wake of improved prices of copper metal, copper concentrates and chromium ores.

Likewise, exports of sugar and byproducts increased by $39 million as shipments of centrifugal sugar, refined sugar and molasses were stepped up.

Fruits and vegetables also exhibited an upswing valued at $10 million.

Agreement Reached on Rescheduling Maturing Debt

HK1001024290 Manila BUSINESS WORLD in English 10 Jan 90 p 2

[Text] Government has succeeded in negotiating for the rescheduling of $343.8 million in maturing debt owed to five members of the Paris Club as of last year-end.

A memorandum issued by the Department of Finance said the amount represents 100 percent of principal and 75 percent of interest payable due as of last Sept 1 and June 30, 1991, inclusive of payments worth $555.6 million due July 1, 1991 and June 30, 1992 under the goodwill clause of the third Paris Club agreement reached last year.

The restructured debt covered those extended by the United States amounting to $227.2 million; France, $42.2 million; Canada, $7.1 million; Spain, $59.1 million; and Switzerland, $8.2 million.

The interest rate carried by the Paris Club debt ranges from 3 percent to two percentage points above the London Interbank Offered Rate [LIBOR]. The bulk of the loans were based on LIBOR, a Central Bank source said. Government plans to finish negotiations with the other nine members of the Paris Club by the end of the first quarter of this year, the memorandum said. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.

Representatives from Germany and Denmark are scheduled to arrive next week for talks on rescheduling of a still undisclosed portion of the total $2.2 billion Paris Club debt.

In the forthcoming talks, the CB [Central Bank] source said Government will specifically ask for much better terms than it obtained under the second Paris Club agreement. These will include interest rate reduction to below the LIBOR, now at 9 percent, and waiver of penalties on maturing interest payments. The source said Government will, for instance, ask for a reduction of the current 6 percent interest rate on loans from West Germany. The third Paris Club Agreement provided that interest rates and conditions of interest on the financial arrangement will be determined bilaterally by the Philippine Government and the creditor country on the basis of the appropriate market rate.

Projections on Regional Growth Published

HK0801054390 Manila BUSINESS STAR in English 8 Jan 90 p 2

["Indicator" column: "M. Manila, S. Tagalog & C. Visayas Will Continue To Set Pace in RP (Republic of the Philippines) Economy"]

[Text] Metro Manila, Southern Tagalog and Central Visayas will remain the most economically progressive areas in the country within the next five years while the Bicol region, Cagayan and Eastern Visayas will continue to be the laggards.

This is according to the latest projection made available to the the BUSINESS STAR by the economic forecasting unit of one of the Philippines' major conglomerates.

Assessing the outlook for the regional development of the country, the study singled out the high investments being poured into and exports emanating from the National Capital Region (NCR) as its main advantages.

The two other regions predicted to perform well will largely benefit from the implementation of the proposed industrial centers in Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Cebu areas.

The NCR, according to the forecast, will still be the pacesetter as its real gross regional domestic product (GRDO), in real terms, is projected to expand by 6.4% in the five year period. This growth is hinged on the expansion of the services and manufacturing sectors which are the main growth propellants of the region.

Region VII or the Central Visayas region, which includes Cebu City, Bohol, Negros Oriental, among others, is next with its GRDP foreseen to grow by 6.1% annually. Agricultural crops such as palay, sugar, coconut, and manufacturing and trade are to be the major contributing factors.

For Region IV or the Southern Tagalog region, the same sectors, except for sugar, will contribute heavily to its development. It is projected to register an above average growth rate of 5.4%. On the other hand, the Bicol region, Cagayan and Eastern Visayas will continue to be the least developed areas of the country because of insurgency and poor infrastructures. GRDP projected for these regions are, 3.2%, 35 and 2.3%, 35 and 2.3%, respectively.

The group further reports that Region III or Central Luzon, composed of Bataan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan, and Zambales, is likely to grow by 5.0% during the period under review, banking on palay and other crops, manufacturing and livestock. For Region I or the Ilocos region real GDRP is anticipated to flag at 3.9%.

The four regions in Mindanao, according to the forecast, will register GRDP growth rates within the 3.9% to 4.9% range with Region X or Northern Mindanao foreseen to log the highest rate. The economies of Regions XI and XII or Southern and Central Mindanao, respectively, are apt to improve by 4.1% while Region IX will lag behind at 3.6%. All these areas are counting on palay, coconut and other crops except Regions IX and XI which also depend on the fishery, services and manufacturing sectors to boost their productivity levels.

REGIONAL GROWTH INDICATORS: 1989-94

(Average Annual Growth Rates, in %)

		ACTUAL 1988		1989		1990-04	
REGION	MAJOR CROPS/ACTIVITIES	Real GRDP	Current GRDP	Real GRDP	Current GRDP	Real GRDP	Current GRDP
	ACTIVITIES						
NCA	Services & Manufacturing	9.9	21.2	7.0	18.9	6.4	17.1
Ilocos	Palay, Other Crops & Mining	4.3	14.1	3.8	14.2	3.9	13.5
Cagayan	Palay, Corn, Livestock & Forestry	5.7	17.1	3.5	13.3	3.0	12.6
C. Luzon	Palay, Manufacturing, Other Crops & Livestock	8.1	15.3	5.3	15.1	5.0	15.3
S. Tagalog	Palay, Manufacturing, Coconut, Other Crops & Trade	5.0	12.7	5.4	15.5	5.4	16.1
Bicol	Palay, Coconut & Other Crops	4.4	14.3	3.6	13.4	3.2	12.6
W. Visayas	Sugar, Palay, Other Crops & Trade	5.4	15.7	4.4	14.5	3.6	13.6
C. Visayas	Palay, Sugar Coconut, Manufacturing & Trade	7.5	18.0	6.3	18.3	6.1	16.5
E. Visayas	Palay, Coconut, Other Crops & Trade	2.6	12.3	2.3	13.3	2.3	12.0
W. Mindanao	Palay, Coconut, Other Crops & Fishery	4.2	10.1	3.7	9.5	3.6	12.8

REGIONAL GROWTH INDICATORS: 1989-94 (Continued)

(Average Annual Growth Rates, in %)

		ACTUAL 1988		1989		1990-04	
REGION	MAJOR CROPS/ACTIVITIES	Real GRDP	Current GRDP	Real GRDP	Current GRDP	Real GRDP	Current GRDP
	ACTIVITIES						
N. Mindanao	Palay, Coconut, Corn & Other Crops	6.1	16.0	5.1	14.9	4.9	14.7
S. Mindanao	Palay, Coconut, Other Crops, Services & Manufacturing	1.5	13.4	4.1	14.7	4.1	14.0
C. Mindanao	Palay, Coconut & Other Crops	5.7	14.7	4.4	14.3	4.1	14.0
PHILIPPINES		6.4	16.5	5.4	16.1	5.1	15.5

Memorandum for Livestock Sector Assistance Signed

HK1101053790 Manila BUSINESS STAR in English 11 Jan 90 p 12

[Text] The Department of Agriculture (DA) signed yesterday a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for a $600,000 technical assistance grant in the development of a livestock sector program, focusing on smallholder development and the alleviation of poverty in the rural areas.

Agriculture Secretary Senen Bacani signed the MOU with ADB Agricultural Development Division Acting manager Nihal Amerasinghe and Robert E. Hood, the ADB agriculture department senior economist. ADB will cover $475,000 of the technical assistance while local counterpart funds will total $125,000.

The technical assistance, which will be implemented for five months by ADB consultants together with local livestock sector experts, will create a development program for the sector.

The scope of work for the technical assistance include:

—inventory of national livestock feed base and the study on the extent of the utilization;
—review of the present marketing practice for livestock and livestock products including transportation and handling;
—evaluation of past and present government, private sector and non-governmental organization performance in the commercial aspects of the livestock subsector development;
—evaluation of government policies with respect to subsector development in the areas of production, marketing, financing, incentives, tariff structure, import quotas, training, technical support, and regulatory services;
—preparation of a medium-term subsector development program to improve productivity and profitability of the subsector, and
—preparation of detailed investment proposals in support of programs, as well as the estimation of financial and economic returns of investment programs and its components.

Bacani said that with ADB's technical assistance, the government sees a reversal of downward trends in livestock production. Currently, production constraints in various national herds have been traced to low herd numbers, poor levels of nutrition and low levels of livestock husbandry and management by most smallholders and commercial ranches. These factors resulted in low calving, weaning and growth rates.

The program being envisioned will identify investment opportunities, support services and incentives that will reverse downward trends in production and increasing importation of livestock products. The emphasis will be on identifying needs and opportunities for smallholder-farmers.

Thailand

Williamsburg Conference Held in Chiang Mai

Alatas on Cambodian Peace Moves

BK1201082790 Bangkok THE NATION in English 12 Jan 90 p 4

[By Yindi Loertcharoenchok]

[Text] Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas will hold separate meetings in Ho Chi Minh with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Co Thach and Phnom Penh Premier Hun Sen on Sunday [14 January] and Monday respectively.

Alatas told THE NATION yesterday before his departure for Chiang Mai to attend a three-day Williamsburg conference that he will meet Thach Sunday afternoon and Hun Sen Monday morning before flying back to Jakarta.

He said that only after the discussions with all the four Cambodian factions will he make an assessment whether to go ahead and hold an informal meeting in Jakarta or proceed directly to a second-round of an international conference on Cambodia in Paris.

But the Indonesian minister said he himself would opt for an informal meeting in Jakarta prior to another Paris peace talks.

"It will probably be better to have a preparatory meeting in order to see various points of views be brought closer together," said Alatas.

In Bangkok, Alatas had discussed with Australian envoy Michael Costello, who shuttled to various countries in the region to find out their opinions over an Australian proposal for a UN administration over the transitional period.

The Indonesia minister only commented that the Costello mission came up with an "encouraging" sign and declined to elaborate about his talks with the Australian envoy.

In Chiang Mai, Alatas was scheduled to meet Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan, who had initiated the idea of a Jakarta meeting.

Alatas on Khmer Participation

BK1201123090 Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1200 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Foreign Minister Ali Alatas will invite the four warring Cambodian factions, Vietnam, Laos, the six ASEAN countries, France, and Australia to attend a new round of Cambodian peace talks in Jakarta in the third or fourth week of February.

Speaking at a news conference in Bangkok, Minister Ali Alatas said that he had conveyed his intention to representatives of the anti-Vietnamese Cambodian resistance group. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas is in Thailand to attend an international economic forum in Chiang Mai.

Chatchai Gives Opening Address

BK1201033190 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 12 Jan 90 p 9

[Text] Chiang Mai—Thailand would strive to find new institutional means to manage ties between Hanoi and the rest of Southeast Asia, with a view to including Indochina in ASEAN after this decade and when the Cambodian problem was resolved, Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan said last night.

Gen Chatchai also said the future success of promoting peace and security in the region depended on the resilience of ASEAN, which Thailand is committed to strengthen unconditionally.

The Prime Minister made the comments during the opening address of the 18th Williamsburg Conference in Chiang Mai last night. The conference ends on Sunday [14 January].

The Williamsburg Conference is an annual meeting which gathers scholars, well-known international officials, captains of industry and commerce to discuss crucial issues.

This year's conference is organised by the Asia Society, New York, and the Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkon University.

Developments in the Asia-Pacific region is the theme of this year's conference.

During his speech, the Prime Minister said Thailand can and should continue to play a significant role to promote Southeast Asia's peace and security.

"First of all, after the Kampuchean problem is resolved, Thailand must strive to help build a new, more constructive structure of relationships between the two Southeast Asias (socialist and non-socialist)."

He said this meant:

- Persuading Vietnam to agree to and respect the principles, norms and rules of the game concerning peaceful co-existence and pacific settlement of disputes;
- Finding new institutional means to manage ties between Hanoi and the rest of Southeast Asia, with the view towards including Indochina in ASEAN sometime after this decade;
- Helping the three Indochinese countries to open up their economies and become involved more fully in the global economic development process on the basis of partnership and not unilateral exploitation; and
- Encouraging the forces of peace and development in the Indochinese countries, not with a view towards bringing about changes in their domestic political orders, but as a means of strengthening the fabric of peace in Southeast Asia at large.

The Prime Minister also said Thailand could and should play a role in promoting arms control and reduction in the region.

Although he believed in military preparedness, this should be kept at a level which did not provoke war or entail unnecessary economic and financial sacrifices.

The Prime Minister said significant changes were occuring in the region.

Although conflicts and differences remained, superpower competition had declined, reducing the prospect of great power presence in the western Pacific and enhancing the prospects of controlling and reducing nuclear and conventional arms in the region.

He said there was a momentum towards peace in the Asia-Pacific region, strengthened by continuing dynamism of regional economies.

The Prime Minister said with the dawning of a new decade there were real prospects that in the next few years Southeast Asia could become one, whereby geopolitical and ideological differences would take second place to common pragmatism to solve poverty.

Thailand has played a major role in decreasing tension and conflict in the region.

Gen Chatchai said Thailand's improved relations with Vietnam and Cambodia have been among main factors leading to Hanoi's early military withdrawal from Cambodia.

"Thailand will not cease to play her part in the search for a just and durable solution to the conflict in Kampuchea," he said.

While commenting on the efforts to promote peace and security in the region, Gen Chatchai said future success depended on continued strength and resilience of ASEAN as a regional organisation.

"For, underlying ASEAN cooperation, are principles of order which, if extended to the rest of Southeast Asia, would make the region truly peaceful and its nations at one.

Praman Holds News Briefing on Ministerial Swap

BK1201042790 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 12 Jan 90 pp 1, 3

[Text] Former interior minister Praman Adireksan said he thought about resigning from the Cabinet when first told about his switch to the Industry portfolio, but changed his mind when urged to stay on by other Cabinet ministers and MPs.

Pol [Police] Gen Praman was speaking to reporters yesterday after farewelling Interior Ministry officials. The press conference was conducted before high-level officials from the ministry.

"I thought about resigning because Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan said I had some shortcomings—not being able to work with the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration. But I changed my mind when asked to stay on by some 40 Cabinet ministers and MPs," he said.

He said his supporters said he should not resign because it could lead to rifts within the Chat Thai Party.

"The Prime Minister said at the Princess Hotel I could not work with Bangkok Governor Chamlong Simuang. I felt what he said was like saying Bangkok is Thailand—like I was at fault for not responding to Maj-Gen Chamlong's needs," Pol Gen Praman said.

He said he was not told in advance of his Cabinet move.

"I knew that I was shuffled on January 8, the day after the Bangkok governor election. The Prime Minister did not let me know in advance. He did not even call for a party meeting. I understand that he discussed the matter with his advisers before the Cabinet change," Pol Gen Praman said.

Pol Gen Praman said his remarks were not intended to blame Gen Chatchai, but he wanted only to tell the truth.

"I am a disciplined person. It's all right for me to take charge of the Industry portfolio. The reshuffle order was approved and signed by His Majesty the King and I have to obey the Royal Command."

Pol Gen Praman said according to normal practice, Gen Chatchai must inform the party about his decision.

"But since he (Gen Chatchai) is wearing two hats—head of the country administration and party leader—he has the right to consider the reshuffle by himself, so he may not have to tell the party."

Asked whether he would try to retake leadership of the Chat Thai Party, Pol Gen Praman joked: "Don't ever think about that. If I did that he (Gen Chatchai) would ask for his elder sister back." His remarks drew laughter from reporters and ministry officials.

Pol Gen Praman's wife, Khunying [honorary title] Charoen, is Gen Chatchai's elder sister.

Asked whether he had apologised to Gen Chatchai, Pol Gen Praman said: "I have made a lot of sacrifices. I even abandoned my party leadership. He did not take it from me. It was I who resigned from the post."

Asked if Gen Chatchai had visited him to explain his move, Pol Gen Praman said: "He did not talk to me directly." It was reported that Gen Chatchai had tried to explain his move through Khunying Charoen.

About 1,000 Interior Ministry officials attended a farewell ceremony for Pol Gen Praman yesterday. Among the high-ranking officials was Maj-Gen Chamlong.

In his farewell speech, Pol Gen Praman said that before he proposed any order which required the King's signature, he told the Prime Minister at least three times.

"After that I left it to my superiors to make a decision.

"I would like to let it be known that what has been done has not been done by myself alone." Gen Praman was apparently referring to his proposal for the appointment of Thamrong Phatthanarat as city clerk, which was delayed by Gen Chatchai.

He said he was concerned about work projects which have yet to be accomplished such as the Interior Ministry's irrigation project, the village scout project, relocation of government installations out of Bangkok, land reclamation laws and the setting up of a police bureau and labour ministry.

A number of leaflets, said to be from Local Administration Department officials who opposed new Interior Minister Banhan Sinlapa-acha, were distributed yesterday in protest at Pol Gen Praman's shift. They said the move was unfair to Pol Gen Praman.

Each leaflet was accompanied by a sheet of paper containing former premier M.R. Khukrit Pramot's article in yesterday's issue of SIAM RAT newspaper, which attacked Gen Chatchai for making the reshuffle and citing Maj-Gen Chamlong's re-election as Bangkok governor as a reason.

Chawalit Denies Involvement in Cabinet Changes

BK1201051790 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 12 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] Armed Forces Chief Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut has denied involvement in much-publicised speculation about his possible move to join the Cabinet.

"As widely known, I have nothing to do with anything and anybody at all. I have my job to do and I have no knowledge if any other persons have tried to do anything," said Gen Chawalit, who broke his silence for the first time on the issue yesterday.

Gen Chawalit, who has kept a low profile since Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan made overtures for him to join his Cabinet, also denied he was partly the cause of Cabinet posts being switched between Banhan Sinlapa-acha and Pol [Police] Gen Praman Adireksan.

He repeated he would definitely honour his pledge to retire early.

"I always do what I say. I can't be hesitant and you'll see it later," said Gen Chawalit, who is due to reach mandatory retirement age in 1992.

Asked for his comments on the call by certain military quarters for him to stay in the Army, Gen Chawalit said the call showed his colleagues' friendship towards him.

He declined to comment on whether or not the switching of posts between Mr Banhan and Pol Gen Praman would have any impact on the country's political stability.

Gen Chawalit said he had been busy recently with his job, working on solving the problem of southern separatists, the possible surrender of key Communist Party of Thailand [CPT] members and the Cambodian conflict.

He said the Armed Forces was negotiating for the surrender of southern separatist bandits and certain key CPT members from abroad.

He did not elaborate.

Vietnam

Press Law Adopted by Eighth National Assembly

Installment One

BK1201140590 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 5 Jan 90

["Part one" of the Law on the Press adopted by the SRV Eighth National Assembly at its sixth session on 28 December 1989]

[Text] To guarantee citizens' freedom of the press and freedom of speech in the press in accordance with the interests of socialism and the people, and to bring into full play the role of the press in socialist construction and national defense along the line of renovation of the Communist Party of Vietnam, by virtue of Articles 4, 67, and 83 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, this law defines the press system.

Chapter I: Generalities

Article 1: The role and functions of the press.

The press in the SRV is a means of mass communications necessary to social life; an organ of party organizations, state agencies, and social organizations—hereunder commonly referred to as organizations—and a forum of the people.

Article 2: Guaranteeing the freedom of the press and freedom of speech in the press.

The state creates favorable conditions for citizens to exercise their freedom of the press and freedom of speech in the press and for the press to correctly develop its work. The press and journalists operate within the framework of the law and are protected by the state. No organization or individual may limit or obstruct the activities of the press and journalists. Nobody may abuse the freedom of the press to infringe on the interests of the state, collectives, and citizens. The press is not censored prior to printing and broadcasting.

Article 3: Various forms of the press.

The press referred to in this law is the Vietnamese press which includes:

1. the printed press—newspapers, magazines, news bulletins, and news agency releases;
2. the broadcast press—radio broadcasting programs; and
3. the video press—television broadcasting programs and audio-video news programs realized by different technical means in Vietnamese, in the languages of the ethnic minorities of Vietnam, and in foreign languages.

Chapter II: Citizens' Freedom of the Press; Freedom of Speech in the Press

Article 4: Citizens' freedom of the press and freedom of speech in the press.

Citizens have the rights:

1. to be informed through the press of all aspects of domestic and internatiaonal situations;
2. to provide information to the press organs and journalists; to send news, articles, photos, and other works to the press without being censored by any organization or individual; and to assume responsibility before the law for the contents of their information;
3. to express their views on domestic and international situations;
4. to contribute opinions to the formulation and implementation of the party's positions and policies and the state's laws; and
5. to contribute opinions voicing criticisms, suggestions, complaints, and denunciations in the press concerning party organizations, state agencies, social organizations, and their members.

Article 5: Responsibility of the press for citizens' freedom of the press amd freedom of speech in the press.

The press organs are responsible for;

1. publishing or broadcasting the works and opinions of citizens; in case of nonpublication or nonbroadcasting they must provide answers and clearly state the reasons;
2. providing answers or requesting the organizations or persons concerned to answer by letter or in the press the suggestions, complaints, and denunciations sent in by citizens.

Chapter III: Duties and Rights of the Press

Article 6: Duties and rights of the press.

The press has the following duties and rights:

1. To make truthful reports on all aspects of domestic and internationmal situations;
2. To propagandize and disseminate the party's lines, positions, and policies; the state's laws; and the national and international, cultural, scientific, and technological achievements in accordance with the press organs' policy and objectives; to contribute to enhancing knowledge and to respond to the healthy cultural needs of the people; to protect the fine national traditions, build and develop socialist democracy, strengthen the bloc of national unity, build socialism, and defend the fatherland.
3. To reflect and guide public opinion and serve as a forum for the people to exercise their right to freedom of speech;
4. To discover and commend good examples and new factors and to struggle against lawbreaking acts and other negative phenomena in society; and
5. To broaden mutual understanding between countries and peoples and participate in the world people's cause of peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress.

Article 7: Providing information for the press.

Within the limits of their powers and duties, organizations have the right and obligation to provide the press with information to help them relay news accurately and timely, and to assume responsibility before the law for the contents of information. Concerning legal cases still under investigation or pending court trial, the organs in charge of legal proceedings have the right not to supply information to the press. However, the press has the right to carry news on such cases according to its own sources of documents and to assume responsibility before the law for the contents of the information. The press has the right and obligation not to disclose the name of its source if disclosure would cause harm to the source, except when it is requested by the procurator of the people's organ of control or the presiding judge of the people's court at the provincial or higher level as necessitated by the investigation and trial of serious crimes.

Article 8: Providing answers in the press.

The heads of press organs are empowered to request organizations and persons of positions to answer questions raised by citizens in the press, and the organizations and persons of positions concerned are responsible for answering these questions. Organizations and citizens have the right to request press organs to provide answers to questions on which the press has reported, and the press organs concerned are responsible for answering such requests.

If a press organ discovers or receives from citizens complaints about or denunciations of facts that show evidence of lawbreaking, it must promptly notify the concerned investigative organ or people's organ of control in writing. The investigative organ or people's organ of control are responsible for accepting the case for hearing and giving an answer to the press on how the case should be solved.

Article 9: Corrections in the press.

If the press carries untrue reports, distortions, and libels which outrage the honor of the fatherland or the honor and dignity of citizens, it must make corrections and apologies or publish or broadcast corrections made by the organizations or citizens concerned. If the press fails to make corrections or if its corrections are not satisfactory, or if it fails to publish or broadcast the corrections from the organizations and citizens concerned without legitimate reason, these organizations and citizens have the right to lodge a complaint with the organs in charge of the press or request a trial by the court of law. Corrections from organizations and citizens must be promptly published or broadcast in a manner commensurate with the reports that need to be corrected.

Article 10: Facts which must not be reported in the press.

To ensure the correct exercise of the freedom of speech in the press, the press must abide by the following guidelines:

1. It is prohibited from inciting the people to oppose the state of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and sabotage the bloc of national unity;
2. It is prohibited from instigating violence; propagandizing a war of aggression; causing hatred among nations and peoples of different countries; and instigating obscenities, debauchery, and crimes;
3. It is prohibited from disclosing state, military, security, economic, and diplomatic secrets, and other secrets defined by the law; and
4. It is prohibited from reporting falsehoods, distortions, and libels aimed at outraging the honor of organizations or the honor and dignity of citizens.

Conclusion of Press Law

BK1201142190 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 6 Jan 90

["Conclusion" of the Law on the Press adopted by the SRV Eighth National Assembly at its sixth session on 28 December 1989]

[Text]

Chapter IV: Press Organs and Journalists

Article 11: Press organs.

A press organ is an organization that engages in a press configuration mentioned in Article 3 of this law.

Article 12: The parent organization of a press organ is an organization which files an application for a press operation permit and which directly manages the press organ concerned. The parent organization of a press organ has the following rights and obligations:

1. Define and direct the observance of guiding principles and goals as well as of the main scope of publication, broadcasting capacity, duration, frequency, range, and the language presentation by the press organ concerned as specified in its permit.
2. Appoint and remove the leader of a press organ under its jusrisdiction after holding consultations with the state press management organ.

Article 13: The leader of a press organ.

1. The leader of a press organ is the editor in chief (for a newspaper) or the general director or director (for a radio or television station, or for an establishment that produces audio-visual news programs).
2. A press organ leader must be a Vietnamese citizen with permanent residence in Vietnam and with full political and ethical standards and press expertise as stipulated by the state.
3. A press organ leader must lead and manage his press organ in all respects, must ensure the observance of guiding principles and goals of his press organ, and must be held responsibile before the chief of his parent organization and before the law for all activities of his press organ.

Article 14: Journalists.

A journalist must be a Vietnamese citizen who has permanent residence in Vietnam and who possesses full political and ethical standards and press expertise as stipulated by the state, who is now working for or collaborating permanently with a Vietnamese press organ, and who holds a journalist identification card.

Article 15: Rights and obligations of journalists.

Journalists have the following rights and obligations:

1. A journalist has the right and obligation to disseminate news reports faithfully, reflecting the opinions and aspirations of the people and thereby contributing to the exercise of the freedom of the press and the people's freedom of speech through the press.
2. A journalist has the right to carry out press activities in SRV territory.
3. A journalist is held responsible for the contents of his press articles and has the right to refuse to write or to participate in writing press articles that violate this law.
4. A journliat is entitled to some systems of preferential treatment necessary for his press activities in accordance with stipulations of the Council of Ministers.

No one is permitted to make a threat against the life of or offend the honor and human dignity of a journalist, or to destroy or seize the means and materials of or to prevent a journalist from engaging in press activities according to the law.

No one is permitted to abuse the name of a journalist to engage in unlawful activities.

Article 16: Vietnam Journalists' Association.

The Vietnam Journalists' Association has the right and obligation to participate in devising and contributing to implementing policies on press information and to protect the legal rights and interests of journalists.

Chapter V: State Management over the Press

Article 17: State Management over the Press.

State management over the press consists of:

1. Devising laws, programs, plans, and policies for developing press work, policies on financial assistance for the press, and policies toward journalists;
2. Promulgating regulations on the operation of the press and issuing permits for press activities; and
3. Guiding and controlling the implementation of press orientations and tasks and legal stipulations on the press, and dealing with violations thereof as prescribed by the law.

Within the framework of its tasks and authority, the Council of Ministers assumes the right to state management over the press throughout the country. People's committees of provinces and municipalities directly subordinate to the central government and corresponding levels assume the right to state management over the press in their localities in accordance with the decentralization of responsibilites as established by the Council of Ministers.

Article 18. Conditions for Press Operation.

Organizations wishing to set up a press organ must fully meet the following conditions:

1. Name a fully qualified person to head the press organ as prescribed under Article 13 of this law;
2. Clearly define the masthead; guiding principles; goals; target groups; and main scope of distribution, broadcasting capacity, duration, frequencies, range, and language presentation of the press organ concerned; and
3. Maintain an official headquarters and have other necessary conditions for ensuring the press organ's operation.

Article 19: Issuance of Permits for Press Operation.

Press organs can only operate with a permit issued by an organ of state management over the press. If the granting of a permit is denied, the organ of state management over the press must give an answer, clearly stating the reasons for the denial, no later than 30 days following the date of application. Organizations to whom the issuance of a permit is denied have the right to appeal to the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Article 20: Validity of Permit.

A press organ must correctly abide by what is stated in the permit. A new permit must be applied for if the press organ wishes to change its masthead, guiding principles, goals, target groups, language presentation, main scope of distribution, or publication periodicity. For changes in broadcasting capacity, duration, frequencies, and range, a permit must be obtained from the organ of state management over radio frequencies. A permit for press operation cannot be transferred to another agency or organization.

Article 21: Other Press Publications and Special or Supplemental Broadcasting Programs.

Press organs and other organizations wishing to publish a special or supplemental issue, and radio and television stations wishing to broadcast a special or supplemental program with the guiding principles, goals, and language presentation being different from those mentioned in the permit, must request permission from the organ of state management over the press.

Article 22: Press Printing and Radio and Television Program Broadcasting.

Printing establishments have the responsibility to carry out contracts and meet the deadline for press publication. They must neither provide printing service for press organs which do not have a permit, nor reprint press materials which have been banned from circulation by the organ of state management over the press. Technical facilities providing transmission service for radio and television stations have the responsibility to ensure the prescribed broadcasting range. Radio and television stations and establishments producing audio-visual documentary programs must not carry the contents of those press materials that have been banned from circulation or confisticated.

Article 23: Copy Deposition.

Printed newspapers must submit copies of their issues before distribution; and audio-visual press organs must keep on file unedited versions, films, and audio and video recording tapes or discs as specified by the Council of Ministers.

Article 24: Press Publication.

Press organs may organize publication by itself or may entrust a registered organization or individual to do this. No one is allowed to hinder the distribution of newspapers to readers unless a ban on their circulation is ordered. No organizations or individuals can circulate printed materials and newspapers which are published without a permit or which have been banned.

Article 25: Advertisements.

The press is allowed to publish or broadcast advertisements and collect advertisement fees. The contents of advertisements must be dintinguishable from propaganda themes, and they must not violate the stipulations mentioned under Article 10 of this law.

Article 26: News Conferences.

Organizations and citizens wishing to call a news conference must give advance notice to the organ of statement management over the press. Press conferences having a content which violates the stipulations mentioned under Article 10 of this law are strictly prohibited.

Chapter VI: Commendation, Reward, and Action against Violations

Article 27: Commendation and reward.

Press organs, journalists, organizations, and citizens with meritorious services and contributions to press work shall be commended or rewarded in accordance with state regulations. Journalists with outstanding achievements shall be honored with state titles.

Article 28: Action against Violations.

1. Press organs or other organizations violating the provisions on press operation permits, on the contents of press information, and on retractions to untrue, distorted, or libelous reports, as well as other provisions of this law shall, depending on the gravity or levity of the violations, be subjected to warning, fines, recall, or seizure of printed materials and audio or video tapes and discs, temporary suspension of publication, or revocation of permit in accordance with legal stipulations on punishment for administrative infractions.

If press organs or citizens release information that causes damage to other organizations or citizens, they must pay compensations for damage as provided for under the civil code.

2. Persons who are held chiefly responsible for the violations mentioned under Item 1 of this article shall, depending on the gravity or levity of the violations, be subjected to disciplinary action, administrative sanction, or criminal investigation.

3. Persons who violate the stipulations on the supply of information; the giving of answers to the press; the establishment of press organs, publications, advertisements, and news conferences; who hinder press activities; who offend the honor and human dignity of journalists; and who violate other provisions of this law shall, depending on the gravity or levity of the violations, be subjected to disciplinary action, administrative sanction, or criminal investigation.

Chapter VII: Final Clauses

Article 29: This law supercedes Decree No 100/SL/L002 dated 20 May 1957 on the press system.

All previous stipulations that contradict this law are null and void.

Article 30: Based on the stipulations of this law, the Council of Ministers shall promulgate a statute on foreign press activities in Vietnam and a statute on Vietnamese press activities that are related to foreign countries.

Article 31: The Council of Ministers shall work out the details for the enforcement of this law.

This law was passed on 28 December 1989 at the sixth session of the Eighth SRV National Assembly.

Signed by Le Quang Dao, chairman of the National Assembly

Mountain Region Resolution Issued 27 Nov

First Installment

BK0901092990 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 26 Dec 89

["First part" of the Political Bureau's 27 November 1989 resolution on some major policies on socioeconomic development in the mountain regions; this portion deals with "The Socioeconomic Situation in the Mountain Regions"]

[Text] The mountain regions are large. They account for three-fourths of our country's natural land area and they have long been inhabited mainly by ethnic minorities and endowed with great economic potentials and with abundant, diverse natural resources encompassing forest land, living creatures, hydro power, mineral ores, and industrial crops. With their high, sloping terrains and their huge botanical resources, the mountain regions play a decisive role in the country's ecology.

Situated along the country's northern and western borders, the mountain regions have many gateways to the outside world and other countries in the region. That is why they occupy a very important position in national defense and security.

Over the years, the population structure in the mountain regions has undergone many changes. In that community, each ethnic group retains its own color but all of them share the same tradition of patriotism and solidarity. They have directly participated in and contributed greatly to the success of the revolutionary undertaking and to firmly maintaining national independence and sovereignty.

Overcoming countless difficulties and ordeals, the party organizations and the multiethnic people in the mountain regions have struggled incessantly and have achieved much progress in the cause of building socialism, developing the economy, gradually developing their strengths, creating large crop specialization areas, turning out ever-greater quantities of farm and forestry products for export, and carrying out industrial, artisan, and handicraft development.

In some localities, the face of the mountainous rural areas has undergone marked changes. A number of cities, towns, and major industrial complexes have been set up. Many families from the lowlands have come to resettle in the mountain regions, bringing with them their intensive cultivation expertise and a number of artisan and handicraft professions from the lowlands.

The mountain compatriots have gradually gained access to scientific and technical findings. A number of children of the people of various ethnic minority groups have been trained as technical workers or scientific and managerial cadres. However, the results obtained are, in general, still small as compared with the capabilities and the requirements for development of the mountain regions specifically and for the entire country.

In general, the level of socioeconomic development in the mountain areas remains very low. Their commodity-based economy is underdeveloped while the natural and seminatural economies still occupy a sizable proportion. Nomadism has not been basically solved. The life of a majority of the mountain population still meets with numerous difficulties, very acute in certain areas. Poverty still exists on a large scale. Cultural activities are inadequate and the percentage of the illiterate is still high. Some epidemics have not yet been basically done away with. In certain localities and at certain moments, epidemics have caused high death tolls. Many negative social phenomena have developed. The reactionaries and hostile forces continue to take full advantage of the rugged and hardly accessible terrains of the mountain regions to carry out their multifaceted sabotage schemes against the revolution. Religions are developing in an abnormal fashion in a number of localities.

In the past, many state-run economic units, especially state-run agricultural and forestry units have been set up in the mountain regions. Although occupying large areas of land, a number of state-run economic units with low productivity and poor efficiency have failed to make full use of all of their land areas while the local people are in need of land for cultivation. This has created disappointments and has made it impossible for the majority of forests and forest lands to develop its usefulness. The wanton forest exploitation and destruction remain very serious. There has been no rational policy for the delivery of forest lands and forests to the people [for management] and the pace of delivery is still slow.

Beside a number of cooperatives noted for their achievements and progress, in general, the bulk of cooperatives in the mountainous rural areas exist only in form, particularly those agricultural cooperatives in high mountain areas. Little attention has been paid to family economies and other appropriate forms of cooperative economies.

Petty trade which corresponds with small-scale and scattered commodity production has been narrowed down and, in some places, eliminated. Some new economic zones have been developed without fully calculating the resulting socioeconomic efficiency and also in an arbitrary, simplistic, and hasty manner.

The infrastructure, particularly communication lines, in the mountainous regions, especially in remote high mountain areas, still remains underdeveloped and fragmented, not yet forming an uninterrupted network linking the various regions. This is hindering efforts to promote circulation in the mountainous regions as well as between mountainous regions and the lowlands. A number of relatively large-sized industrial establishments—such as coal mines; hydroelectric power projects; and facilities for mineral exploitation, engineering, chemical and fertilizer production, and forestry product processing—have been operating independently, thus failing to play a pivotal role in promoting regionwide development.

The above situation exists due to the difficulties facing the economy in general and the mountainous regions in particular; and more importantly, to deficiencies found in the socioeconomic policies for the mountainous regions and in the implementation of these policies.

1. Not being deeply aware of the important position as well as the natural and socioeconomic characteristics of the mountainous regions, we have yet to truly consider development of the mountainous regions as an integral part of the strategy for socioeconomic development nationwide. We have failed to closely link economic development in the mountainous regions with that in the lowlands and to organize an overall and comprehensive study of political, economic, cultural, social, national defense, and security problems facing the mountainous regions in connection with the problem of nationalities in determining the guidelines and policies toward the mountainous regions. We have not properly used investments. Particularly, we have not paid due attention to building the infrastructures of the mountainous regions.

2. There have been many mistakes made in the establishment of socialist production relations in the mountainous regions. We have emphasized the building of large-scale state installations, carried out the socialist transformation of agriculture in a mechanical and apish manner in accordance with the delta pattern, and emancipated the standard of production and social conditions of the mountainous regions. These methods have restrained the development of production and have caused many adverse socioeconomic and political consequences.

3. The procedures for conducting on-the-spot basic and advanced cadre training as well as the policies toward cadres of ethnic minority people and lowland cadres assigned to the mountainous regions have been studied inadequately and have been implemented inconsistently and casually without encouraging cadres to remain in the mountainous regions in order to serve efficiently in developing these areas.

As yet, the mountainous regions have not had a suitable contingent of competent cadres who thoroughly understand and who are devoted to building and developing these regions.

4. The central government's task of providing leadership and guidance for the mountainous regions is not yet commensurate with the important strategic position of the mountainous regions. Leadership is poor. All echelons and sectors from the central down to the grass-roots levels are still irresponsible, bureaucratic, inactive, and dependent.

The aforementioned situation requires urgent action to determine correct guidelines and policies for vigorous socioeconomic development in order to build the mountainous regions comprehensively strong and firm. This is both the pressing requirement of the mountainous regions and the extremely important duty concerning long-range national construction.

First Part of Second Installment

BK1001093390 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 26 Dec 89

["Second part" of the Political Bureau's 27 November 1989 resolution on some major policies on socioeconomic development in the mountain regions]

[Text] Some major positions and policies on socioeconomic development of the mountain regions:

In formulating major positions and policies on socioeconomic development of the mountain regions in the spirit of resolutions of the Sixth Communist party of Vietnam [CPV] Congress and those of the party Central Committee plenums, we must firmly grasp the following concepts:

1. Socioeconomic development of the mountain regions is an organic part of the national economic development strategy. We should, on the one hand, urge mountain provinces to contribute to implementing the strategic general socioeconomic development positions of the nation, while on the other hand, taking into full account the unique natural, historical, socioeconomic, and cultural characteristics as well as customs of the mountain regions in general, and those of each locality and tribal group in particular, in concretizing and implementing the general positions and policies on developing the mountain regions. We should bring into full play the dynamism and creativity of localities and grass-roots units.

2. The building of socialism and the development of the mountain regions' economy and culture are the common cause of the nation, especially the multiethnic people in the mountain regions and resettlers from the lowlands. Exploiting and developing the mountain regions are aimed at promoting the direct interests of the regional people as well as those of the nation.

3. We must firmly grasp the developing policy and formulate plans for the multisectorial commodity economy to advance toward socialism, while readjusting production relations in the mountain regions to suit the characteristics and capability of the production force. We must strictly respect the people's right to self-determination in selecting appropriate economic forms and management mechanisms for achieving high economic results. We should refrain from carrying out tasks just for form's sake or in a duplicated and coercive manner.

4. We must develop the mountain regions by comprehensively covering the economic, political, cultural, social, national defense, and security domains while paying special attention to carrying out the socioeconomic development program and satisfactorily implementing the party nationalities policy. We must also pay appropriate attention to resolving social issues to improve the people's material and cultural life.

Regarding national defense and security, we must strive to satisfactorily carry out decisions stipulated in resolutions No 02 and 07 of the Sixth Party Central Committee Political Bureau and apply them appropriately to the mountain regions' conditions.

Defending the fatherland's border areas and protecting the mountain regions are the common task of the nation. Specifically, it is the vital task of people in the mountain regions. We should recruit and train youth of the mountain regions for the contingent of the regions' cadres, combatants, Army and security forces as well as for the border defense force.

Part Two of Installment Two; Three

BK1101064590 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0500 GMT 27 Dec 89

["Continuation of second part, and third part" of the Political Bureau's 27 November 1989 resolution on some major policies on socioeconomic development in the mountain regions]

[Text] The decisive factor in ensuring the comprehensive, steady development of the mountain regions is that we must attach importance to party building work. This is aimed at enabling party organizations of localities in the mountain regions to truly manifest the intellect of the local people of all nationalities and represent their legitimate interests and aspirations, as well as to ensure a close link between the party and people, thus making them worthy of being the nucleus that leads the process of socialist construction in the mountain regions and helps build socialism throughout the country.

These viewpoints serve as the basis for defining major policies to carry out socioeconomic development in the mountain regions in the years ahead. This includes the following aspects:

I. It is necessary to establish an economic structure for the mountain regions along the line of developing the commodity economy in close coordination with the delta provinces, and to strive to bring into play the advantages of each area.

1. Agriculture and Forestry

We must solve the problem of grain in the mountain regions according to viewpoints on the commodity economy and the strength of each locality, and eliminate the practice in all areas of producing enough grain only for oneself.

2. Industry and Infrastructure

We must vigorously develop the processing industry—especially the processing of farm and forest products—and small industry and handicrafts in the rural areas, mainly on a small or medium scale to suit the investment capabilities of various business households; preserve and develop all traditional professions of people of various nationalities, such as hand weaving, embroidering, and knitting; expand new branches and trades, especially those using locally available raw materials; and arrange for various families to engage extensively in the preliminary processing of farm or forest products.

Regarding communications and transportation, we must amass investment capital from the central government and localities, satisfactorily arrange for Army and assault youth forces to participate in capital construction, and solicit contributions from all state-run economic units in the areas, along with seeking loans or cooperation from foreign countries to build or upgrade a number of key communications networks and some important economic centers.

As far as electricity is concerned, we must concentrate on supplying power to the people in areas near various hydroelectric power plants while attaching importance to the development of small hydroelectric power stations and other energy projects under the motto that all production and business units and the people work together on a hamlet and village scale or in groups of families.

Regarding water sources, along with investing in the effective exploitation of some large reservoirs and dams, we must amass capital from the localities concerned, as well as from the people, to build small reservoirs to support intensive cultivation and agriculture, develop fishery among the people, and improve the ecology.

3. Trade and Service Activities

To ensure that grain, food, and consumer goods are sufficiently and promptly supplied to the mountain regions and that all of the products turned out by these regions are sold, we must streamline all state-operated trade, home trade, export-import, and service centers and networks; eliminate unnecessary intermediary organizations; expand general business activities; and reorganize all collective trade organizations at many levels and in many sizes.

4. Quickly Apply Advanced Science and Technology to the Mountain Regions

We must continue improving basic survey work and making a general assessment of the natural conditions and resources in the mountain regions and, on that basis, formulate a general plan and long-term and short-term plans for socioeconomic development in these regions, with emphasis on the need to ensure that the ecology is satisfactorily preserved. It is strictly necessary to pay attention to training technical cadres for the mountain regions and to combine cadre training work closely with research on and the application of new techniques.

5. External Economic Relations

Along with encouraging the exploitation of goods for export and satisfactorily organizing the processing of products in many sizes with advanced technology to improve the value of export goods, we must satisfactorily organize and control export and import activities in all border provinces and districts, including the exchange of goods between people on both sides of the border, and enforce policies for the protection of locally made goods and against economic sabotage and smuggling activities by dishonest merchants or state organizations. Mountain localities close to the border can play the role of a bridgehead by serving as general agents for export and import transactions with neighboring countries—strictly in accordance with state regulations.

II. Satisfactorily Adopt Policies on the Multicomponent Economy, Readjust Production Relations, and Renovate Management To Fully Unleash Production Capabilities in the Mountain Regions

1. It is necessary to reorganize unions of corporations and general corporations along the line of eliminating unnecessary intermediary organizations; launch a drive to inspect the use of land by state farms, forestry sites, or units stationed in the mountain regions; and redetermine and rationalize the sizes of land use. Areas of land that are left uncultivated or are not likely to be put into use in the years to come or are being used with poor results by these units must be resolutely returned to the local administration for allocation to the people for production with better results.

We must prepare for and experiment with the transformation of a number of state farms and forestry sites into share-holding enterprises under numerous forms, including cooperation with foreign countries or privately-owned enterprises.

2. With regard to the collective economic sector, all problems must be settled on the principle of true democracy and voluntariness to encourage peasants to join various economic organizations as well as to foster active cooperation in many forms and on many suitable scales between families and between laborers.

3. The Family Economy

In the first stage as well as during the long transitional period, the family economy constitutes a suitable form of developing the commodity economy in the mountain regions. Therefore, special attention should be paid to encouraging and assisting the family economy in order to enable it to develop.

4. The private economy—which operates according to law in the domains of agriculture, forestry, small industry, handicrafts, trade, and service, and plays an important role—constitutes a positive factor in the process of shifting the mountain regions from a natural economy to a commodity economy.

III. Renovating the socioeconomic policies toward the mountain region.

1. As an immediate objective, it is necessary to adjust the tax system regarding agricultural production, small industrial and handicraft production, and goods circulation so as to promote the development of the commodity economy in the mountain region.

2. It is important to shift from the method of giving incentives to the sale of materials in support of production to the method of subsidizing the supply of commodity products. As far as the policy toward social welfare recipients is concerned, direct assistance rather than reimbursements for price differential should be applied.

3. It is necessary to encourage the establishment of industrial, commercial, and service centers at the various townships, prefectures, and communications networks in the mountain region.

4. Regarding life, education, training, cultural and social development, and public healthcare, as an immediate objective it is necessary to concentrate efforts on the following key tasks: a. It is necessary to increase funding for public healthcare service in the mountain region and to guarantee a sufficient supply of medicine for the treatment and prevention of common ailments and epidemics.

b. It is important to work out an incentive policy toward suppliers of essential products for the tribal people's daily life, like salt, lighting oil, medicine, writing paper for students, and other supplies in support of cultural and artistic activities.

c. Measures must be taken to strengthen the mass media and acquire modern equipment like radio cassette recorders, videotape recorders, and cassette tapes, so as to improve the quality of local radio and television programs. Efforts are needed to disseminate the contents of those cultural documents and materials which respond to the needs of our ethnic minority compatriots and which are consistent with their tradition. Attention must be given to using local dialects and writing systems as vehicles for carrying out information and propaganda work among our ethnic minority compatriots.

d. Efforts must be made to renovate the educational system, personnel training, and benefit packages for cadres on work assignment in the mountain region. Steps must be taken to adjust the remuneration policy toward ethnic minority cadres and lowland cadres on work assigment in the mountain region, especially in the highlands and remote areas or on islands.

Part Three: Organization and Guidance of Implementation

1. We must renovate the party leadership of the mountain region and strengthen the organization and improve the quality of the staff organs' cadre contingents to make them competent enough to help the central level in studying and promulgating policies as well as in supervising the organization of implementation of nationality and socioeconomic policies in the mountain region. We must renovate the organizational forms and operational methods of the mass organizations in accordance with reality in the mountain region to strongly motivate these organizations to successfully implement the party's positions and policies.

2. To ensure successful fulfillment of the aforementioned major requirements and policies, the Political Bureau and Secretariat of the party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers should adequately increase the contingent of key cadres of the mountain provinces, including leaders, managers, and scientific and technical workers. The Political Bureau will assign a number of comrades to assume the main responsibility for, and to work out plans for periodic hearing of reports on, the implementation of this resolution. The Council of Ministers will assign one of its deputy chairmen to be permanently in charge of guiding government work in the mountain region. Each of the related sectors should assign one of its leaders to assume responsibility for, and a number of its cadres to be exclusively in charge of, the mountain region's questions. Depending on their needs, the mountain provinces and those provinces and cities which have mountain districts should appoint some members of their provincial people's committees to take exclusive charge of work related to nationalities and to mountainous, remote, and former base areas. Regulations should be adopted to adequately apply the principle of democratic centralism in the people's councils in localities inhabited by many different ethnic minorities so that the people's councils may serve as the real popular organs of power while ensuring national unity. We must consolidate the commune-level administration in conjunction with correctly defining the tasks of the village and hamlet, paying due attention to the role of village and hamlet chiefs in economic and social management and in national and security tasks.

3. The Council of Ministers will guide the concretization and legalization of this resolution's contents for promulgation and implementation as of the first quarter of 1990. In the process of concretization, it is necessary to determine appropriate steps and practical, concrete, and suitable tasks, and to concentrate with the greatest possible efforts on the tasks to be carried out in the immediate future and in the next few years.

4. The party Central Committee Secretariat will guide the various departments of the party in supervising the implementation of this resolution, regularly monitor and review their work, and make timely suggestions and adjustments in the implementation process.

Agriculture, Food Industry Minister Interviewed

BK1101144390 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 2 Jan 90

[Interview with Nguyen Cong Tan, minister of the agriculture and food industry, by station correspondent on changes in agricultural production in 1989—date, place not given]

[Text] [Correspondent] Dear Comrade Minister, the year 1989 was favorable to agricultural production. Despite many natural disasters, the agriculture sector achieved very satisfactory results. Could you assess the most outstanding achievements in agricultural production?

[Nguyen Cong Tan] It is right that agricultural production in 1989 was good despite some difficulties. As yet, some positive changes have been achieved in agriculture. I, for one, think that these changes involved three points: First, the grain production plan norm was overfulfilled. More than 20.5 million tons of grain were likely to be obtained including 18 million or more tons of rice. This is an increase of more than 1 million tons of grain over 1988 production. Secondly, animal husbandry also has developed, especially the herds of pigs, chickens, and other domestic animals. Production volume has increased greatly compared to last year. Long-term industrial crops such as coffee, rubber, pepper, and mulberry have also developed. However, some agricultural products were not as good as those in 1988, namely cane sugar, tobacco, peanuts, and soybean. Among all these changes, the most noteworthy was grain production because this was the first year in which we overfulfilled the plan norms for both area yield and production volume which were set by the National Assembly at the beginning of the year.

[Correspondent] Dear Comrade, what factors do you think led to changes in grain production ?

[Nguyen Cong Tan] Minister: As you all know over the past 2 years, including 1988-89, grain production was in general good due to good harvests. There were 6 good harvests countrywide even though some regions were hit by natural disasters that did not much affect grain production volume. This resulted from many factors that must be carefully analyzed. It is also difficult to separate the effect of each specific factor. Nevertheless, I think that the following factors can be analyzed: First, we must say that the weather in 1988 and 1989 was very favorable. Excluding some localities hit by natural disasters, the weather conditions in other localities, especially the Mekong River Delta, were in general good for three crop seasons in 1989.

As for the north, 1989 could be called the year having the least major natural disasters that affected rice production in the Red River Delta. Apart from the weather conditions there were some subjective factors. The state and the people made additional investment in agriculture in terms of water conservancy, fertilizer, insecticide, engineering, and so forth. The capital invested in agriculture during the year also increased and the supply of agricultural materials to peasants was also better during the year than in previous years. Next was the technological effect, especially the transfer of technical services to peasants, which actually underwent positive changes. Nevertheless, the overall factor was that the systems and policies of our party and state toward agriculture have changed, particularly the rules and policies specified in Resolution No 10 of the Political Bureau.

Among all of these, I only sorted out a few major points of interest involving the sales of products and pricing policy. Except for some specific time, in general, the prices of agricultural products in many localities have now brought about some benefits to peasants. Particularly, the ratio of rice to fertilizer was previously 3 kilos of rice to 1 kilo of fertilizer and is now reduced to 2 kilos of rice to 1 kilo of fertilizer. Moreover, we now can circulate freely agricultural products in the market, enabling producers to sell their products at the most profitable market. The one-price system for grain has also eliminated the need for subsidies, thus creating conditions favorable to grain production and consumption.

[Correspondent] As to the question of food grain, despite the fact that we have enjoyed a bumper crop, peasants have, in general, not been quite happy with that. Could you, Comrade, tell us of the reasons for this?

[Nguyen Cong Tan] This is a major problem that we must think about, especially when we are the ones who should take responsibility before the people over problems relating to state policies toward peasants and agriculture. Recently we have enjoyed a bumper rice crop. Peasants should have been elated with that, but there are factors that have dampened their elation. Peasants are currently reported to have faced these problems: The quantities of food grain available on the market are large while the price of food grain is, at times, low. As food grain is sold freely on the market, its selling price has, in certain localities and at certain moments, been lower than production cost. Meanwhile, peasants have complained about high agricultural production cost. For instance, the relatively high price of electricity used in agriculture has had an impact on farmland irrigation cost. Peasants in various areas have also complained that fertilizer and insecticide are expensive. Therefore, peasants have the feeling that their income earned from grain production is not as good as before. That is why there have been indications of rice growers showing less enthusiasm.

In certain localities, there have been the phenomena of peasants returning part of their contracted land and shifting from rice cultivation to other more profitable crops. Although these are regarded as isolated cases, we must take them into account. As far as I know, in the time to come, the state will, from a macroperspective, have to continue to solve the matters in question and to carefully look into other problems facing peasants to devise measures to promptly deal with the situation and constantly create a true source of enthusiasm for the peasants.

[Correspondent] As you know, Comrade, the Council of Ministers recently presented a report at the Eighth National Assembly's sixth session calling for fulfillment of the 1990 agricultural production target of 21 million metric tons. In your capacity as minister of agriculture, do you, Comrade, have any comment on this target?

[Nguyen Cong Tan] At the recent National Assembly session, the comrade chairman of the Council of Ministers presented before the National Assembly the grain production target of between 21.5-22 million metric tons with rice accounting for more than 19 million metric tons. This target represents a positive factor as it shows a rising trend. This year we have reaped over 22.5 million metric tons of food grain and next year we will strive to attain some 21.5-22 million metric tons. I have the following ideas: First, as to the question of space, we still can further expand our rice areas in certain localities, especially in the Mekong River Delta.

It is necessary to concentrate on planting more between-crop sweet potatoes of different varieties in the Long Xuyen quadrangle, in Dong Thap Muoi, and in the western area of the Hau River. Regarding crop output, the Mekong River Delta still can achieve some increase. Especially, compared with the 1988 grain output, the 1989 target shows an increase of approximately 1 million metric tons. Thus, the target of 21.5-22 million metric tons is attainable. But it is most important that we must solve various problems regarding policies toward peasants, especially the policy on product sale, on agricultural production cost, as well as other problems that may come up in the rural areas.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Comrade.

Papua New Guinea

Government Extends Bougainville Emergency

BK1201081490 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Papua New Guinea's national Parliament has voted overwhelmingly to extend the state of emergency on Bougainville for another 2 months. The Radio Australia correspondent in Port Moresby, Rob Raushky, reports that the extension comes as 400 security force members are entering nine rebel areas to engage militants on the island.

During the debate on the state of emergency extension, the justice minister, Mr Narakobi, said media reports that the government had declared war on the Bougainville rebels were totally wrong. However, he said the military under police direction had been ordered to step up operations on the island with the aim of destroying the Bougainville rebels.

The defense minister, Mr Benais Sabumei, told Parliament quelling the guerrilla war would not be easy and could require a security force presence for many months.

Meanwhile, a Roman Catholic bishop has called for the immediate withdrawal of Papua New Guinea security forces from Bougainville Island and accused the government of trickery. Bishop (Gregory Singkai), head of the church on the island, told REUTER news agency by phone that the security forces should pull out of Bougainville immediately and leave the islanders to work out their own problems. Bishop (Singkai) dismissed as untrue a government claim that Mr Francis Ona, leader of a separatist rebellion on the island, had been killed by his own followers. The bishop claimed that Mr Ona was alive but could not come out of the jungle because the government had placed a $200,000 reward on his head.

Vanuatu

Vanuatu Rejects Diplomatic Ties With Taiwan

BK1201100290 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] The Vanuatu Government has again rejected the establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The prime minister, Father Walter Lini, issued a statement in Port Vila thanking the government's position following a meeting with a representative of the Taiwanese trade mission based in Suva.

Father Lini told the Pacific News Service, PACNEWS, that the representative had continued to pressure the government despite cabinet's decision last year not to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan. He said he was disappointed by the approach taken by the Taiwanese representative who has promised the government development assistance only on condition that Vanuatu establish full diplomatic ties with Taiwan.